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Abstract
My thesis consists of two relatively independent topics. In the first topic I empirically inves-
tigate the factors that determine the presence of the independent coffee shops in the market
of Central London. In the second topic I present a theory of cartel detection. The common
feature of these topics is that I investigate the demand side effects on market structure and
its impact on competition.
To be more specific, in the first topic I build a simple theoretical model of product
differentiation in adjacent markets, based on Mazzeo (2002). For the empirical estimation I
have constructed a unique dataset of coffee shops in Central London. I further manage to
identify differences on demand characteristics across markets by utilizing data on people’s mo-
bility from the tube stations and provide evidence for the existence of product differentiation.
It is found that residential areas with high employment, areas with small business density
and leisure areas increase the profitability of the independent coffee shops. A counterfactual
analysis is also presented.
In the second topic I investigate the cartel’s strategies and likelihood of collusion when
the buyers of the cartel are able to report its existence to the anti-trust authority. I char-
acterize the cartel’s optimal behavior when the buyers are actively monitoring the cartel’s
members and are able to report a cartel to an anti-trust authority1. I present a simple static
model and I show that the likelihood of collusion increases as the willingness of the buyers to
report increases (cost of reporting decreases). Furthermore, it is shown that it is optimal for
an anti-trust authority to decrease the cost of reporting (a trade-off between price reductions
in existing cartels and increased likelihood of cartel formation is identified). Finally, alterna-
tive cartel strategies are also explored in this topic. As for the last point, I show that the
threat of exclusion (foreclosure) and price discrimination are robust strategies that prevent
1This is an element of market structure since the buyers are exogenously informed or assumed that they
actively engage in the cartel’s detection. The next task is to investigate whether competition fails and identify
factors that prevent cartel formation.
xi
buyers from reporting.
xii
Introduction
My thesis is divided into two topics. The first topic includes six chapters and investigates the
factors that determine the exit decision of the independent coffee shops in Central London.
The first chapter of this topic includes an introduction and the literature review. The second
chapter presents the theoretical model. In the third chapter the data is presented and the
relative market is defined. In the fourth chapter the empirical investigation is provided. The
fifth chapter is a concluding chapter but also includes the appendix of the topic. In the last
chapter the bibliography is reported.
The title of the second topic is buyers reporting a cartel. This topic is divided into five
chapters. In the first chapter (chapter 7) I present a detailed introduction of the topic but I
also include the literature review. In the second chapter (chapter 8) I present the theoretical
model and the social welfare implications. In the third chapter (chapter 9) I investigate
alternative cartel mechanisms and characterize the optimal private enforcement strategy. In
the fourth chapter (chapter 10) I conclude and provide the mathematical appendix. In the
last chapter I report the relevant bibliography.
xiii
Topic I: David vs. Goliath; Product
Differentiation and Chain Stores’
effects on Independents
In the first topic I present an empirical investigation of the coffee shops market in Central
London. I utilize a unique dataset of coffee shops in Central London to explore the impor-
tance of chain stores’ behavior towards the presence of independents in the market. A simple
theoretical model that links exit with entry of firms and introduces product differentiation
in concentrated markets is constructed. The model predicts that product differentiation and
market specific demand characteristics are key factors to ensure the survival of the indepen-
dent firms. The high quality dataset addresses common problems in investigating metropoli-
tan areas. The most innovative part of this topic is the use of tube stations’ data to estimate
the importance of demand characteristics to the likelihood of an independent coffee shop to
exit. An additional important finding of the empirical estimation is that within group (inde-
pendents) competition is more important than between groups (chain stores vs. independents)
competition. The intuition for this finding is the existence of product differentiation which
safeguards the independents from the chain stores’ effects. Furthermore, the importance of
product differentiation for the buyers is estimated and, in contrast to most of the literature,
the importance of the demand characteristics in the exit decision of an independent coffee
1
shop is quantified. A counterfactual analysis of city planning policies and their impact on
market concentration is presented.
There are six chapters in this topic. In the first one I discuss my motivation and my
research questions. I also present the most important findings and the framework used. I
then discuss the relevant literature. In the second chapter I present the theoretical model
and in the third chapter I present the data and discuss how I define the relevant market. In
the fourth chapter I present the empirical results and the counterfactual analysis. In the fifth
chapter I conclude the topic and include the relevant appendix. In the last chapter I present
the bibliography used.
2
Chapter 1
David vs. Goliath: Introduction and
Literature Review
In the first chapter I discuss the motivation of this research project. I also present my
research questions and the framework used. In addition I briefly present the data sources
used to identify market specific demand effects and the significance of product differentiation.
The most important findings are also being discussed. Finally, in the last section I present
the relevant literature.
3
1.1 Introduction
In the UK there has been a long discussion1 about the “clone towns” effect2 and whether the
chain stores expansion should be restricted. As lobbyists against chain stores expansion argue,
the cities are being homogenized, the local identity is lost3 and highly concentrated markets
are generated. In the case of coffee shops within Central London sub-markets I observe the
independent firms (independents) enjoying a large market share, on average corresponding
to approximately 60%, which remains constant across time. However, a “clone town” effect
is also present, since in some cases the chain stores dominate with shares larger than 70%4.
Hence, the coffee shops’ industry in Central London is an ideal market to examine the factors
that facilitate the presence of independents in markets and highlight the effects of chain stores’
(hereafter denoted as C-Ss) behavior in the market5.
In chapter 2 I present a simple theoretical model extending Mazzeo’s (2002) model by
introducing an exit stage, as with Bresnahan and Reiss (1994), and introducing neighbourhood
effects, as with Seim (2006). The entry and exit multiplicity issue is tackled by assuming that
the entrants need to bid for their right to enter the market, through an English Auction
setting6. The unique equilibrium defines both the number and the identity of the entrants,
predicting that the most profitable enter. At the exit stage the incentives of the entrants
1See the following websites for illustration http : //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4602953.stm,
http : //www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/28/totnes− costa − coffee− high− street?INTCMP =
SRCH and
http : //www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this− britain/cambridge − beats − exeter − for − title − as −
uks− ultimate− clone− town− 2079476.html.
2Where “clone towns” refers to the dominance of chain stores across city centres’ in UK towns and the
displacement of independents.
3See for example, New Economics Foundation (NEF) website (http :
//www.neweconomics.org/publications/reimagining− the− high− street).
4A map is provided in the appendix with the market shares of subgroups across submarkets in Central
London.
5Investigating if the “clone towns” effect exists in the market of coffee shops.
6This assumption was motivated by the fact that available retail space in Central London are scarce and
the entrants will need to compete, bid against each other in order to enter.
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to replace7 an unprofitable incumbent combined with the assumption that entrants need to
bid for their right to enter, guarantee a unique equilibrium as well. Moreover, the model
provides a link between entrants and incumbents. To be more specific, the model predicts
that displacement and replacement, which rationalize entry in satiated markets, can be an
equilibrium behavior.
Most importantly, this model predicts that product differentiation and market specific
effects will safeguard the independents since it increases their profitability and offsets any cost
advantages that the C-Ss may enjoy. I further identify a non-strategic fringe, independent
incumbents, for which the market structure is given when taking exit decisions. In addition,
the C-Ss behavior does not depend on an individual independent’s probability of exit but
rather on the market structure8. As a consequence, a simple estimation procedure can be
used in order to examine the independent’s likelihood of exit9. Furthermore, the model
developed here can also be applied to other industries characterized by variation on both
entry and exit and a satiated market, where the total number of firms remains unchanged.
Industries where the assumption that entrants need to compete for the right to enter include
the airlines, the shipping and the retail industries in metropolitan areas.
In the empirical estimation the predictions of the theoretical model are tested and in
contrast to most of the existing literature10, with exception to Mazzeo (2002) and Smith
and Gorman (2008), demand factors that influence the market’s profitability are investigated.
A unique panel data-set of 1900 coffee shops covering the period between 2000 to 2009 is
employed including entries and exits of both independents and C-Ss in the coffee shops’ market
7This is also a consequence of the location scarcity assumption.
8In my view, the C-Ss decisions should not be influenced by the behavior of a particular independent but
rather from the overall market structure.
9Notice that an independent entrant is behaving strategically but conditional on entry an independent
incumbent is a non-strategic player. Therefore, a simple exit rule is constructed and estimated through a
random-effects probit model.
10The literature has mainly focused on supply side effects such as sunk and fixed costs, suppliers’ strategic
behavior and economies of scope.
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of Central London. Most importantly, product differentiation is present in the data-set11 as
well as a large variation on the independents’ market shares across Central London subareas.
Data on commuting are included, i.e. on people’s traveling through tube stations, to estimate
the demand characteristics. The latter has been an unexplored source which tackles the
issue of demand effects’ estimation in metropolitan areas. The tube stations’ data reveal the
demand characteristics of each area12. In this topic people’s entry in the morning rush hours
is utilized to estimate the effect of residential employment on the independent’s profitability.
Another variable is constructed to estimate the effect of high business density by using counts
of the number of people that exit a tube station during the morning rush hours13. The third
variable is the number of people that visit a tube station during the weekend. This variable
should capture the demand for product differentiation14. The last variable constructed from
the tube station data is the total number of people that commute through a particular tube
station (both entries and exits). This variable captures the total demand for coffee, while the
previous three variables estimate demand characteristics. Furthermore, if the tube station
data is used properly it can be a source to investigate a wider range of questions (such as
city planning to decrease market concentration15) and a number of other industries within
metropolitan areas.
A random-effects probit model is applied in order to estimate the determinants of the
independent incumbents’ likelihood of exit. Even though the theoretical model is richer
11The independents’ group can be categorized into four different subgroups; coffee shops, delicatessens,
patisseries and sandwich bars. Furthermore, coffee is differentiated as a product as well. Some examples are:
Cappuccino, Latte, Americano, Macchiato, Espresso and filter coffee.
12The demand in Metropolitan areas is mainly defined by the number of people that visit a subarea and
not its local population. As a result benchmark data sources like the local demographics will fail to estimate
the importance of demand.
13Exit from a tube station is someone’s destination and I believe that during these hours the destination of
people is most likely to be their work place.
14It is more likely for people’s destination during the weekend to be leisure areas and I assume that at
leisure areas people are more likely to consume a differentiated coffee product.
15Other uses for the data-set are to investigate the determinants of real estates values in Metropolitan areas,
safety issues in Central London, businesses agglomeration, determinants of city planning and employment in
Metropolitan areas as well as counterfactual analysis.
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in structure, I do not investigate C-Ss entry - exit decisions or the entry decision of the
independents since it is not in the scope of this topic to examine market evolution16. The most
important finding of the empirical investigation is that within groups competition is found to
be more important than between groups suggesting the existence of product differentiation.
It is further shown that in the coffee shops’ market of Central London there is no effect on the
independents’ profitability resulting from the C-Ss’ presence or expansion. It is found that the
independents’ exit depends mainly on the number of independent incumbents and entrants.
Furthermore, the significance of product differentiation on the independents’ profitability is
estimated and specific market demand effects are identified. An additional finding is that an
independent coffee shop located in a leisure area, an area with a small density of businesses
and a residential area with high employment, will be more profitable. The last result suggests
that preferences in different areas determine the structure of the industry.
Finally, a counterfactual analysis, incorporating two scenarios, presents an example of
investigating city planning policies in Metropolitan areas and their effect on market structure
and concentration. In the first scenario we place a uniform (the same across subgroups) cap
on the number of entrants. This scenario was motivated by a planning regulation that took
place in 1996 in the UKs groceries market. We show that under this scenario the number of
independent incumbents will decrease and that the independents will be influenced the most.
In the second scenario we restrict the number of C-Ss entrants to zero if their market shares
are larger than a threshold point. This approach, liquidation of assets or growth constraints,
is usually taken by anti-trust authorities when they trace presence and abuse of market power
in an industry. The second scenario successfully increases the number of independents and
decreases the C-Ss market share.
16The construction of an entry - exit model, a more general model, was necessary since it defines how
entry influences exit in satiated markets. Investigating market evolution in the coffee shops market of Central
London is left for future research.
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1.2 Literature
The theoretical part of this topic builds on Mazzeo (2002). Mazzeo uses the framework
proposed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992). The latter authors provide a
framework to investigate the effect of entry and strategic behavior on market concentration.
Furthermore, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), estimate threshold points required for an additional
competitor to enter. Additionally, Bresnahan and Reiss (1994) investigate the importance of
sunk and fixed costs in their effort to estimate their effects on the intensity of competition.
Their estimation is based on the observation that when entering firms endure sunk costs and
when exiting they face a scrap cost. The approach taken was to compare the exit and entry
thresholds in order to estimate the fixed costs of an industry. In chapter 2 I extend Mazzeo’s
(2002) paper to allow for an exit stage as with Bresnahan and Reiss (1994). In contrast
to both papers, I formally shown that entry and exit is feasible in satiated markets. I also
suggest a new assumption, auction game prior entry (the entrants need to bid for the right
to enter the market), which solves the multiplicity issue.
Mazzeo (2002) is the first researcher that endogenizes the choice of the entrants to locate
themselves in the product space, introducing product differentiation. In a similar paper S.
Greenstein and M. Mazzeo (2006) test the role of product differentiation in entry decisions,
in the telecommunications industry. However, in this model the types of the groups, Chain-
Stores (denoted by C-S) and independents (denoted by y), are predetermined and they may
choose whether to enter heterogeneous markets. Hence, in the chapters of this topic the
type of the entrant is not endogenized but the choice to enter depends on their type in the
product space17. My approach also allows for the investigation of between and within groups
competition effects on the independents’ profitability, as with Mazzeo (2002). Furthermore,
the task to investigate a metropolitan area, Central London, introduces spatial correlation
17This will be further explained in the theoretical model.
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that needs to be tackled, something that is not considered by Mazzeo. In addition and with
respect to product differentiation, Smith and O’Gorman (2008) also consider the importance
of product differentiation when estimating lower and upper bounds of the Radio Industry
fixed costs but they do not aim to identify specific demand market effects and demand taste
parameters18.
Seim’s (2006) work is the first paper which endogenizes entry in adjacent markets.
Adjacent markets are present in this data, markets within Central London, and as a result
Seim’s work will be relevant to the chapters of this topic. Seim’s technique is employed as
a control for spatial correlation in the empirical estimation. However, her theoretical model
generates a nested algorithm which defines the entry rule in adjacent markets is not extended,
since I believe that this should be a straightforward extension of Seim’s model and for the exit
decisions the adjacent markets are not a strategic element19. Notice, though, that the main
difference of the theoretical model chapter of this topic with Seim’s work is the introduction
of both product differentiation and exit stage.
The fact that both entry and exit is investigated, generates a model of market evolution.
There are a number of other papers that also examine market evolution. B. Jovanovic’s (1982)
seminal paper proposes a theory of selection where the most efficient grow and survive. A
similar paper that examines the firms’ life cycle is S. Klepper (1996)20 who presents a model
where product innovation determines the life cycle of the industry. Klepper (2002) empirically
tests this hypothesis. He shows that pre and post experience matters through R&D for firms’
survival, in four distinct industries. Klebber’s model is built on a series of papers that examine
the product innovation hypothesis. See for example, J. M. Utterback and W. J. Abernathy
(1975) and B. Jovanovic and G. M. MacDonald (1994). However, in the coffee shops’ industry
18I show in the empirical estimation chapter that there is a morning hours effect on the profitability of the
independent coffee shops. This suggests the presence of a strong preference to consume coffee in the morning.
19The independent’s do not choose to exit from adjacent market A or B since by definition they are 1 store
firms.
20Who builds on the work of B. Jovanovic (1982).
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and for the time period examined (2000-2009), product innovation is not relevant and as a
result it is not anticipated that it can explain the industry’s evolution. My model differs from
this literature since I examine product differentiation21 as a factor that determines the market
evolution22.
The theoretical chapter of this topic examines replacement and displacement of the
incumbents, which links entry with exit and explains why we observe this behavior in a
satiated market. Displacement, as far as I know, has only been examined in an empirical
study by D. Shapiro and R.S. Khemani (1987) who found evidence that the entrants displace
the incumbents.
In a similar strand of literature, R. Ericson and A. Pakes (1995) examine the dynamics
of industry evolution. The firms are assumed to choose between entry, investment and exit.
These choices are influenced by expectations on the evolution of competition. A number of
papers have enriched this framework. V. Aguirregabiria and P. Mira (2007) propose a frame-
work that allows for multiple equilibria in dynamic discreet games. A. Pakes, M. Ostrovsky
and S. Berry (2007) present an approach to estimate the sunk costs. J. H. Abbring and J.
R. Cambell (2010) extend Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) model by assuming last in, first out
behavior that guarantees a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in order to estimate the sunk
costs. N. Yang (2011) applies a dynamic framework that uses refinements of Markov per-
fect equilibria to overcome multiplicity issues. My theoretical chapter considers both entry
and exit but in contrast to the above papers I abstract from endogeneity and dynamic con-
cerns23. This is mainly because I focus on providing a simple model that introduces product
differentiation and market specific effects, in such a setting (with both entry and exit), in
order to investigate whether demand effects can explain the persistence of independents in
21The availability of differentiated products is defined by the taste parameters of the consumers. In other
words, the demand of differentiated products will allow for the suppliers (firms) to become product differen-
tiated.
22The framework used is also different.
23I further explain this issue in both the theoretical chapter and the empirical chapter of this topic.
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the markets.24. I manage to do that by identifying a non-strategic fringe where endogeneity
(influencing the market structure as well as being influenced by the market structure of the
industry) and dynamic concerns are not an issue.
In the entry in concentrated markets literature there are a number of papers that exam-
ine the effects of C-Ss behavior (entry and strategic behavior) on the market structure of an
industry. This part of the literature is the most relevant to this topic. To be more specific,
O. Toivanen and M. Waterson (2005) are the first, to my knowledge, that present an analysis
of C-Ss strategic behavior. They find support on market learning effects, a result that I wish
to investigate further. They focus entirely on competition within C-Ss rather than between
C-Ss and independents. J. Holmes (2011) and P. Jia (2008) also examine C-Ss. The former
identifies economies of scopes which can explain the growth of a C-S. The latter investigates
the impact of the C-Ss entrance on the independents (this is also the closest paper with re-
spect to the research question examined25) in a model in which firms choose to enter and exit.
However, her model lacks differentiation and abstracts from metropolitan areas.
With respect to the coffee shops’ industry, as far as I know there are only two other
papers that investigate this market; McManus (2007) and D. Durevall (2007). More particu-
larly, McManus examines non-linear pricing and finds evidence that distortions decrease, in
the coffee market, as the willingness of buyers to pay increases. Hence, even though McManus
investigates the market of coffee shops, he uses a different context and investigates a different
research question from the one presented in this topic. Durevall examines the coffee industry
in a different context as well. He investigates whether market power is present in the coffee
shops market in Sweden and whether downstream prices are high.
Finally, the entry and exit literature has mainly abstracted from metropolitan areas.
24Extending the empirical approach to incorporate dynamics will definitely be an improvement, but this is
left for future research.
25She investigates what happens to the independents when a C-S enters while I examine both the C-Ss
effect and the demand effects (and I show that the latter is more significant in the coffee shops market).
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The main reasons for that are either the lack of micro level data of the population or the
nature of demand in these areas. To be more specific, for some industries (retail) the main
bulk of revenues is generated from the population that visits an area (footfall) rather than
the residents of that area. The only exception to this literature is the paper by Bresnahan
and Reiss (1994) who investigate the market of dentists. However, the feasibility of this study
was based on the local attribute of this industry (it is less likely for people to travel a great
distance to visit a dentist, except on rare cases where specialized work is required and in the
case of a “star” dentist). Hence, there was no need to estimate the demand charateristics of
the industry based on footfall variables.
1.3 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the motivation, the research questions, the framework, the data
sources and the literature of the first topic. The motivation comes from a long discussion in UK
about the “clone cities” effect. The research question is why do we observe in some markets
within Central London the C-Ss displacing the independent coffee shops and in some other
markets the fail to do so. Furthermore, I am interested to investigate what determines the exit
decision of the independent coffee shops in Central London. I first, construct a theoretical
model that specifies the exit decision of the independents. The data sources used are the
Yellow and White pages, the tube station data and neighborhood statistics from the Office
of National Statistics. The empirically investigation suggest that product differentiation and
market specific effects are important factors to the independent coffee shops exit decision. A
counterfactual analysis is also presented in this topic.
My research on this topic is relevant to the entry in concentrated markets literature.
To be more specific, I built my theoretical model based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1994) and
Mazzeo (2002). Notice that the most relevant papers are the ones by Toivanen and Waterson
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(2005), Jia (2008) and Holmes (2011) who investigate entry of C-Ss in concentrated markets.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Model
In this chapter a simple model is presented, which introduces replacement and displacement of
the incumbents when product differentiation is present. The model actually extends Mazzeo
(2002) to allow for an exit stage, as with Bresnahan and Reiss (1994), and controls for adjacent
market effects as with Seim (2006). To be more specific, I utilize Bresnahan and Reiss’ (1994)
approach to define a structure on the profit functions for entry and exit. The Bresnahan and
Reiss paper provides an empirical and theoretical framework which allows the estimating of
the fixed costs of an industry. I show that entrants might replace or displace an incumbent.
I also assume location competition prior entry which solves for multiple equilibria. Finally,
the exit decision of an independent coffee shop is characterized.
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Figure 2.1: Timing: David vs Goliath
2.1 Theory
I assume a game of two stages. In the first stage the potential entrants receive their fixed cost
draw, this will be repeated at each time period for the entrants but not for the incumbents.
The entrants then decide where (within a market) and whether to enter. Then the entrants
decide how to enter; either by displacing or replacing an incumbent. In the last case I will
assume that the entrants will need to buy their right to enter the market (this under some
conditions will generate displacement) or buyout the incumbent (replacement). In either
case this will be accomplished through an English auction setting (if there is more than one
potential entrant). In the second stage the incumbent observes the changes on the market;
the number and the identities of the new entrants as well as their highest bid. The incumbent
will then decide whether to accept a bid from the entrants and exit, or exit in any case (even if
the incumbent has not received a bid) or stay in the market. The first two cases will generate
the scrap value for the incumbents which will be denoted as hi
1. The timeline is given in
figure 2.1.
For a more formal definition of the timing please see the appendix. Let me now define the
profit function for the three different states that a firm may encounter. The profit functions
following Bresnahan and Reiss (1994) are:
Entrant: Πi,j,t = d(Z)αi,j,tS(Y )− fi,j,t − Fi,j,t (2.1)
1The scrap value can be positive or negative, since it includes the bid of the entrants (if the incumbent is
replaced) and the cost of shutting down a business.
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Incumbent: Πi,j,t = d(Z)αi,j,tS(Y )− fi,j,t (2.2)
Exit: Πi,j,t = hi,j,t (2.3)
Where subscript i refers to an individual coffee shop, j to the market and t to time.
Where d(Z) is population demographics and αi,j,t is the residual demand parameter, a pa-
rameter that will capture product differentiation by decomposing the market structure into
different subgroups. This is the approach that Mazzeo (2002) uses in the entrants’ profit
function. Furthermore, S(Y ) is for the size of the market, fi,j,t is the fixed cost, Fi,j,t is
for the sunk cost and hi,j,t is the scrap value of the incumbent that exits. Notice that the
main difference between the profit function of the entrant and that of the incumbent is the
existence of the sunk cost (Fi,j,t), a cost that an entrant needs to sunk. Additionally, I have
normalized the marginal cost and set it equal to zero. This assumption was mainly motivated
from B. McManus (2007) finding that the marginal cost of a cup of coffee is approximately
$0.04-$0.06, a negligible amount.
Let me assume two kinds of entrants, a C-S and the independents. The entrants differ
on fixed costs fk, where k ǫ {c − s, y} and y is the notation for the independents. I will
assume that there is only one type of C-Ss in the market2 while there are NI potential
independents. Additionally, it is assumed that the fixed cost of a C-S entrant is generated by
an i.i.d. distribution Φ(f) with support [0,¯fc−s]. On the other hand, it is assumed that the
pool of independent entrants draw each time period a type for their fixed cost from an i.i.d.
distribution Φ(f) with minimum support f¯c−s and maximum f¯y. As a result, the fixed cost
2I am going to show that this assumption will not influence the results. Moreover, I do not separate
the C-Ss into the two categories (other C-Ss and C-Ss) in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
However, extending the model into three subcategories should be straightforward and the results should
remain unchanged as well.
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of the C-S is always going to be smaller than the independents, fc−s < fy. In this way, it is
allowed for the C-S to enjoy a cost advantage. To be more specific, Pr(fy < fc−s) = 0 where
Pr is the notation for probability. Whether this is a result of economies of scope or higher
productivity will not be examined. Notice that Abbring and Cambell (2010) have assumed
that the firms of the industry have only drawn their types at the birth of the industry (no
re-drawing of types) and they solve the equilibrium multiplicity issue at the exit stage and
entry stage by assuming a first in, last out strategy followed by all the firms. However, if
entrants redraw their types then the above strategy cannot hold, as it is not necessarily a first
in, last out result. Furthermore and with respect to the coffee shops data, this assumption
cannot be utilized since I observe both replacement and displacement of incumbents, while
entrants remain in the market3. In addition in the coffee shops market of Central London
it is possible for the fixed costs (which are of immense importance for this industry) of the
entrants to be smaller than the incumbents (thus indicating a redraw of fixed cost type).
In order to capture the demand for differentiated products I am going to assume that
the two types of entrants are faced with a different stream of revenues within a market. To
be more specific, I assume that the C-S will be able to capture a portion of the population
of the market, αc−s ∗ S, while the independents will capture αy ∗ S, where S is for the total
number of buyers (size of the market). The two demand parameters need to sum up to one,
αy + αc−s = 1
4. Notice that αy ∗ S is the aggregate demand share for the independents.
Therefore, that parameter can be decomposed to αi,j,t, as used in equations (2.1) and (2.2),
to capture the residual demand for an independent coffee shop. In other words, the residual
demand, parameter ai,j,t as defined by equation (2.1) and (2.2) belongs to the demand share
of a subgroup (
∑I
i=1 ai,j,t = ay,j,t). Notice that in contrast to Mazzeo (2002) the product dif-
3The first one that should have exited according to Abbring and Cambell (2010) framework.
4Notice that I decompose the incumbents as with P. Jia (2008) and M. Slade (1992). The latter paper, is
the first one to my knowledge that has decomposed the participants of the market in such a way; investigated
C-Ss and independents behavior in a different context (investigating the competition of the retail gasoline
stations).
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Figure 2.2: Entry Decisions
ferentiation is not endogenously decided by the entrants (the entrants cannot decide between
becoming independent or C-S). Therefore, in this model I allow for product differentiation
to exogenously determine the behavior of firms5. However, the entry decision is not endoge-
nized since I assume that the entrants choose the market they enter. To be more specific, in
this model the firms do not choose locations but rather choose markets, given their product
range, which generate the higher stream of revenues. This approach is equivalent to choosing
a market from a finite set of different markets (adjacent markets) given that a firm needs to
locate either left or right in the linear city model. The idea is presented in graph 2.2.
I have fixed the location of independents and C-S and drawn a vertical line across four
different markets. The markets differ with respect to buyers’ preferences6. For example, in
the fourth market there is little demand for the independents but this is not the case in the
third market. Actually an independent will find it more profitable to enter in the third market
than in any other, assuming that fixed costs are unchanged across adjacent markets. At the
same time a C-S might find it more profitable to enter the fourth market. This gives rise to
the first corollary of this chapter.
5Notice that the particular decomposition that I used is motivated by Hotteling’s (1929) seminal paper.
6This can be rationalized as a large set of preferences (from 0-1) where in some markets there are no
individuals at the extremes.
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Corollary 2.1.1 In some cases the most profitable firm is not necessarily the most cost effi-
cient.
As a result, it is not necessary any more for the most cost efficient entrant to enter but
rather the most profitable (higher demand might compensate for the high fixed costs of an
independent). The proof is straightforward. The demand for differentiation states that in
some cases ay,j,t > ac−s,j,t which means that it is possible that Πy,j,t > Πc−s,j,t even though the
C-Ss are more efficient, fy,j,t > fc−s,j,t. Hence, the assumption of product differentiation and
market specific characteristics (markets are different as well) allow for an inefficient, higher
cost, but favoured by demand for differentiation independent to enter the market. To be more
specific, even though the C-Ss have a cost advantage they might be faced at the same time
with relatively lower demand (αc−s < αy) and in some cases the lower demand might induce
the less efficient to outbid (the English auction stage will formally be described later on) the
C-S and enter the market. Hence, I am not constrained by a first in, last out equilibria (where
the most efficient firm enters first as with Abbring and Cambell (2010)) since a less efficient
but more profitable entrant is more likely to enter and survive, in some cases, in the market.
It also follows, in this case, that the most efficient incumbent (C-S) might exit earlier than a
less efficient incumbent (independent), given some demand shocks.
Thus, given their product type, the entrants will rank the markets based on profitability
(decide where to enter) and then will bid for the right to enter the market (decide whether
to enter). A common problem with the entry game (given the choice of the market) is the
issue of multiple equilibria. In order to illustrate the issue, I provide a game similar to the
one presented by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990).
In the above game (see table 2.1) there are two potential entrants, player 1 and 2, with
a > b > 0. If both enter the market they become unprofitable, while if only one enters then
the entrant has positive profits. This game has two Nash Equilibria. This result generates
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Player 2
Enter Stay Out
Player 1 Enter −a,−b a, 0
Stay Out 0, b 0, 0
Table 2.1: Entry Game
an empirical estimation issue. The literature has overcome this issue by identifying in the
data a first mover and as a result redefining the game with a Subgame notion that generates
a unique N.E. and a unique prediction on the identity of the entrant7. However, the data
available cover a time period where the market has been relatively stable (satiated), with
small entry and exit of the C-Ss, and as a result it was not possible to identify a first mover.
On the other hand, it was observed that the retail space in Central London, and generally in
metropolitan areas, is scarce.
Scarcity of retail space can be seen in the second map provided in the appendix. In
the map it can be seen that in the area between Holborn, Covent Garden and Temple tube
stations there are approximately 200 coffee shops. Notice that the walking distance between
Holborn and Covent Garden is between 10-15 minutes. Furthermore, other retail units are
present within this area such as restaurants, pubs and textile retailers. Therefore, I believe
that the scarcity of retail space is a reasonable assumption. As a result of the scarcity issue,
I will assume that the entrants will need to bid (compete) for the right to enter the market
(acquire retail space for their shop). The entrants compete by participating in an English
Auction. Notice that the method of competition (type of auction) is not important but rather
the competition assumption. In other words, by the efficiency result of the auction theory,
the prediction of the identity of the winner (in this case the entrants identity) is unique, i.e.
the most profitable wins the auction.
In order to present the effect of an English Auction to the entry game some further
7See for example Berry (1992) and Toivanen and Waterson (2005).
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simplifying assumptions will be taken and abstract, for the time being, from product differ-
entiation effects. Assume the following rank of fixed costs for the incumbents (denoted as
In) and the entrants (denoted as En): f In1,j < f
In
2,j < ... < f
In
N,j and f
En
1,j < f
En
2,j < ... < f
En
m,j
where n is the number of incumbents, m the number of potential entrants and the numbers
1 to j correspond to markets (ranked from the ones with the smallest value of fixed cost).
As a result the following rank of profitabilities is observed: ΠIn1,j > Π
In
2,j > ... > Π
In
n,j and
ΠEn1,j > Π
En
2,j > ... > Π
En
m,j . Notice, that product differentiation will only re-order firms within
the particular ranking. As a result there will be no adverse effect from introducing product
differentiation.
Let me define B¯In the outside option for an incumbent, the minimum value that makes
the incumbent willing to exit, and B¯En the outside option for the entrant, an option to locate
in the market without buying out (replacing) the incumbent. Intuitively, the last assumption
allows for the entrants to enter the market without always having to replace an incumbent.
The outside option of the entrants is equivalent to entrants acquiring an empty retail space
or acquiring a retail firm which is not specialized in the coffee industry. Similarly the outside
option of the incumbent might be an offer from an interested entrant of another industry
(restaurant or grocery) to acquire the incumbent’s retail space. Assume also that there are
only two profitable entrants with a fixed cost draw smaller than the one of the least profitable
incumbent:
Assumption 1:
ΠInn−1,j,t(n + 1, f
In
n−1) > Π
En
1,j,t(n + 1, f
En
1 ) > Π
En
2,j,t(n+ 1, f
En
2 ) > Π
In
n,j,t(n, f
In
n ) > 0 (2.4)
0 > ΠEn1,j,t(n+ 2, f
En
1 ) > Π
En
2,j,t(n+ 2, f
En
2 ) (2.5)
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The first condition (2.4) states that the two entrants are more profitable than the least
profitable incumbent but less profitable than the next in order incumbent. The second condi-
tion (2.5) states that it is not possible for the entrants to enter the market without displacing
or replacing the incumbent8. The next result presents the equilibrium behavior.
Lemma 2.1.2 Given assumption 1, the most profitable entrant will enter replacing the in-
cumbent with a bid equal to the profit of the second most profitable entrant if the incumbent’s
outside option is low enough.
For the proof please see the appendix. In the above specific case, two entrants are
profitable if only one of them enters the market by replacing an incumbent. The lemma
2.1.2 states that there is a unique equilibrium with the most profitable entrant replacing
the incumbent and the less profitable entrant not entering the market. In this case the
assumption of an English auction assumption solves the multiplicity issues with respect to
the identity of the entrant. Notice that the assumption of an English auction is not essential
for the equilibrium characterization since any auction setting will generate the same prediction
(efficiency result of auction theory), that the most profitable enters.
An issue with the competition prior entry is that it is not feasible to empirically estimate
either the entrant’s sunk costs or the incumbents’ scrap value. This is due to unobservable
issues that cannot be resolved. To be more specific, an econometrician observes the number
of successful entrants but does not observe the last most profitable entrant that failed to
enter which determines the level of sunk cost. This unobservable characteristic is of immense
importance since it defines the sunk cost (highest bid) of the entrant and in some cases
(replacement) the scrap value of the incumbent9. This will be further explained later on.
The purpose of lemma 2.1.2 was to introduce in a simple case the solution for the equi-
8This is a simplifying assumption.
9For given market structure and demand characteristics the sunk cost is not unique since it depends on
the most profitable entrant that failed to enter.
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librium multiplicity problem and to present an example on how exit can be linked with entry.
However, let me now be more formal on how this assumption solves the entry multiplicity
problem.
Proposition 2.1.3 If the entrants compete for the right to enter the market then there is a
unique prediction on the entry game; the most profitable enter.
Proof: Assume M the number of potential entrants and L the number of market oppor-
tunities (number of new entrants that can be sustained in the market). Assume that M > L.
Notice that for other casesM < L andM = L the prediction is unique; everyone enters. Rank
the entrants according to their profitability ΠEn1,j > ... > Π
En
L−1,j > Π
En
L,j > Π
En
L+1,j > ... > Π
En
M,j.
Then examine the L+ 1 and L entrant, by definition ΠEnL,j > Π
En
L+1,j which means that the L
entrant will outbid the L+ 1 and the L+ 1 will be outbidden by any entrant ranked from 1
to L. Therefore, the L+ 1 entrant will not enter the market. The same holds for all entrants
ranked from L+1 to M . Therefore, a unique prediction is that only the most profitable enter
(ranked from 1 to L).
QED
This result is very useful, in this context, since it solves the equilibrium multiplicity issues
as presented by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990). To be more specific, under the assumption of
competition prior entry this will generate a unique NE with the most profitable (but not
necessarily the most efficient, see 2.1.1) entering the market. Furthermore, the assumption of
an English auction can be used in industries like the airlines as well. In the airlines’ industry
the firms need to bid for the right to locate themselves in a hub or operate on a route.
Additionally, this assumption might be relevant to the telecommunications’ industry where a
network will be made available to the highest bidder. Most importantly, the scarcity of retail
space in metropolitan areas suggests that this assumption is a reasonable one. The scarcity
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of locations will enforce the potential entrants to bid for the right to enter the market which
will create an extra sunk cost. Alternatively, this can be thought of as the need of an entrant
to acquire a firm in a metropolitan area in order to enter the market.
D. Levin and J. L. Smith’s (1994) paper investigates entry in auctions. However, they
introduce entry decisions (endogenizing auction participation decisions) to an auction setting
while I introduce auction (competition) prior to the entry game. They show that the efficiency
of the auction is preserved. Hence, the entrant with the highest valuation of the market is
going to win the auction.
The proposition 2.1.3, has presented a new modelling approach to solve the equilibrium
multiplicity issue at the entry game. Additionally, the proposition 2.1.3 suggests that the
entry decision of an individual firm is conditional to the entry decisions of the competitors
(endogeneity of individual entry decision). Furthermore, I have also presented how it is
possible for an incumbent to be replaced.
Let me now be more specific as to the choice of an entrant to replace or displace an
incumbent. Assume that the fixed cost draws are such that there is only one potential entrant
and that the incumbent’s profit becomes negative if the potential entrant enters. Assume as
well that the following conditions hold:
Assumption 2:
ΠEn1,j,t(n, f
En
1 ) > Π
In
n,j,t(n, f
In
n ) > 0 (2.6)
ΠInn−1,j,t(n+ 1, f
In
n−1) > Π
En
1,j,t(n + 1, f
En
1 ) > 0 > Π
In
n,j,t(n+ 1, f
In
n ) (2.7)
The first condition states that the most profitable entrant (from all the potential en-
trants) is more profitable than the least profitable incumbent if the market structure remains
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unchanged. The second condition introduces the second least profitable of the incumbents
(superscript n − 1) and states that the entrant will be profitable even if the least profitable
incumbent (indexed as n) stays in the market. However, this is not the case for the incumbent;
if the entrant enters and the market structure increases by one firm then the least profitable
incumbent will have negative profit.
Lemma 2.1.4 Given assumption 2: If B¯In >B¯En then the incumbent will be displaced. If
B¯In ≤ B¯En then the incumbent will be replaced.
The lemma 2.1.4 explains why we observe in some instances entry and exit in satiated
markets (where the total number of firms remains unchanged across time). To be more
specific, it is possible for the market demand to be stable across time but at the same time
we might observe entry with replacement or displacement (keeping the number of suppliers
constant as well) if the entrants enjoy a better cost draw (or if there is a change on demand
within a market10). These two properties of this model, replacement and displacement, give
rise to a link between entry and exit. To be more specific, the number of the entrants
(through changes to the number of existing firms in the market) and their types (whether the
incumbents will be replaced) influence the decisions of the incumbents to exit. All benchmark
models that investigate entry and exit, predict that entry will generate exit by increasing the
competition and decreasing the profits of the incumbents (through an increase on the number
of competitors, n parameter in the model). While in this case it is predicted that exit can be
generated even if an incumbent is still profitable and this is possible through the replacement
effects.
Furthermore, it is possible that the entrants will neither replace nor displace the incum-
bents. This is the case if the demand increases and can sustain more firms than the current
number of incumbents; when even the least profitable incumbent has positive profit11. The
10i.e. an increase on demand for independent coffee shops and an equivalent decrease on demand for C-Ss.
11In other words and for a given time period and a given market, BIn > BEn, where the BEn corresponds
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last effect suggests, as expected, that demand (market) increase will decrease the likelihood
of exit of the incumbents. In addition, an incumbent might choose to exit if, for example, the
market shrinks even with a lack of new entrants.
In the case where there are more potential entrants than incumbents to exit then the
English auction will define the identity of the entrants (most profitable) and as a result the
incumbents’ scrap value in the case where they are replaced. The intuition is the following: if
there are a number of possible entrants but only one of them can enter the market, otherwise it
is unprofitable, then by the English auction argument the most profitable entrant will bid up
to the point where the second most profitable entrant will not find it profitable to bid higher.
Thus, B1En,j,t = Π
2
En,j,t, where superscript 1 is an identifier for the most profitable entrant
and Π2En,j,t is the profit of the second most profitable entrant. Notice that B
M
En,j,t = f , the
bid will determine the sunk cost (f) and as a result it is specified by the entrants’ behavior,
hence endogenous. Similarly this argument can be used for more entrants and more than 2
incumbents to exit. In all cases the prediction is unique; the most profitable enter or remain
(in the case of replacement, this will be explained later on) in the market.
Let me now proceed to the final stage, the exit decision. First of all, notice that if
replacement is present then there is a unique prediction of the identity of the incumbent
to exit. The main reason for this is the fact that the least profitable incumbent will be
replaced; the entrants have no incentive (in this model at least12) to replace a more profitable
incumbent. However, if there is displacement or if the market demand is declining then there
is a similar equilibrium multiplicity issue, with respect to the identity of the incumbent to
exit, with the entry game. In order to visualize this issue assume the game reported in table
2.2.
In the above game (table 2.2) there are two incumbents that become unprofitable if
to the maximum bid offered by the entrant to replace the incumbent, which in this case is rejected by the
entrant since it chooses to enter through the outside option.
12I assumed that the demand shares are equal between the incumbents.
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Player 2
Exit Stay In
Player 1 Exit 0, 0 0, b
Stay In a, 0 −b,−a
Table 2.2: Exit Game
both stay in the market but they remain profitable if one of them leaves the market. It
is also assumed that one of them is relatively more profitable in any state of the world
(a > b > 0). Therefore, there are two pure strategies N.E. with only one of the incumbents
exiting. However, I will assume that the incumbents use a strategy which specifies that the
least profitable incumbent exits13. This assumption guarantees that the exit decisions are not
influenced by other players’ exit decisions but rather on incumbents’ rank of profitability. In
other words, independently of the decision of the least profitable incumbent the second in
order has a dominant strategy which is always to stay in the market, if only one incumbent
needs to be displaced. At the equilibrium, and by a rational expectations argument, the least
profitable incumbent exits14. This assumption is similar, in concept, to the one taken by J. H.
Abbring and J. R. Cambell (2010)15. Notice that it might not be a necessary assumption in
this case, since the scarcity assumption might guarantee that even if a coffee shop incumbent
is not replaced by a coffee shop entrant it might be replaced by another retailer (i.e. textile
retailer), if we assume that retail space in Central London is never left unoccupied. Therefore,
guaranteeing that the least profitable exit the market. Both of these assumptions (least
profitable exit and scarcity effect on the exit stage) have a common prediction that the least
profitable incumbent exits. This guarantees a unique equilibrium, on the identity of the exit
firm, even if I allow for product differentiation (unique N.E. between groups as well). In other
words, the determinant of the exit decision is the rank of profitability and the type of an
13This is one of the N.E. presented.
14An incumbent’s exit decision will have been influenced by other incumbents’ exit decisions if the players
were employing mixed strategies.
15They assume a first in, last out strategy.
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incumbent, independent or C-S, does not generate multiplicity issues. To conclude, the least
profitable will be replaced or will exit and a unique N.E. will be observed in the markets.
Having a unique solution to both the entry and exit stage guarantees a unique SPNE.
However, the above structure of the game assumes that the incumbents cannot influence
entry. This is indeed the case for the independents, since by assumption they cannot expand
and enter with more stores in the market, but this is not the case with the C-Ss. I am
not formally seeking to establish the C-Ss’ ability to influence both entry and exit but a
simple numerical example of strategic manipulation of exit is provided in the appendix, for
the interested reader.
In this model entry deterrence is possible by the entrants themselves, the entrants deter
other entry instead of incumbents deterring entry (as has usually been investigated by the lit-
erature). The case of entry deterrence, in this model, is a special case of the entry behavior. To
be more specific, assume ΠEn1,j,t(n, f
En
1 ) > Π
In
n−1,j,t(n, f
In
n−1) > Π
En
2,j,t(n, f
En
2 ) > Π
In
n,j,t(n, f
In
n ) > 0
and 0 > ΠEn1,j,t(n + 1, f
En
1 ). In this case the unique N.E. predicts that the least profitable
incumbent is replaced (by the second condition) by the most profitable entrant, assuming
low enough outside scrap value. Hence, this is an efficient result at the same time, since the
most profitable of both entrants and incumbents occupy the market. For more details and a
formal proof please see the appendix. This is a slightly different approach to Sutton’s series of
papers16 and the literature that examines endogenous sunk cost. The main difference is that
the entrant firms are the ones that sunk a cost in order to prevent a less profitable entrant
to enter. Hence, the endogenous cost arises because of competition between entrants rather
than the incumbents’ effort to deter entry.
To sum up, the above model presents a theory where exit depends on entry but not
vice versa for the independents (non-strategic fringe). The entry depends on the type of
the incumbents, the size and the characteristics of the market and whether the entrants can
16See Sutton (1986), Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991).
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generate exit. Entry might also be influenced by incumbents’ deterring effects; an incumbent
by expanding, through opening new stores, can in principle deter entry. However and in the
case of the independents, they are not able in principle to follow this strategy either because of
credit or managerial constraints. Consequently, the independent incumbents cannot influence
entry17. Entry, on the other hand, will influence the independents’ exit decisions since the
entrants are able to acquire (replace) or displace (if they are more profitable) an incumbent.
Notice, as well, that for the entrants that are more profitable than the incumbents it is a
dominating strategy to enter, irrespective of the behavior of the independent incumbents
(exit)18.
I will now focus on the non-strategic fringe of the firms, the independent incumbents.
Their profit functions can be defined as:
Πy,j,t = dj,t(Z)αy,j,t(ownc−s,j,t−1, Entc−s,j,t, owny,j,t−1, Enty,j,t)S(Y )j,t − fy − fy,j (2.8)
Notice that I have introduced the effect of market structure into an independent’s in-
cumbent profit function. This was achieved by assuming that the residual demand, αy,j,t,
depends on the market structure of the industry. To be more specific, ownc−s,j,t−1 refers to
the number of C-Ss incumbents and Entc−s,j,t refers to the number of C-Ss entrants. A similar
notation has been introduced for the independents’ market structure variables, owny,j,t−1 and
Enty,j,t. The market structure elements have been also decomposed to entrants and incum-
bents in order to introduce learning (entrants having a larger impact on the profitability than
17A further justification for the assumption that independents are not able to influence entry is the fact
that in the data set, and for the time period examined, I do not observe independents’ expansion (I do not
observe independents becoming small C-Ss).
18In the case of displacement it is straightforward that the entrant will enter the market. In the case of
replacement it is an equilibrium result for the entrant to enter and the incumbent to exit. Thus, from these
two links we can see that entry is realized if the profitability of the incumbent is positive given the current
structure (before exit is realized).
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incumbents), as proposed by Toivanen and Waterson (2005).
Finally, an incumbent will exit if its outside option is greater than its profit. Hence,
exit will be observed if:
By,j,t ≥ dj,t(Z)αy,j,t(ownc−s,j,t−1, Entc−s,j,t−1, owny,j,t−1, Enty,j,t−1)S(Y )j,t − fy − fy,j
+ ρky + σuy,t (2.9)
Where By,j,t is the outside option (scrap value) of the independents. Notice that the
scrap value depends on time and on the incumbents’ identity, since more profitable incumbents
will require a higher scrap value to exit and by the fact that the entrants’ types are redrawn
every period and the scrap value which depends on the maximum replacement bid changes
on time as a result. The uy,t and the ky is an iid error term normally distributed with mean
zero.
However, since I examine a metropolitan area I need to take into consideration spillover
effects from neighbouring markets. To be more specific, the requirement that entrants will
bid for their right to enter a market guarantees that the most profitable entrant will enter in
the most profitable market. As a result, the entry decision will be influenced by neighbouring
areas. Entry will be influenced by the strength of demand and market structure, as with Seim
(2006)19, but also through the fixed costs draw of the entrant and the local incumbents. Exit
on the other hand depends on local entry, since entrants might displace or replace incumbents,
local demand changes and does not depend on entry - exit, demand and the market structure
of neighbouring (adjacent) markets. For example, an exit of an incumbent in a neighbouring
market will have no impact in a local market. There will be no changes to the intensity of
19Entry decisions should be made in the same manner as with Seim (2006) and as a result this is not further
examined in this topic.
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the competition (with respect to the number of incumbents) in the current market.
I assume that entry in a neighbouring market will not decrease the demand in the local
market. I feel confident that people are choosing places to visit, rather than coffee shops,
and then choose a coffee shop to enjoy their coffee. However, demand or market structure
shocks in one market might influence the adjacent market and for that reason I incorporate
these in the empirical analysis. To be more specific, the existence of a more profitable market
might generate entry in one market by the most profitable entrants. As a result, this will
decrease the entry in the less profitable market and become less likely for an incumbent to
be displaced. Hence, exit should not be directly influenced by the neighbouring markets but
the entry is influenced and is correlated between markets.
In order to control for adjacent markets I will assume that they influence the profit
function, equation (2.9), in a linear manner. Hence, the independent incumbent’s profit
function, the no-strategic fringe, is:
dj,t(Z)αy,j,t(ownc−s,j,t−1, Entc−s,j,t, owny,j,t−1, Enty,j,t)S(Y )j,t − fy − fy,j − By,j,t
+ ρky,t + σuy,j,t + f(own−c−s,t−1, Ent−c−s,t, own−y,t−1, Ent−y,t) < 0 (2.10)
Where f(.) is the function that incorporates the neighbourhood effects. Hence if equa-
tion (2.10) is smaller than zero an independent incumbent will exit while if it is greater than
zero then the independent Incumbent will stay in the market.
Admittedly the approach presented in this chapter can be enriched by introducing dy-
namics20. For example, it is possible for an incumbent to prefer to stay in the market, even
if its profitability becomes negative, in order to be replaced by entrants with a better draw
20Introducing, for example, uncertainty of the entrants on the incumbents’ profitability.
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of fixed costs in the future (or if there is demand changes within the markets21). In the ap-
pendix I present a simple dynamic aspect of the model. It is shown that the expected growth
of demand is the most decisive factor that might postpone a coffee shop’s exit.
2.2 Conclusion
To conclude, in this chapter a simple entry - exit game has been presented. Entry with exit
has been linked through the choice of displacement and replacement. The multiple equilibria
on both exit and entry were tackled by assuming that entrants compete at the entry stage.
It has been shown that for an individual independent incumbent, a non-strategic fringe,
the likelihood of exit will be influenced by the market structure variables (entrants and the
number of incumbents). The market structure variables of other groups, such as the C-Ss,
should influence the independent’s profitability differently from its own variables. This is
mainly because of product differentiation and the shifts through the αy,j,t term. Admittedly
the theoretical model is richer in structure and will allow for empirically investigating the
determinants of market structure in general, investigating both the C-Ss’ entry-exit decision
and the independents’ entry decision. However, this is not in the scope of this topic and is
left for future research. In the empirical estimation I will investigate the determinants of the
presence of independents in the markets through their exit decisions. In the chapter that
follows I present the data set and define the relevant market.
21i.e. an increase on demand for independent coffee shops.
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Chapter 3
Data and Market Definition
In this chapter I present the data gathered for the estimation. I use three main sources: the
White and Yellow pages to identify the coffee shops, counts of people that enter and exit
a tube station to generate variables that capture demand characteristics and finally from
the office of National Statistics (neighbourhood Statistics) to construct local demographic
variables. I also define the relevant market, describe issues and the approach used to resolve
them.
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3.1 Data
I have constructed a unique data-set on coffee shops in central London. As far as I know, this
is one of few data-sets that includes both independents and C-Ss in a particular market (P.
Jia (2008) being the other one). The names, addresses and telephone numbers of the coffee
shops have been individually gathered from the paper formats of the Yellow and White pages
catalogues1. Since either of the sources might suffer from typographic errors across years I
used the address and the telephone numbers to eliminate the possibility that a specific coffee
shop is registered as two different entities. The Yellow pages categorize the firms based on
their activities. This was convenient since it provided the ability to easily identify the coffee
shops. Furthermore, from 2005 the White pages include a categorization of firms based on
their activities as well. As a result I was able to identify some further coffee shops that were
not included in the Yellow pages. Notice that the listings in the White pages are free of charge
in contrast to the ones in Yellow pages.
The Yellow pages (Yell pages UK) can be accessed at the Berkshire Record Office (BRO),
at Reading UK. The BRO archives stores public information about people and businesses.
The main use of the archives is to trace and explore the history of a person. I use the Yellow
pages for Central London from 2000 to 2009. There are five peripheral areas in London but
due to time, budget constraints and the mere size of the project I have chosen to focus only
on Central London.
The White pages (BT’s Phonebook) are accessible by BT’s (British Telecommunication)
archives located in Central London. They have available copies of Central London’s White
pages from 2001 to 2011 (I used up to 2009) in paper format and prior to 2001 in micro fiche.
I have decided to use this series of phonebooks from 2001 and onwards mainly because of the
difficulty of using micro fiche to gather data.
1This was an approach taken by Toivanen and Waterson (2005) as well.
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I have decided to go through both White and Yellow pages as a robustness check of the
sample. The firms are not obliged to register in the Yellow pages (something that is costly for
them) and most importantly they are not obliged to register every year. There were a number
of firms that were registered in one year and then re-registered some years after. This could
create problems when a researcher is interested in identifying the year of entry and the year of
exit. For that reason, I have decided to use the business directory of the White pages where
the telephone numbers of all firms are listed. As a result I have corrected approximately 30%
of the sample (in some cases I had entries and exits in the wrong year).
However, there were two further issues that had to be tackled. The first one is that the
Yellow pages are circulated every June while the White pages are circulated every September
(from 2005 and onwards). I have decided to use the entries from the White pages as the main
source since the Yellow pages is a source that depends on the willingness of the firm to be
registered. In any case, the mismatch2 between the two resources constitutes less than 5% of
the sample. The second issue is with respect to the definition of Central London. The White
pages define Central London in a narrower geographic manner than Yellow pages. I have
decided to follow the White pages definition of Central London and disregard coffee shops
outside this area, in order to maintain consistency across the sample (following the narrowest
definition in order to be in line with both data sources). If otherwise then the coffee shops
outside Central London would have suffered from measurement errors. Furthermore, in the
case where two coffee shops with different names were registered with the same address within
a particular year, I decided to randomly drop one of the two in order to avoid duplicates (this
was a rare case though).
In total more than 1900 coffee shops were gathered. Those included coffee shops that
2For example, there were some cases where entry of a coffee shop appeared in the White pages while there
was no entry in Yellow pages, and vice versa for exit. This is because the White pages cover a longer period
within a year than Yellow pages. In other words entries between the months of June-August will not be
covered by the Yellow pages editions.
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have existed (within the time period of the sample), exited or entered, during 2000-2009 in
Central London. For the reader that is interested in grasping the difference between the size of
Central London’s and London’s area, I provide a in the appendix. The coffee shops were then
geographically mapped using a software freely available on the internet by Batchgeo3. This
website maps the addresses (mainly using the postcodes) to a Google map. It also provides
the user with the geographic coordinates of the inputs. In the case that some addresses were
not matched to a particular point I have manually used the Google map to find the correct
address. In most of such cases the addresses have suffered from a typographic error, which
has been corrected. I then used the geographic coordinates to match the coffee shops to a
particular market; more information will be given in the section that defines the relevant
market, by using the Euclidean distance metric4.
3.1.1 Market Structure
Let me now describe the data available on the number of companies. I have created three
categories: independents, C-Ss and Other C-Ss. The C-Ss are divided in two sub-categories,
large and small scale C-Ss (the last one is named Other C-Ss). The largest firms which are
included in the C-Ss category are Starbucks, Costa Coffee, Coffee Republic and Caffe Nero.
The sub-category of C-Ss with a smaller scale of Chain-Stores (more than 1 coffee shop but
less than 10 in Central London) consists of more than 20 firms. Notice that the four largest
C-Ss had a minimum of 30 coffee shops in Central London. Hence, changing the upper bound
of the Other C-Ss (which was set at 10) will not have any impact on the categorization of the
C-Ss, if the criterion is less than three times the present value of the upper bound. The lower
bound was chosen to be 2 stores in order to identify the non-strategic fringe (the importance
of identifying a non-strategic fringe has been explained in the theoretical chapter of this topic)
3http : //batchgeo.com/
4The Euclidean distance metric has also been used by P. Davis (2006) to define a relevant market.
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of coffee shops which were named as independents. I have decided to decompose the C-Ss into
two subgroups because I believe that the smaller C-Ss might be more aggressively competing
with the independents than the major C-Ss. In other words, the major C-Ss leave no space
for their individual stores (within Central London) to adjust their product availability or
pricing in different sub-markets, while I feel that this might not be the case for the smaller
C-Ss (which have more freedom at individual store level). Some examples of small C-Ss are
Aroma, Seattle Coffee Co, Baggelmania, Apostrophe, Manhattan Coffee Co. and AMT.
As for the independents, it was found in the data that the independents are quite
heterogeneous with respect to their operations. Four different subcategories of independent
coffee shops were identified; patisseries, sandwich bars, delicatessens and coffee shops. The
larger in size subcategory are coffee shops, the second in size are sandwich bars and the smaller
one (less than 100 firms) are patisseries and delicatessens5. In the empirical analysis I do not
separate the different subcategories of independent coffee shops.
As for the major C-Ss, Starbucks is the largest operator with more than 100 coffee shops
in Central London. In 2003 Starbucks had begun a worldwide acquisition of Seattle Coffee
Co which was completed by 2003. As a result the number of Starbucks stores exogenously
increased dramatically within a year; approximately 40 new shops were opened just in Central
London6. With the exception of that year, Starbucks had a small number of coffee shops
opened in Central London afterwards, approximately 5 per year. The second largest player,
Costa Coffee, had mild entry behavior with 2-3 new stores opening each year in Central
London. Moreover, Caffe´ Nero had acquired Aroma in 2002, which generated a similar jump
of the number of new C-Ss but afterwards Caffe´ Nero had 1-2 stores opened every year.
Additionally, it seems that Coffee Republic with approximately 30 coffee shops in Central
5I realize that the subcategories are observed with a measurement error since in most cases the name of
the coffee shop does not reveal its operations and a coffee shop might have chosen to be listed as a coffee shop
rather than another subcategory.
6I control for this effect by introducing time fixed effects.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Coffee Shops and Subgroups Market Shares
London has been a minor player in the industry, with minimum entry and mainly exiting the
market.
The total entry of the C-Ss corresponds to 23% of all entry, the other C-Ss category
corresponds to 18% and the independents to 59%. The average number of C-Ss per market
is 3.91, which corresponds to 23% of the market. The average for other C-Ss is 2.73, which
corresponds to 16% and for the independents is 10.6 which corresponds to 62% of the mar-
ket. This means that the bulk of entry comes from the independents and suggests that the
independents are not displaced or deterred by the C-Ss (since the independents keep entering
the market and they are preserving their large share of the market). The graph (3.1) presents
the market size and the market structure of the industry.
The graphs where constructed by taking the average cross-sectional value per market7
and plotted across the years available. In graph 3.1 we can see that the number of coffee shops
remains relatively unchanged across time, with the only exemption being the years prior to
2003. Most importantly, the right hand side graph suggests that the C-Ss fail to dominate
the market. This can be seen at the right hand side graph of figure 3.1 where the C-Ss enjoy
a small share of the market and it is relatively unchanged across time; the latter holds across
all groups as well. Interestingly, the graphs in figure 3.1 show that the industry is overall
7The market will be defined in the section that follows.
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Figure 3.2: Total Entries and Exits
relatively stable (satiated) and this holds either overall or within groups. However, notice
that within markets it is observed that there are both increasing and decreasing numbers of
coffee shops across time.
Figure 3.3: Entries and Exits by Subgroups Market Shares
The second group of graphs (figure 3.2 and figure 3.3) present a similar case as with the
first group. The total entries are approximately equal to the total exits (on average across
all years). It is also worthwhile to mention that there are cases where exits are larger than
entries within the sample, thus a lot of variation both on entry and exit, but on average it
seems that they cancel out each other. The graphs of the second figure (figure 3.3) show that
both entry and exit are dominated by the independents. The smallest exit rate belongs to
the major C-Ss, the minor (other) C-Ss have approximately the same entry and exit rate.
Most importantly, the entry rate of the independents is higher than their exit rate, suggesting
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that the independents are not being displaced or deterred to enter the market by the C-Ss.
Another notable result is the entry of the C-Ss in 2003 where there is a jump. This jump
is attributed to the Starbucks acquisition of Seattle Coffee Co. Furthermore, it seems that
this aggressive entry had an impact on the group of C-Ss rather on the other groups since
the C-Ss had the smallest growth after 2003. The exit rates are influenced by 2003 as well.
This can be seen in the right hand side of the last group of graphs in figure 3.3. In 2003
there is a jump on the number of exits for both the independents and the major C-Ss. On
average there are 1.77 exits per year per tube station with 13% (or 0.23 per year per station),
attributed to the Chain Stores, 21% (or 0.37 per year per station) to the minor (other) C-Ss
and 66% (or 1.17 per year per station) to the independents. On total there are 18 firms per
market in a year (see the 3.2 graph), on average, with 2 entries per tube station per year and
1.78 exits. More than 50% of these entries and exits are attributed to the independents. The
C-Ss, both major and minor, have a smaller presence in the market and smaller entry and
exit. Summary statistics are provided in the appendix.
In the following graphs I abstract from time variation and focus on cross-sectional vari-
ation8. The 3rd set of graphs (see figure 3.4) present the number of firms per tube station
and the number of the subgroups with respect to the Totaltube9 variable.
The left hand side graph, of the 3.4 figure, suggests that as the traffic of a tube station
increases (more people are visiting it) the number of coffee shops that can be supported
increases. However, it seems that from a point and afterwards it is inconclusive, for log
values of tube traffic greater than 9. This suggests that in tube stations with high traffic
there are other factors that influence the number of firms; strategic interactions might be
one of them or other market characteristics. As for the right hand side graph, it seems that
the previous finding holds within subgroups as well. The number of coffee shops, within
8Hence, each observation corresponds to a tube station with the variables being averaged across time.
9The total number of people that visit the tube station, averaged across time.
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Figure 3.4: Total Firms and Subgroups to Totaltube
subgroups, increases as the traffic increases up to a point and afterwards is inconclusive. A
possible explanation to that finding is that higher traffic areas can sustain a larger number
of coffee shops but from a point and afterwards this is not necessarily the case as it seems
that other forces come in to play. Furthermore, the number of independents seems to remain
high (relative to the other subgroups) irrespectively of the traffic of the tube station. The
failure of the C-Ss to displace the independents can be attributed by the existence of product
differentiation and/or a focus of the C-Ss to within their group competition. Finally, in the
appendix I also provide a set of graphs that present the number of firms and its decomposition
into the subgroups with respect to the geographic size of the area.
3.1.2 Tube Stations Data
In order to estimate the demand characteristics that determine the exit decision of indepen-
dents I propose the use of tube stations’ data, a previously unexplored approach. Notice that
large metropolitan areas have been avoided by the researchers in the past either because of
lack of data or because of the weakness of local population and demographics data to explain
the entry and exit behavior of firms. As for the tube stations’ data, I use this source to proxy
for the size of the market, the demand for differentiated products and other demand charac-
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teristics such as whether an area has a high business density or low unemployment. The tube
stations’ data capture the number of people visiting an area, a measurement of footfall, which
I regard as having a large impact on the profitability of retail firms in metropolitan areas10,11.
The market characteristics can be estimated by utilizing expected traveling behavior of the
commuters. For instance, commuters at the morning rush hours are expected to travel at
their places of occupation and as a result I can identify areas with high business density and
low unemployment.
Tube stations data were kindly provided by Transport for London (TFL). The data
corresponds to the traffic of the tube stations in a typical12 day of the year. The data are
gathered for a particular month (November, which remains the same across my sample) in
a year. The sample provides a typical weekday (average traffic of the counted month) while
Saturday and Sunday is given separately. For the empirical investigation I have merged
Saturday and Sunday13. While I do not have yearly data for these, I feel confident that
cross-sectional and time variation of the tube stations traffic will be well represented.
I have disregarded Tower Gateway station due to lack of data (tube stations entries and
exits). I have also dropped Bank station and Monument because the tube stations data are
merged (not separated from each other). I have decided to drop these two stations because
the distance between them is far enough to consider them as different markets (more than
100ft) and also because the two sites probably attract different groups of population. To be
more specific, the Bank of England’s headquarters are located next to Bank station, which
means that a more business oriented population is attracted to that area, while the north
10Admittedly, similar footfall variables in a different context, using the number of employees of business
centers, have been used by R. Thomadsen (2005).
11The Starbucks state in their website “Given we tend to locate in places with the highest footfall, usually
on high streets and in prime locations, our rents have traditionally been very high, and we have in the past
made decisions during a period of rapid expansion that continue to prove challenging.”, please see http :
//starbucks.co.uk/blog/speech− at− london− chamber − of − commerce/1248
12As defined by the TFL.
13I believe that these days should reflect a measurement for leisure (through travelling) and I cannot think
of a particular reason why they should be categorized individually rather than as a group.
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bank of Thames is very close to the Monument which I assume that is more attractive for
leisure.
Furthermore, a number of tube stations were merged (using coordinates that are half
way along their distance to define a “new” merged tube station), because of the small distance
between them (less than 50ft). The stations are: Aldgate East station merged with Aldgate
station, Great Portland Street station with Regent’s Park, Euston Square station with Warren
Street and Edgware Road station with Edgware (circle) station. I have decided to merge these
stations in order to avoid defining a market too narrowly, this will be made more clearly later
on. I have also dropped Shoreditch and Bermondsey because BT’s Phonebook (White Pages)
does not cover these areas adequately. This leaves me with 47 potential markets.
A series of variables were created, from the tube stations’ data, to capture demand
heterogeneity. To be more specific, I have created a variable for morning rush hours exits
(7-10 am) to capture business density across markets (named as Outrush). It is assumed
that people’s exit (destinations) during the morning rush hours are more likely to be their
work place and as a result these data reveal areas with high business density through a large
number of exits (visits). I expect that areas with high business density will be characterized by
higher propensity to consume but at the same time less taste for differentiation (independents
will be less profitable in these areas). The higher propensity to consume can be explained
as being either more likely to consume coffee while at work at the morning, or that people
who spend most of their time close to their jobs are more likely to stop for a coffee at a store
nearby. Whether the profitability of an independent coffee shop will be positively influenced
by locating in such area or not will be investigated at the empirical estimation chapter.
Another variable constructed from this dataset is the tube stations entries during the
morning rush hours (7-10 am) which is named Inrush. I assume that people entering a
tube station during the morning rush hours are more likely to be residents of an area that
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are employed (leaving an area to commute to their jobs) and as a result it is possible to
characterize residential areas with high employment rates. This variable is meant to capture
residential density and the working population of the area, an inverse deprivation variable14.
The residential areas with high employment numbers should increase the consumption of
coffee and as a result the coffee shops profitability, mainly because of an income effect (given
that the good is normal and not inferior).
A variable, which is the sum of people that visit (exit) the tube station during the
weekend, is also constructed in order to capture whether an area is leisure oriented; this
variable is named Weekend. In the latter variable it is anticipated that an area which is
frequently visited (number of people that exit the tube station) during the weekends is an
area for leisure activities. It is also assumed that in leisure areas people are more interested
in trying a differentiated coffee shop and as a result it is anticipated that the scope for
differentiation can be estimated. A problem with the weekend variable that came to my
attention is that some tube stations exhibited closures during the weekends. In order to
control this problem I have introduced a series of dummy variables15.
The last variable, constructed from these data, is the total number of people that visit
and leave the tube station, named Totaltube. This variable is meant to estimate the impact
of the demand size (number of foot fall) on the independent’s profitability. It is anticipated
that areas with high number of visitors should increase the coffee shops profitability since the
size of the market increases16. Finally, summary statistics for the tube stations’ data can be
found at the table 3.1).
14Since lower employment corresponds to higher unemployment
15The tube station Cannon St. had closures during the weekends across all of my sample. While the
Chancery Lane tube station had closures from 2001 to 2005 and Temple tube station had closures form 2001
to 2003.
16On the other hand, it is always possible that the increased traffic might decrease the probability for a
given commuter to buy coffee, a crowding out effect. This might be the case if there are queue effects, which
decrease the willingness of people to buy coffee. This issue will be addressed in the empirical estimation
chapter.
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Totaltube 470 200th 153th 16.2th 554th
InRush 470 7.17th 10.9th 0.26th 51.1th
OutRush 470 14.5th 9.70th 0.97th 46.4th
Weekend 470 54.6th 44.6th 0th 155th
Table 3.1: Tube Station Variables Summary Statistics
In the tube stations data there are substantial variations across all variables, even though
I just focus on a relatively small area of London (as defined by Central London’s Phone-
books17). For example, Totaltube has a minimum of 16.2th and a maximum of 554th visitors.
The first variable measures the “traffic” of the tube station. The InRush variable (number
of people that leave an area) has a minimum of 0.26th in a year and a maximum of 51.1th.
For the business density variable (Outrush) there is a minimum of 0.97th and a maximum
of 46.4th. Finally, the Weekends variable (which measures the number of people that visit a
tube station during the weekends), has a min of zero and a maximum of 155th. The minimum
is zero mainly because of partial closures of some tube stations18.
3.1.3 Benchmark Variables
I have also gathered variables from sources commonly used by the literature to estimate
demand characteristics. To be more specific, local population characteristics are gathered from
the Lower Layer Super Output Areas (hereafter defined as LLSOA) dataset, of the Office of
National Statistics (ONS). The LLSOA dataset is the smallest geographic definition of Central
London. The variables constructed by this dataset are the percentage of claimant benefits
(this includes claimants from all sources of social benefits19), residential population and the
17A map that presents to area that investigated and the wider area of London is given at the appendix
18If I ignore the tube stations which had closures during the weekends then the min value is 2.398th.
19Breaking this variable into a more specific, for example only unemployment claimants, was not possible
because of data unavailability in most areas for the period prior to 2006.
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demographics on residential population (pensioners). These are the benchmark variables used
by the empirical literature of entry in concentrated markets models to estimate the demand
characteristics of the industry.
A problem with these data is that in most of the cases the tube station is not located
in the centre of the area of interest. Hence, I expect a measurement error for these variables.
A more serious problem is that for some cases the categorization of some areas is not small
enough. For example, there are three tube stations located in the City of London 001D (as
reported by LLSOA). These are the Cannon Street, the Mansion House and the Liverpool
Street tube station20. Overall, there are 6 cases with LLSOA data being assigned to more
than one tube station. As a consequence I anticipate that the LLSOA data will exhibit smaller
across markets variation and might add spatial correlation. In order to control for the latter I
have created a set of dummy variables that are going to be used in the empirical specification.
Another issue with the variables constructed from the LLSOA data is that the date of
publishing the data and the period they cover are different. To be more specific, the claiming
benefits variable (hereafter referred to as Claimben) is measured every August, the housing
variable is measured every March and the population statistics is measured every June. This
is due to the fact that there are different agencies responsible in gathering and publishing the
data statistics.
3.1.4 Data to Construct a Proxy for Fixed Costs
Finally, I have gathered real estate data in order to generate a proxy variable for the fixed
costs of the coffee shops. The fixed cost variable is constructed by collecting the values of
flats sold for each postcode in the dataset. The sources used are the mouseprice.com and
rightmove.com websites. I believe that the average residential property value of an area
20These three tube stations are some of the ones with the smallest distance between them.
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should be positively correlated to the commercial value. Moreover, the commercial value of
the property should mirror the rent that the coffee shop is paying21 and as a result I should
capture the importance of the fixed costs fairly well, since the rent is a major part of the coffee
shops’ fixed costs. However, part of the fixed costs of a coffee shop should be the labor and
the utilities of the store as well, but unfortunately there are no available sources to measure
these factors to my knowledge. In any case, I believe that the rent of a property is the most
important part of the fixed costs.
In order to gather the data for the fixed cost variables, I have used the first three digits
of the postcodes (the number of the digits is either six or seven) from the coffee shops data
(using their addresses) to retrieve data on properties sold per tube station market. The three
digit level generates, most of the time, a satisfactory size of an area. On average a three digit
postcode area corresponds to just a smaller area than the coverage of a tube station (the
market and the area of the tube station will be defined at the market definition section). In
some rare cases though (two cases) a three digit area corresponded to a larger area covering
more than three tube stations. Notice that for more disaggregated data (four or even five
digit level postcodes) will either be too difficult to find sufficient observations, since in most
of the cases there are less than ten properties actually sold for all the years of interest, or
the time needed to gather data, for this control variable, is prohibitively high. The three
digit postcode classification provides me with 66 postcodes in Central London. For these 66
postcodes I have gathered property (flats) sold prices from 2000 to 2010 with 20 observations
per postcode per year, a total of 14,520 observations (approximately). The choice of taking
20 observations per postcode per year covers 100% of the actual properties sold for some areas
21Admittedly it might be the case that the properties might have been bought by the coffee shops in-
stead of being leased. Unfortunately, it was not possible to find any information that states with certainty
whether coffee shops are leasing or buying their property. In the latter case the constructed variable should
fail to capture the importance of fixed costs since the expense of buying a place should be a sunk cost
rather than a fixed cost. However, I feel confident that the majority of the coffee shops are with lease
contracts. See for example the Coffee Republic (major C-S) website, see page 55 in the following website
http : //www.coffeerepublic.co.uk/uploads/files/CR%20Sales%20Brochure.pdf , which suggests that 21%
of the turnover goes for rent payments.
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but for some others it is a small sub-sample.
The Rightmove website, in contrast to the Mouseprice website, provides to the interested
researcher the history of the sold prices of a particular property. Through these websites a
researcher can search for a particular postcode and find all the properties which correspond to
that postcode. For each property the price and the date of the sale appears, if there was any
sale, but unfortunately the number of bedrooms does not. In order to access this information,
the viewer will need to pay a fee. However, even if this fee is paid the number of the searches
that you are able to access is restricted (less than 350 searches can be performed with full
information within a month)22. Hence, I have decided to gather data on properties sold of
less than 1m (deflated across years)23.
The postcodes used to gather data on the fixed cost variable were manually matched to
the tube stations. In most of the cases there were more than one postcode for a particular
tube station. However, some postcodes were either adjacent to, or included a large area of the
tube station, while in some other cases a postcode corresponded to a smaller area of the tube
station market. For that reason two categories have been created. The first one was named
major and the second one minor. The major ones received double the weight of the minor and
as a result I have created a weighted average of the value of flats sold in the tube station area.
For example, assume 3 major and 2 minor be part of a tube station, in this case the major
ones received a 1/4 weight and the minors 1/8, which was multiplied to the corresponding
average value of the postcode. The average property value sold across the entire sample is
372, 123.60 with a standard deviation of 109,218. The summary statistics, which are provided
in the appendix, suggest that there is high variation on the property values sold.
22I have actually paid a fee and found out that I can only access the full information on the sold properties
for a small number of pages.
23Admittedly this can be problematic since it might be the case that an area will have very expensive
properties and as a result I only gather information for small sized properties (i.e. only 1 bedroom flats)
while in other areas (cheaper) I will gather information on all kind of flats (i.e. from 1 to 4 bedroom flats).
However, I believe that this should not be a major issue since the majority of the flats available in Central
London are either 1 or 2 bedroom flats, thus it is more likely to gather information on 1 or 2 bedroom flats.
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I have also constructed two variables to control for data issues of the fixed cost variables.
The first variable controls for the area of South of Thames. This area includes 5 tube stations
for which I had only two postcodes available. Consequently, there is not enough information
to estimate the fixed costs across these five tube stations. The second variable is for tube
stations that have a small number of sold properties. This might create measurement error
since it is more likely to overestimate or underestimate the average property value of an area.
In order to identify the effect of the fixed costs on the profitability of the coffee shops
I will generate two variables from these data. The first one, hereafter named fixcost, will
abstract from time variation. A second variable, fixcosttime, is constructed in order to capture
the time variation of the fixed cost within a coffee shop observation. This variable will be
equal to the average value of the properties sold at a tube station.
The first variable was constructed by applying the average value of the properties sold
(at the particular tube station) from the time that a coffee shops enters to all the periods
that the coffee shop appears in the sample. This variable should capture the time invariant
part of the fixed cost (within a coffee shop observation) since I expect that the initial value of
this variable will play the most significant part on my effort to control for the fixed costs24.
Notice that this variable will exhibit cross sectional variation (different tube stations take
different values of fixed cost) and time variation across coffee shops, since coffee shops enter
in different years within a given market.
Notice that, as I have shown (in the theoretical chapter of this topic), the profit struc-
ture of an entrant will be different from its profits after the first year of existence (profits
as an incumbent) and this is mainly because of the sunk costs, which occur at entry. In
order to avoid this issue I drop observations, from the sample, for the first year of a coffee
shop’s existence. As a result the zero value of the dependent variable is uniquely identified.
24It is a common belief in the industry that the commercial rents are sticky across time. This is mainly
because of a clause on the lease, usually used in such contracts, which specifies that the rent will increase
after a predetermined number of years, and at a predetermined rate.
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Consequently, the fixcost variable will be different from the fixcosttime variable across all
observations. The reason is that the first observation of the fixcosttime, which is the only
observation that is equal at a given year with the observations of fixcost, is lost. An example
is given in the table that follows (table 3.2).
Year ExitIndep Fixcosttime Fixcost
2002 . 301393.8 301393.8
2003 0 307874.7 301393.8
2004 0 329148.7 301393.8
2005 0 335178.9 301393.8
2006 1 364071.2 301393.8
2007 . 395575.5 301393.8
Table 3.2: Fixcosttime vs. Fixcost Example
In the above table I assumed that a coffee shop entered in 2002 and exited in 2006. The
fixcost variable is fixed across time and is equal to 301,393.80, the value which corresponds
to the coffee shop’s entry. Notice that the values presented above are actual data and they
correspond to the average flats sold in Chancery Lane tube station market. The Fixcosttime
variable takes different values across time. In 2002 the value of that variable is the same with
the values of Fixcost across time. However, by the construction of the dependent variable
(ExitIndep) the first observation, for all variables, is dropped25 and as a result the fixcosttime
variable is not equal to the fixcost at any time period. Hence, the fixcosttime should capture
the time variation of the fixed costs.
3.2 Market Definition
It is assumed that the area of tube stations is suitable for defining the market of coffee shops
in Central London. The footfall should be far more important as a driving force for a firm’s
25I drop the first observations of the entrants in order to uniquely identify the zero value of the dependent
variable, as it was shown in the previous paragraphs.
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profitability in a metropolitan area than local population characteristics. Tube stations are
a source of footfall and as a result equally as important. An indication of its importance has
also been presented on the descriptive statistics. The total number of tube stations in Central
London is 56, thus 56 potential markets for coffee shops. Some stations have been disregarded
because of lack of data and some other stations were merged because of the small distance
between them (I cannot assume that these stations are separated markets). Consequently, I
was left with 47 tube stations. The distance between the tube stations will be used to generate
a variable for the geographic size (area) of the tube station. This variable corresponds to the
area of a circle, with the tube station at the centroid and the minimum distance between the
tube stations as the radius. A map of the tube stations in Central London is also provided
in the appendix.
However, complexities are generated when defining the tube stations as the relevant
market. Mainly because the tube stations are not a predetermined relevant market by any
authority. Electoral, economic or census sub categorizations are not useful to estimate demand
characteristics in a metropolitan area since they are either too widely defined and/or there
is no objective way for an authority to count the foot-fall of an area, which I believe plays
an immense part on the profitability of firms in some industries (i.e. retail). For the task of
defining a market I will employ the intuition presented in the literature of market delineation.
This literature suggests demand substitutability, following G. J. Stigler and R. A. Sherwin
(1985), of no overlapping markets as a criterion. However, this requires the researcher to
apply tests on price elasticity from different definitions (broad vs narrow for example) between
geographically different markets, i.e. test for prices co-integration26 or co-movements27. This
is not feasible with these data, since data on prices are not available, and as a result I adopt
26See F. Asche, K. G. Salvanes and F. Steen (1997).
27See Benson, B.L., and M.D. Faminow (1990) for a review.
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Figure 3.5: Uniform Approach
a more intuitive approach that addresses the same issues28 with the delineation literature29.
I present three alternative definitions of a relevant market and argue which is the best
one to use. Notice that, in all cases, I aim to avoid overlapping markets. The first approach,
which is graphically presented in the first figure (see figure 3.5), will be named uniform
approach. The uniform approach is constructed by taking centroid from a tube station with
a radius of half the distance between the two closest tube stations. This is a similar approach
to K. Seim (2006) with an important modification. K. Seim (2006) used circles centered to
a census defined area to capture the intensity of competition, while I use her approach to
define the tube stations market (circles centered at a tube station). Furthermore, there are
econometric issues that cannot be solved by this approach, as I am going to explain later on.
In graph (3.5), I present a hypothetically squared shaped city (the actual shape of the
city is not an issue in this case). In this city I have four tube stations (S1, S2, S3 and S4).
The city has only two underground routes which are depicted by the horizontal and vertical
blue lines. I also present four hypothetical location choices of the coffee shops (1, 2, 3 and
28See for example E.U. Guidance on Relevant markets; the web-page is:
http : //eur − lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = OJ : C : 1997 : 372 : 0005 : 0013 : EN :
PDF.
29P. Davis (2006) paper is faced with similar, but distinct, issues in a different context.
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4). I have used the location of the tube station as the centroid of the blue circles. The
blue circles are constructed based on the minimum distance of the closest neighboring tube
station30. Coffee shops are categorized in a market based on whether they are located within
the area of a circle. This criterion was used in order to avoid overlapping markets. However,
the tube stations which are closest to each other, and more likely to be the busiest stations,
cover the smallest geographic area of the town while the stations that are located in a greater
distance cover a larger geographic area. This is the first inconsistency in this market definition.
Smaller geographical areas correspond to tube stations with higher traffic, this generates a
small market over-representation problem. However, this is an issue that researchers are faced
with any form of data. To be more specific, census area categorization is based on the size of
population rather than the geographic size of an area. Hence, I should also expect in census
data the same inconsistency; greater areas correspond to smaller populations (even within a
city). The researchers have been correcting this issue by introducing a control variable equal
to the geographic area of the market.
The next issue is a misallocation bias. Let me examine point (2); the coffee shop that
corresponds to location 2 is closest to tube station S1 but because of the min distance criterion
it is categorized to market S4. However, a commuter will prefer to use station S1 to reach
point (2). Alternatively, it is more likely for those coffee shops to be influenced by S1 traffic
rather than S4. Hence, I will misallocate coffee shops in larger areas with a higher probability
if I use this approach. An example where this issue fails can be seen through points (1) and
(4), since these two points are correctly allocated to S3 and S4 respectively. This might create
bias in my estimations since smaller areas will be allocated disproportionably a lower number
of coffee shops.
30This approach generates heterogeneously sized markets. I could use as a criterion the minimum distance
between the two nearest tube stations across all of my sample (the min between all the minimum distances).
However, this will result in the market being too narrowly defined and failing to allocate the main mass of the
coffee shops in the markets. To be more specific, the min-min criterion (mentioned in this footnote) results
into a distance of 50 metres around the tube stations (an area just 2500m2) and a total number of 600 coffee
shops being allocated from the 1900 total.
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The next issue is the minimum distance bias. This is depicted from points (1) and (3).
The points (1) and (3) share approximately the same distance between them and their nearest
tube station. However, point (1) is allocated as a coffee shop that belongs to market S3, while
point (3) is not allocated to S2. Notice though that I should expect that point (3) is more
likely to be influenced by station S2, if the assumption that closer tube stations exhibit higher
traffic is true, rather than point (1) from S3. This is a similar bias to the previous one; the
main difference though is that now I exclude point (3) from the estimation because of the
criterion used on defining the market.
Another issue is the treatment of coffee shops within an area, the within markets bias.
To be more specific, a coffee shop that is located at the exit of the tube station will most
likely absorb higher number of commuters than a coffee shop at the boundary of the market.
However, if I do not tackle this problem a coffee shop at the boundary of the market will
be influenced by tube stations’ traffic in the same way as a coffee shop located next to the
station.
Finally, the current definition of the market generates a small sample representation. In
other words, in the first graph (3.5) the observations that are going to be used are the ones
that belong to the blue circles. As a result this method will not capture all the population of
the coffee shops in the metropolitan area.
An alternative approach is to split the metropolitan area into parts that will allocate all
the coffee shop to their nearest tube station. In this case the market is not as well defined as
in the first one. However, it solves the misallocation bias and the small sample representation
(all the coffee shops will be allocated to a market). For example, point (2) now belongs to the
first market (S1) rather than to the fourth market (S4). This is a consequence of re-balancing
the area of closely located tube stations. It also solves for the minimum distance bias; both
(1) and (3) are located in a market. But increases the within markets bias, see point (5). The
54
Figure 3.6: 2nd Approach
graph 3.6 presents this approach.
However, this approach magnifies the small market over-representation problem. In
other words, the tube station that covers the greatest area is the one with potentially the
smallest traffic, tube station S4. As a result this tube station might have an equal number
of coffee shops, in an extreme scenario, even if the majority of the coffee shops lie in a great
distance (which might not be explained by tube stations). Hence, cross sectional variation of
coffee shops, across tube station markets, will be reduced.
The third approach is constructed by using the average distance metric between neigh-
boring tube stations given that the distance is smaller than a threshold value, otherwise I
use the threshold value. The last approach will be adopted for the empirical investigation.
The third approach solves the minimum distance bias, the misallocation bias and, up to a
point, the small sample representation. It also reduces the small market over-representation;
notice that point (5) does not belong to (S4) anymore. The graph 3.7 presents this approach.
Notice that the within market bias will be solved by using appropriate weights. The weight
that is used is the coffee shop’s distance to the tube station (let’s name the distance as Di).
If I divide the demand shifters (in this case tube stations) with the proposed weight then the
coffee shops at a greater distant will be matched with a smaller demand. In this way further
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Figure 3.7: 3rd approach
away coffee shops are less likely to be influenced by the tube stations’ traffic.
The criterion used for this approach is:
min{Di
2
, D¯}
Where Di is the distance between the two neighboring tube stations. I have used
different threshold points for D¯. A consistent approach will be to use a criterion based on
the peoples’ willingness to travel from a tube station to a coffee shop. As a result a criterion
that can be used is 5, 10 minutes and 15 minutes travel on foot. When I use the 15 minutes
criterion 90% of the coffee shops data are included in the sample, while the 10 minutes criterion
generates only 60%31. I have decided to use the 15 minutes criterion in order to cover the
majority of the market. Hence, the small sample representation should not be an issue, since
I almost capture the whole population of coffee shops.
In order to allocate the coffee shops to a market, I have calculated the Euclidean distance
of each coffee shop to all 47 tube stations and then compared these distances to the above
min criterion. Hence, if the Euclidean distance of the coffee shop from a specific tube station
31Notice that a decrease of the radius by 1/3 will decrease the geographic size of the market by more than
50%.
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is smaller or equal than the min criterion then the coffee shop is allocated to that tube station
market, it belongs to the area of the tube station. If this is not the case, then I proceed to
the next tube station and if there is no match to a particular tube station the coffee shop
is dropped from the data32. Notice that this approach has generated a 90% match of coffee
shops to tube stations’ markets (approximately 1700 coffee shops were allocated to the tube
stations’ markets from the 1900 of the sample).
Notice, that the minimum distance between the tube stations is 0.00207 (D¯) with respect
to Euclidean distance metric. This corresponds to a diameter of approximately 1250 ft or a
distance from a tube station of 625 ft. With respect to walking distance, this corresponds to
3.5 min and this is the case if I assume a walking speed of 3 ft per second.
Furthermore, I divide the demand variables, the variables from the tube stations’ data,
with the distance of a particular coffee shop to the tube station (Di) which was allocated.
Under the proposed weight the coffee shops in a greater distant will be matched with a
smaller demand within a tube station. In this way further away coffee shops are less likely to
be influenced by the tube stations’ traffic.
3.3 Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, I believe that the coffee shops industry is a good case study since
both the C-Ss and the independents are present in the sample and there is a high variation
of exit and entry, both across time and markets33. Another interesting feature is the failure
of the C-Ss to displace the independents and dominate the market (globally at least). Most
32The algorithm is the following; for coffee shop ‘j’ calculate Di,j . If Di,j ≤ min{Di2 , D¯} then set 1 to a
tube station ‘i’ dummy variable. Otherwise set it equal to zero. If Di,j is larger than all the min criterion
then drop the coffee shop. To be more specific, I have summed all the tube station dummies and if the sum
for a specific observation equals to zero (no allocation) I drop the observation.
33Other industries, such as the groceries and fast-food, might lack this variation when the market has been
established.
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importantly, coffee shops are highly differentiated and this allows examining the impact of the
C-Ss presence to independents’ profitability. Finally, I have gathered data from tube stations
commuting patterns and data from national statistics to estimate the importance of demand
characteristics. In the next chapter I present the empirical results.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Investigation and
Counterfactual Analysis
In this chapter the empirical investigation and the counterfactual analysis is presented. The
empirical estimation is split in two parts. In the first part I estimate the importance of market
specific effects to the profitability of the independent coffee shops and present evidence for the
existence of product differentiation. I also show that the benchmark variables fail to explain
the demand effects that influence the independents’ exit decision. This is in contrast to the
variables constructed by the tube stations data. In the second section, of this part, I control
for time demand effects. To be more specific, I show that the marginal propensity to consume
coffee in the morning and on weekends are important factors that need to be controlled. I
also show that a coffee shop is relatively more profitable if it is located in an area that is
characterized as leisure (which I attribute as a taste parameter for product differentiation), in
an area that is characterized by high employment with respect to the residential population
and an area that has low business density.
In the second part of this chapter I present two counterfactual excercises. In the first
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case a city planner enforces a maximum cap on the number of new coffee shops in the market.
This has a disproportional effect on the independent coffee shops. I show that the number of
independents decreases within three years. In the second exercise I present a more targeted
policy, where a city planner restricts the number of new C-Ss to zero if the C-Ss enjoy a
market share larger than 40%. This is a more successful policy since it increases the number
of independents by approximately 25% within a year.
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4.1 Empirical Investigation
In this section I will estimate equation (2.10). The variables that are going to be used
in order to control for the demand size of the market are Total Entry and Exit from the
tube station (tube station traffic) or area population (from the benchmark data source) or
both. The Inrush and Outrush variables from the tube stations’ data capture the demand
characteristics of a tube station market, such as employment and business density, while the
Weekend variable categorizes the areas as leisure (scope for product differentiation). These
variables are expected to influence the market share of the independents. However, I cannot
identify these demand characteristic with the variables derived from the benchmark approach,
i.e. pensioners and number of benefit claimants (these two variables identify the spending
power of a representative buyer).
The dependent variable is the probability of an independent to exit. It takes a value of
1 if an independent firm exits, zero if an incumbent remains in the market and is dropped out
of the sample otherwise. As presented by equations 2.1 and 2.2, an entrant and an incumbent
have different profit functions. Hence, if both states of the world (incumbent and entrant)
are equal to zero then I would not uniquely identify the value for zero. Therefore, I have
decided to drop the entrants from the sample. In total there are 4,382 observations from
918 independents (across 9 years). Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapters I
abstract from the exit behavior of the C-Ss for two reasons. Firstly, the C-Ss exit behavior
is exogenously to an independent coffee shops decision to exit (no issue of endogeneity that
needs to be tackled). In addition, C-Ss’ exit is rarely observed and as a result the lack of
variance will generate difficulties on estimating the parameters of interest.
A maximum likelihood estimation is utilized with the dependent variable being the
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independents exit decision. More formally:
lnL(β) =
T∑
t=1
( J∑
j=1
( n∑
i=1
(
Yi,j,t lnΦ(x
′
i,j,tβ) + (1− Yi,j,t) ln
(
1− Φ(x′i,j,tβ)
))))
Where Y is:
Yi,j,t = 1{Y ∗i,j,t<0} =


1 if Y ∗i,j,t < 0 Exit of Independent Incumbent,
0 otherwise.
and:
Y ∗i,j,t = β0 + β1dj,t(Z) + β2αi,j,t + β3S(Y )j,t + β4fj,t + β5f(.)j,t + ui + εi,j,t (4.1)
Notice that Y ∗i,j,t is a reduced form estimation of equation (2.10). Where dj,t(Z) is a
vector of variables that include the demand characteristics of market j in period t, αj,t is the
demand share of individual i (residual demand) which is determined by the market structure
variables (entrants and incumbents for each group). S(Y )j,t is the size of demand in market j
at time period t, fj,t is the fixed cost of an area at period t and f(.) are neighboring variables
to control for spillover effects (from neighboring areas). Finally, εi,j,t and ui is the error term
(random-effects estimation). I assume that the error term is i.i.d. normally distributed with
mean zero and variance one.
Five different specifications of equation (4.1) are presented. In the first one I estimate
equation (4.1) without including demographics of the local population. In the second estima-
tion I incorporate the local demographics but I ignore the tube station variables in order to
compare the results with the benchmark approach. In the third specification I include both
the local population and the tube station variables. In the fourth specification I include some
extra control variables and introduce variables such as demand variables at the neighbour
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markets in order to control for potential spatial correlation between the demand variables. In
the final specification, I use only tube station variables, following the initial assumption that
markets within London are defined solely by their footfall characteristics, and some further
control variables1. I also include nonlinear effects (squared values) of the independents market
structure variables (incumbents and entrants), squared terms of the Other C-Ss incumbents,
exterior demand controls and market structure variables. When I include the squared terms,
I take appropriate corrections on the reported coefficients2. Finally, notice that the tube
market demand variables, the fixed costs variables and the geographic size of the area (Area
variable) have all been divided by 1000.
For the convenience of the reader a list with the names and abbreviations of the variables
is provided in the appendix. Furthermore, the coefficients and the standard errors reported
in the table that follows are the marginal effect ones. Finally, all the specifications are based
on a random-effects model.
Independent Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) Probit (5)
Variables Probability for Probability for Probability for Probability for Probability for
an Independent an Independent an Independent an Independent an Independent
to exit to exit to exit to exit to exit
Fixcost 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00012) (0.00011)
Fixcosttim -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00014
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00013)
Pop - 0.00003 0.00001 0.00002 -
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Pensioners - -0.0001 3.55e-06 -0.00002 -
(0.0001) (0.00011) (0.00011)
Claimben - 0.0001 0.00005 0.00006 -
1These controls include year dummy variables, dummy variables for tube stations that exhibited closures,
dummies for the benchmark variables that correspond to more than one market and a number of dummy
variables that control for tube station that lie at the boundary of the market. The last group of variables are
meant to control for the fact that I don’t have sufficient data to control for neighbouring effects for sub-markets
that lie at the boundary of Central London.
2If the square of variables are included in the estimation then the marginal effect will be calculated as
dy
dx
= ˆbeta0 + 2 ∗ βˆ1 ∗ X¯. Where X¯ is the average value of the variable that its squared term is included, βˆ0 is
the coefficient that corresponds to X and βˆ1 the coefficient that corresponds to X
2. Therefore, I can use the
following transformation to calculate the coefficient of interest: βˆ0 =
dy
dx
− 2 ∗ βˆ1 ∗ X¯ .
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(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Area -0.0001** -0.0004 -0.0001** -0.00008* -0.0011***
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00004)
Weekend -0.0754** - -0.0753*** -0.0744*** -0.0732**
(0.0301) (0.0294) (0.0289) (0.0290)
Inrush -0.0414** - -0.0405** -0.0405** -0.0407**
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0183)
Outrush -0.0643** - -0.0622** -0.0619** -0.0631**
(0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0295) (0.0292)
Totaltube 0.0258** - 0.0257** 0.0255** 0.0252**
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.01021) (0.0101)
L1OwnIndep 0.0008 0.0006 0.01520*** 0.0161*** 0.0129***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0033)
EntryIndep 0.0047 0.0027 0.0224** 0.0218** 0.0255**
(0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0073)
L1OwnCS -0.0005 0.0017 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0025)
EntryCS 0.0001 0.0032 0.0044 0.0042 0.0028
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0062)
L1OwnOther -0.0026 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0035)
EntyOther 0.0180** 0.0180** 0.0147** 0.0144** 0.0161**
(0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0072)
Mark. Str. No No Yes Yes Yes
Var. Squared
Mark. Str. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ext. Comp.
Dem. Ext. No No No Yes Yes
Growth Var No No Yes Yes No
Constant -1.6581*** -1.7793*** -2.1273*** -2.1610*** -2.0496***
(0.2295) (0.2717) (0.3344) (0.3665) (0.2779)
Obs. 4382 4382 4382 4382 4382
Groups 932 932 932 932 932
Sigma u 0.3162 0.3475 0.2274 0.1630 0.1444
Rho 0.0909 0.1078 0.0492 0.0259 0.0204
LogLikel. -1523.8463 -1520.9047 -1506.4388 -1506.0922 -1513.464
yhat 0.108 0.1076 0.1056 0.1059 0.1071
Notes: All the specifications above are based on the random-effects model. In all the specifications I have
included control variables for missing data and year fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in the
parenthesis. The coefficients and the standard errors reported are the ones that correspond to the marginal
effects, with the exception being the one of the constant term.
* Statistically Significant at 10%.
**Statistically Significant at 5%.
***Statistically Significant at 1%
Table 4.1: Estimation Results
64
Likelihood ratio tests were performed in order to test the hypothesis that the tube
station variables (and as a consequence footfall variables more generally) should be used in
the studies of entries and exits in metropolitan areas. The hypothesis that the 2nd specification
better fits the data than the 1st one has been rejected. Moreover, the 3rd specification better
fits the data than either the 1st or the 2nd. The 4th specification better fits the data than
the 2nd but this is not the case with the 1st and the 3rd specification. The last specification
better fits the data than either of the other specifications. As a result I cannot reject the
hypothesis that footfall variables better describe the demand shifts than the benchmark local
demographics variables.
First of all, notice that I have included the square of the independents entry (EntryIndep
squared), the square of the lag of own independent stores (L1OwnIndep squared) and the
square term of the lag of own Other C-Ss (L1OwnOther squared) in the 3rd, 4th and 5th
specification. If I exclude the nonlinear terms then the entry of independents and the lag
number of own stores ceases to be statistically significant (see 1st and 2nd specification). I
have tested, in all specifications, whether these variables should have been excluded from
the specifications and the hypothesis has been rejected. Nonlinear variables for the other
market structure variables do not change any of the results in the reported specifications and
I reject the hypothesis that they should be included. This is a first result in favor of the
existence of product differentiation in this market. A competitive model with homogeneous
firms is rejected. Mainly because the non-linear terms should have the same significant and
the same importance (same coefficient) of the market structure variables across all groups (in
the homogeneous case), this is not the case here.
In all the specifications the entry and the incumbents of the independents increases the
likelihood of exit, they exhibit a significant and positive coefficient. In contrast, the other
market structure variables are statistically insignificant except for the entry of other C-Ss
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(EntryOther). The fact that only entry of smaller C-Ss is significant suggests that there is a
temporary effect of these C-Ss to the profitability of the independents. To be more specific,
an entrant becomes incumbent after its first year of existence and the fact that there is no
significant effect on the other C-Ss incumbents suggests that the profitability of the indepen-
dents is influenced temporarily; it is influenced only the first year of the other C-Ss existence.
Furthermore, notice that individually the independents market structure variables are more
important (exhibit higher coefficient) than any corresponding market structure variable of
the C-Ss groups (compare for example the coefficient of independent entrants with the one of
C-Ss and other C-Ss).
The above results are robust to different specifications and are in favor of product
differentiation. As with respect to the product differentiation, in a homogeneous market it
should be expected that splitting the firms into different subgroups should not rise to different
importance (coefficients) on the independents profitability and they should also be statistically
significant. As it has just been shown this is not the case. This result can be better explained
by the model presented in the theoretical chapter that controls for product differentiation,
where the competition within groups (independents) is more important than the competition
between the groups3. Consequently, the lack of significance and the smaller importance of
the market structure (lag incumbents and entrants) coefficients of the C-Ss and the smaller
C-Ss (this will be further analyzed later on) is an indication that differentiation safeguards
the independents from the C-Ss presence in the markets.
The product differentiation arises from the taste parameters. An econometrician can
infer the existence of product differentiation by the behavior of the firms (revealed preferences
approach), as it has been explained above, through the intensity of competition between
3The second order effect I believe is due to demand spillover effects, as suggested in the theoretical model,
which increase the profitability of the incumbent by a decreasing manner (by increasing the demand within
a subgroup). Alternatively the 2nd order effect might arise from agglomeration (clustering of coffee shops
increases the demand for coffee). In either case I believe that this result is in favor of the initial hypothesis of
existence of product differentiation.
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and within groups. In this study I have tried to implicitly quantify the importance of this
parameter through the weekend variable. The hypothesis is that leisure areas will reflect the
demand for product differentiation and by the weekend variable I can identify the leisure areas
(rank areas to “more” or “less” leisure oriented) and as a result its coefficient is an indirect
measure of the product differentiation parameter. This variable is statistically significant
across all specifications and increases the profitability of the independents (negative sign to
the likelihood of exit). Since this parameter increases the profitability of independents it
protects them from being displaced by the C-Ss (as it has been shown by the theoretical
model). Additionally, it is the most important variable since its coefficient is larger than
the other market demand variables. However, further investigation is needed, which will be
presented at a later stage, since there might be another explanation for the magnitude of this
coefficient. To be more specific, higher demand for coffee during the weekends might be the
driving force which increases the independents profitability.
In the first specification all the tube station variables are statistically significant at 5%.
The only market structure variable that is statistically significant is entry of other C-Ss. To
be more specific, as the number of entrants of small (other) C-Ss increases, the likelihood of
an independent to exit increases. In other words the profitability of the incumbents decreases.
This result is counterintuitive since same group market structure variables do not influence
the likelihood of exit of the independents but a market structure of another group does. As
I am going to show this result is driven by omitted variables bias. Moreover, the geographic
size of the area decreases the likelihood of exit and it is statistically significant at 5% but
the fixed cost variables, even though they have the anticipated impact to the independents
profitability, fail to be significantly important.
In the second specification the benchmark demand variables fail to explain the inde-
pendents likelihood of exit. The fixed cost variables fails to be significant but they have the
anticipated sign. The market structure variables are not statistically significant, except of en-
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try of other C-Ss, and the area becomes insignificant as well. This suggests that benchmark
demand variables fail to explain the profit variation of the coffee shops.
In the third specification, where I have included the benchmark and the tube stations
demand variables, the squared own market structure variables (non-linear effects) and the
market demand growth variables I get results in line with the theoretical predictions of the
theoretical chapter and the corresponding literature of this topic. In this case all the tube
station variables remain statistically significant at 5%, with an exception of the weekends
variable which is significant at 1%. The local demographics are statistically insignificant and
the area is statistically significant at 10% with a negative sign (in larger areas it is more likely
for an incumbent to stay in the market). The fixed cost variables are once again statistically
insignificant. The entry of independents is significant at the 5%, the number of independent
incumbents (lag number of own independent stores) is statistical significant at 1% and they
both influence the likelihood of exit (profitability) positively (negatively), with the former
having a greater impact. The last result is in line with the results of O. Toivanen and M.
Waterson (2005). The squared terms of the own market structure variables (lag number and
entrants of independents) are both significant with a negative sign. This suggests that as the
number of entrants increases, the marginal effect decreases. Moreover, entry by other C-Ss
influences exit positively at a 5% significance level but the sign is smaller than the respective
one of independents.
In the fourth specification I have included some further control variables, the market
demand exterior variables. It can be seen that the variables of my interest remain significant
(tube station variables, market structure variables and their square terms) and the sign of
the coefficients unchanged, suggesting that they are robust to different specifications. The
area and the entry of other C-Ss variables are significant (at 10%), a decrease for the latter
variable compared to the previous specifications. The fixed cost variables are insignificant.
Furthermore, some of the demand exterior variables are significant and I fail to reject the
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hypothesis that they should not be included in the estimation. Finally, the growth variables
are not statistically significant and the hypothesis that they should be incorporated to the
model has been rejected.
In the final specification I have dropped the local demand (benchmark) and the growth
variables4. The area variable is strongly statistically significant, at 1%, and influences neg-
atively the likelihood of exit. The tube stations variables, which capture demand character-
istics, are statistically significant at 5%. The demand shifters, which determine the demand
share of the independents, influence negatively the likelihood of exit (increase the indepen-
dents’ profitability). The size of the tube station influences positively the likelihood of exit
but this is due to the decomposition of the tube stations variables (when I add the tube
stations coefficients it becomes negative and if only Totaltube is used at the probit it exhibits
a negative sign as well). The market structure variables for independents, incumbents and
entrants, are statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively and influence positively the
likelihood of exit. The coefficient of the independent entrants is larger than incumbents sug-
gesting, as with previous specifications, that the learning effect is significant (I have tested
the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal and rejected). The square terms of the
independent entrants and incumbents are statistically significant with negative sign suggest-
ing decreasing returns to their numbers. The only other market structure variable that is
statistically significant, at 5%, is the entry of other C-Ss with a positive sign. This suggests
that smaller C-Ss have a temporary effect on the profitability of the independents, since the
incumbents have no significant effect. A noticeable result is that most of the times (with the
exception of the fixed cost variables) the sign of the coefficients of the statistically significant
variables is robust across all the specifications.
I have also introduced control variables for the tube stations that are located close to
Thames, close to a park and tube stations that operate as train stations as a robustness check.
4This is because previous tests have suggested that they should not be included in the empirical estimation.
69
However, these control variables have been found statistically insignificant and the hypothesis
that should be included in the specifications has been rejected. Therefore, whether a coffee
shop is located at a tube station that supports a train network, or located close in a park or
even located on the banks of the river Thames that will not matter to its profitability.
Finally, the claiming benefit variable is a proxy for an areas deprivation. The total
population of an area is used in the literature as a variable to capture the size of the demand. I
have also included the number of pensioners in an area in order to control for different spending
patterns within age cohorts. However, none of these variables are statistically significant in
either of the specifications used.
Let me now interpret the results of the last specification. The tube stations weekend,
in and out at rush hour variables (Inrush and Outrush) decrease the likelihood of exit. Most
importantly, the weekend out variable has the greater impact from all the other tube station
variables. The marginal effect is -0.0732 and is statistically significant at 5% points. The
weekend out variable is meant to capture the demand for differentiated products since it is
assumed that people at leisure areas are more likely to prefer a differentiated coffee shop.
As for the interpretation of the coefficient, a 10% increase of the number of visitors per
weekend, which corresponds to 5000 people, will increase the profitability of the coffee shops by
approximately 70% on average5. In the next section I will explicitly estimate the importance
of a coffee shop being located at a leisure area and the consumption effect of the weekend (it
is possible that people are more likely to consume coffee at the weekend).
The inrush variable identifies the income effect of local population, since higher traffic
in rush hours means that a larger number of people are working in that area and use the tube
station to commute to their working places. The marginal effect of this variable is -0.0406
and it is statistically significant at a 5% point. Hence, the coefficient suggests that a 10%
5The effect was calculated in the following way. The marginal effect corresponds to a 1% change of the
likelihood of an independent to exit. Therefore, I have calculated the 1 percentage point of the average. In
the above case that will correspond to 500 people.
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increase of employment, an increase by 623, will increase the profitability of an independent
by 40%.
The outrush variable, which measures the number of people that exit a tube station
during the morning rush hours, identifies whether a tube station is located in a high business
density area. I am anticipating that this variable will capture the business density effect on
the independents profitability. To be more specific, I am expecting that it is more likely for
people who travel during the morning rush hours to commute for work and as a result their
destination (exits from the tube) should be their work places. I found that an increase on the
number of exits by a 130 per day (1% increase) increases the profitability of the incumbent
(reduces the likelihood of exit) by 6% (the exact coefficient is -0.0631) and it is statistically
significant at 5% points. Notice that the outrush variable influences the profitability by a
larger magnitude than the inrush variable. Hence, it seems that an independent located at
an area with a high number of visitors (exits from tube stations) will be more profitable
than an independent in a residential area, the difference of the coefficients has also been
found statistically significant. However, it is also likely that during the rush hours people are
consuming more coffee. Notice that I am going to further investigate, in the next section, this
prospect.
The last variable, which measures the actual number of people visiting the tube station,
is positively related to the likelihood of exit. The coefficient is 0.0252 and is statistically
significant at 5%. Notice that the coefficient has a positive sign which means that as the
total traffic of the station increases the likelihood to exit increases (increase of visits - size
of the market - decreases the independents profitability). However, the fact that I am using
three variables that are part of the Totaltube variable means that the variation from the total
tube variable is deducted. As a result when I add all the coefficients of the tube stations
variables, since the existence of the other variables decrease the variation, the effect becomes
negative and is equal to -0.1518. I have also used a specification which includes only the total
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exits and entries from the tube station variable (Totaltube), excluding the other tube station
variables, and the sign was negative and the variable statistically significant, verifying the
intuition presented above. Therefore, increased traffic, which increases the overall number
of people that may buy a cup of coffee, of a tube station increases the profitability of an
incumbent and decreases its probability to exit. Hence, an 1800 overall increase of visits per
week (1% increase of this variable) will increase the independent’s profitability by 15%. Notice
that I have mentioned at a previous stage that there might be two effects, for this variable,
that work in opposite direction. On the one hand, as the number of buyers increases the
aggregate demand should increase, and on the other hand as the number of buyers increases
the likelihood of a commuter to buy a coffee (a decrease on the propensity to consume)
decreases. However, I have found no evidence for the latter effect since second order effects
(which should capture the decrease) of the Totaltube variable are statistically insignificant6.
As for the own market structure variables of independents, both variables are statistical
significant at 1% for the incumbents and 5% for the entrants. The entrants’, which measures
the change to competition, marginal effect is larger than the incumbents (which measures the
intensity of competition of the existing firms). To be more specific, the entrants’ marginal ef-
fect is 0.0255 while the incumbents’ is 0.0129, almost half as much. This suggests the presence
of demand learning effects and verifies the results of Toivanen and Waterson (2005). A new
independent entrant will decrease the profitability of the independent incumbent by almost
2% while if a market has one more independent incumbent store (cross-sectional difference
on the number of independent incumbents) this will decrease the profitability by about 1%.
The only other market structure variable that is statistically significant is the entry of
other C-Ss, at 5%. As mentioned above, the insignificance of the other C-Ss incumbents to
the profitability of the independents suggests that the effect is temporary. The marginal effect
is 0.0161 and is smaller than the independent entrants’ effect (0.0255). This suggests that
6The specification is not presented in this chapter.
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the initial assumption for the existence of differentiation is correct. In addition, the failure of
the other market structure variables can be attributed to the fact that there is differentiation
and that competition within the three groups is more important than competition between
the groups7.
From the control variables that were used the only one that was statistically significant is
the other C-Ss incumbents exterior variable. The marginal effect is 0.0025 and is statistically
significant at 10% points (with s.e. 0.0015)8. I believe that there might two forces that
influence the likelihood of exit through the exterior market structure variables. The first
possible explanation is that an increase in a neighbour’s other C-Ss decreases the overall
demand in the current area. In other words, there is a demand effect from clustering of coffee
shops (agglomeration) in neighboring areas. Secondly, a high number of incumbents in the
neighborhood areas might generate higher entry of coffee shops in the local area, an indirect
effect.
Moreover, the fixed costs variable is statistically significant at 10%, the coefficient has
a positive sign and is equal to 0.0002. Notice that the fixed cost variable has been divided
by 1000 and its average value is 370 approximately. Hence, if the values of the residential
properties increase by 3700 (1% of 370,000) then the fixed costs will decrease the incumbents
profitability, through an increase of fixed costs, by 2%. Notice that the fixed cost variable
that captures the time variation within a coffee shop observation is statistically insignificant
and takes a negative sign. The direction of the sign suggests that fixed costs increases across
time (within a market), in other words it decreases the likelihood of exit of an independent
coffee shop. This is anticipated since increased fixed costs are less likely to influence the
7A possible critique for the lack of C-Ss effects on the independents’ profitability might be the fact that the
C-Ss have mainly entered the market in the years prior 2000. Therefore, the surviving independents as well
the entrants have already gone through a selection process. However, the within and between competition
result should be robust to this argument since all models with homogeneous firms predict that even in the
long run, in this case in a satiated market, there should be no difference from splitting the firms into different
subcategories.
8This is not reported in the table due to space limitations.
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incumbents and more likely to influence the entrants, which means that an incumbent has
a cost advantage and it is less likely to exit compared to the entrants (assuming the same
demand across incumbents and entrants).
Finally, the area variable is significant at 1% and has a negative sign, which is equal to
-0.0001. This means that an increase on the geographic size of the market decreases the like-
lihood of exit of an independent. For the likelihood of exit to decrease it is necessary that the
profits of the incumbent increases. A large area might correspond to higher location dispersity
of the firms or to a larger geographic market (larger demand). However, I believe that the
second scenario should be rejected since local demographic variables, such as population and
benefit claimants, have been found insignificant (they do not influence the profitability of the
independent coffee shops). Consequently, I assert that the area is an indirect measurement
of geographic competition intensity. Notice that the average value of the area is 263,929.50,
which means that if the area increases by 200,0009 (which corresponds to a 447 m2 increase)
the profitability of the independents will increase by 1%. This a relatively small increase
on profits, given that the assumed increase on the geographic area was almost equal to the
average geographic area.
To conclude, the weekends variable which is an estimation of the product differentiation
parameter has been found significant, robust and the most important factor that influences
independents’ incumbents profitability. Furthermore, the fact that within groups competition
is more important, both in size and with respect to statistical significance, also suggests the
importance of product differentiation for the independents survival in the market. Most
importantly, I have shown that demand market specific effects influence the profitability of
an independent coffee shop. Market effects include areas with business density, employment
of residential population and leisure areas. In the next section I re-present some of the
specifications analyzed in order to separate the increased propensity to consume coffee in the
9Notice that in the estimation the fixed costs variables have been divided by 1000
74
morning hours and the weekends from the other variables of interest.
4.2 Identifying the Increased Propensity to Consume
In this section I am going to re-investigate the 1st, the 4th (the 4th will be applied with a small
modification since the benchmark demand variables are dropped) and the 5th specification
but I am going to decompose the weekend, the Inrush and the Outrush variables. I am going
to split each of these three variables into two parts, a part with the lowest percentile of the
variables and a part with the highest percentile. The idea is that the lower percentile of
the variables will capture the increased propensity to consume in the weekends and in the
morning rush hours. The higher part will incorporate both the increased propensity and the
effects of residential, business and leisure areas that might add to the profitability. In other
words, by decomposing the variables the tube stations are ranked to low and high business
density areas for example. The percentile used is the 50%. By using the percentiles I can
identify explicitly the different effects on the independents profitability and most importantly
quantify the importance of product differentiation. This is done by taking the difference of
the coefficients from the decomposed variable. To be more specific, the first variable generates
a coefficient β1 = βc where c is for the increased propensity to consume. While the second
variable will generate a coefficient β2 = βc + βx where x is the effect of interest (i.e. business
density effect). Therefore by taking the difference of β1 and β2 I can identify βx. An example
of how these variables are constructed is given in the figure (4.1).
In figure (4.1) I have decomposed the Outrush variable in two parts. A variable for
the lower 50 percentile which incorporates the number of commuters that exit during the
morning rush hours for tube stations with low exit traffic and zero otherwise. For example, a
tube station with low exit traffic during the morning rush hours is Covent Garden and a tube
station with high traffic is Liverpool Street. Therefore, the lower 50 percentile will take 0.7
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Figure 4.1: Identifying the Increased Propensity to Consume
th. for Covent Garden and zero for Liverpool Street. As for the second variable, it is exactly
the reverse. It will take 46 thousand for Liverpool Street and zero for Covent Garden10.
The identification strategy used has been adopted from the literature that examines price
asymmetries, see for example Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997). Finally, in the next
table I am presenting the result of the revised empirical estimation.
Independent Probit (6) Probit (7) Probit (8)
Variables Probability for Probability for Probability for
an Independent an Independent an Independent
to exit to exit to exit
Fixcost 0.00009 0.00019* 0.00019*
(0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00011)
fixcosttime -0.00017 -0.00013 -0.00013
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011)
Area -0.00008** -0.00011*** -0.00011***
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
WeekendNleis -0.0686** -0.0708** -0.0689**
(0.0324) (0.0318) (0.0316)
WeekendLeis -0.0930*** -0.087*** -0.0887***
(0.0340) (0.0326) (0.0327)
InrushNResid -0.0046 0.0022 -0.0004
(0.0417) (0.0394) (0.0393)
InrushResid -0.0513** -0.0494** -0.0496**
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0200)
OutrsushNBus -0.1866** -0.1528* -0.1665**
(0.0883) (0.081) (0.0835)
OutrsushBus -0.0809** -0.0771** -0.0779**
(0.0339) (0.0327) (0.0327)
10Notice that this approach does not create multi-collinearity since there is no coefficient that can be
multiplied with one of the variables to generate the other one. This is given that I am not incorporating the
initial variable (otherwise I would have created multi-collinearity).
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Totaltube 0.0320*** 0.0301*** 0.0307***
(0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0113)
L1OwnIdep 0.0009 0.0127*** 0.0124***
(0.0011) (0.0033) (0.0032)
EntryIndep 0.0048 0.0247** 0.0254**
(0.0035) (0.0073) (0.0072)
L1OwnCS -0.0007 0.0012 0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0025)
EntryCS -0.00002 0.0027 0.0025
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0062)
L1OwnOther -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034)
EntyOther 0.0177** 0.0162** 0.0162**
(0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0072)
Mark. Str. No Yes Yes
Var. Squared
Mark. Str. Yes Yes Yes
Ext. Comp.
Dem. Ext. No Yes Yes
Var.
Growth Var No Yes No
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Effects
Constant -1.6658*** -1.98118*** -2.0231***
(0.2322) (0.3556) (0.2734)
Obs. 4382 4382 4382
Groups 932 932 932
Sigma u 0.3324 0.1931 0.1848
Rho 0.0995 0.0359 0.0330
LogLikel. -1521.0909 -1511.4107 -1511.6705
yhat 0.1059 0.1053 0.1053
Notes: All the specifications above are based on the random-effects model. In
all the specifications I have included control variables for missing data and
year fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. The
coefficients and the standard errors reported are the ones that correspond to
the marginal effects, with the exception being the one of the constant term.
*Statistically Significant at 10%.
**Statistically Significant at 5%.
***Statistically Significant at 1%
Table 4.2: Estimation Results, Identifying Increased Propensity to Consume
Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the last specification (8) is the one that better fits
the data. Furthermore, independently of the specification used the tube station variables
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are robust since they are both statistically significant at either 1% or 5% and the sign of
their coefficients remains unchanged. The market structure variables remain unchanged as
with the previous specifications, see table (4.1). Both the independent incumbents and their
entrants are significant with a positive sign, when I include their squared terms. Additionally,
the entrant’s coefficient is larger than the incumbent’s coefficient, verifying the presence of
learning effects in the markets. The other market structure variable that matters is the entry
of other C-Ss (smaller C-Ss) which influences the independents’ exit positively. However,
the independents’ entrants coefficient is larger than the corresponding one of the other C-
Ss. The latter suggests, combined with the fact that the rest market structure variables
fail to be significant, the existence of product differentiation (within groups competition is
more important than between groups). The fixed cost variable is significant in the last two
specifications and has the expected sign but the variable that captures fixed cost time changes
is insignificant. This suggests that the independents’ exit behavior is mainly driven by demand
shifts and the intensity of competition. Finally, the area is significant at either 5% or 1% and
the sign is negative.
The results that I am going to present are the ones from the final specification (8). As
expected the weekend variable in areas with a high number of visitors (named WeekendLeis)
exhibits a larger coefficient (in absolute values) than the weekend variable with low number
of visitors (0.0887 0 vs. 0.0689). The latter coefficient is meant to capture the increased
propensity to consume in the weekends while the former incorporates both the propensity to
consume and the leisure effect (the product differentiation taste parameter). As a result an
estimate value of the product differentiation effect is -0.0198, which is computed by taking
the difference between the two coefficients. This means that an increase of traffic (visitors)
by 500 in leisure areas at the weekends will increase the profitability of the independents by
2% more than other areas (after controlling for the increased propensity to consume coffee at
the weekends).
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Most surprisingly, an independent coffee shop located at an area with high business
density is less profitable than in areas with low business density (OutrsushNBus vs. Outr-
sushBus). To be more specific, areas with low number of visitors during the morning rush
hours takes a sign of -0.1665 (OutrsushNBus), while areas of high number of visitors during
the morning hours take a sign of -0.0779. This indicates that the independent coffee shops
which are located in areas with a high cluster of business are less profitable by 0.0886%. This
also suggests that the C-Ss are actually enjoying a competitive advantage and the demand
of these areas favours the C-Ss. Furthermore, the coefficient of the OutrsushNBus variable
should capture the increased propensity to consume in the morning hours for people that visit
an area (exit a tube station).
Finally, the number of people that leave a tube station in non-residential areas (Inrush-
NResid) fail to be significant and as a result a comparison with the corresponding variable
in residential areas (InrushResid) might be misleading. As a result, I cannot identify the
increased propensity to consume parameter (in the morning hours for people that leave their
area) and the effect of increased employment of the residents of an area.
In the appendix I present another specification which tests whether the demand shares
change across years. It is shown that demand shocks, shifts in taste, are present. Most
importantly, all the above results are robust to the new specification as well.
To conclude, in this section I have presented an approach to quantify the importance
of product differentiation on the profitability of the independent coffee shops. I have shown
that the independents located in areas with high business density are less profitable than
other locations. I have found that low deprivation areas increases independent coffee shops
profitability and that the learning effects remain robust. Therefore, market specific demand
effects are an important determinant of independent coffee shops.
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4.3 Counterfactual Analysis
The purpose of this section is to investigate the impact of two city planning scenarios on
the presence of independents’ in Central London. Planning regulation has been proposed,
by lobbyists against the growth of C-Ss, in order to protect small independent stores. The
lobbyists have been using the term “Clone Town”, which refers to the phenomenon that high-
street local shops are being replaced or displaced by C-Ss and as a result the town centres
are becoming more homogeneous (a town losing its uniqueness). An independent think-tank,
New Economics Foundation (NEF), has found that in 2010 41% of the English towns are
clones11. Arguments against regulation include cost efficiencies and productivity, these are
characteristics that favour C-Ss. While independents are thought to pay higher wages, in
some cases they employ more people, and the revenues generated are re-invested in the local
community thus promoting growth within those areas. A paper that examines some of these
factors is F. Schivardi and E. Viviano (2011) for Italy and papers that focus on the groceries
sector in UK are R. Griffith and H. Harmgart (2008) and R. Sadun (2008).
In 1996 a regulation was imposed on the groceries sector in UK12 which introduced entry
constraints on large stores (greater than 2500 m2) located at the outskirts of a town in order
to restrain city centre “draining” effects. R. Sadun (2008) found that there was no effect on
local employment from the introduction of this regulation.
The above regulation cannot be applied in the coffee shops market as an intervention
mechanism since the coffee shops operate units smaller than 2500 m2. Furthermore, in order
to open a coffee shop in UK, the owner will need to hold an A3 permit on the premises of the
establishment. The A3 permit is required by both restaurants and coffee shops. This permit
requires that the coffee shops satisfy some food safety management procedures, HACCP13.
11http : //www.neweconomics.org/publications/reimagining− the− high− street
12Planning Policy Guideline 6 (PPG6) in 1996.
13See the following: http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/publication/hygieneguidebooklet.pdf.
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Besides that basic requirement, coffee shop licensing is mainly decentralized and local author-
ities have the freedom to set some further standards or impose further licence requirements.
For example, the London Borough of Camden requires a licence for a firm to place tables and
chairs on the pavement14. However, it seems that the licensing requirements do not impose a
barrier for new coffee shops to enter.
In the spirit of the 1996 regulation I impose a cap on the maximum number of coffee
shops that can enter Central London, in the first counterfactual analysis.
4.3.1 Maximum Cap on Entry
I assume the introduction of a centralized policy which places a maximum number of entrants
per subgroups at a given area. The maximum number is set to 2 per subgroup, thus a
maximum entry of six coffee shops per year per tube station. I have introduced this shock
(policy) in 2007 in order to compare the counterfactual results with the actual behavior of
the independent coffee shops (actual data). Notice that the maximum entry of independents
is 4 during this period (2007-2009), while for the C-Ss it is 2 and for the other C-Ss is 3. As
a result this counterfactual analysis will mainly influence the independents entry behavior.
In order to simulate the response of the independent incumbents, after this shock, I
have used the coefficients estimated from the panel probit and their error terms15. In a sense
I have assumed that the unobservable terms, which are included in the error term, remain
unaffected by the introduction of this shock. I have simulated in each period the probability
of exit, summing over the coefficients which were multiplied by the unchanged variables and
multiplied by the new Entry variables and then added the true error term. To be more
specific, the equation that generates the prediction for a given year is (ignoring the time and
14See the following: http://camden.gov.uk/ccm/content/business/business-regulations/licensing-and-
permits/licences
/entertainment-related-licences/tables-and-chairs-licence.en
15From the previous section.
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Figure 4.2: Average Number of Independents per tube station
space subscripts for easiness):
yˆ = bˆ0 + bˆ1Xtrue + bˆ2XNew + εˆ
Where yˆ are the predicted values (new values), the subscript “true” is for the true
variables, “New” for the variables that are affected by the counterfactual analysis and εˆ is for
the error term which was generated by the panel probit with the true data. Notice that for
each year after 2007 I have recalculated the number of incumbents per subgroups (since the
shock had an impact on the number of incumbents). I have then generated the average exit
rate and multiplied that with the number of incumbents that had not exited in the previous
period, according to the counterfactual result, but had exited according to the true data.
This approach allows me to calculate the number of exits for a part of the sample where I
lack estimated errors16. The next figure (4.2) plots the results of the exercise with respect to
the number of independent coffee shops.
16I implicitly assume that the error term for this category of coffee shops is not different from all the others.
Furthermore, by multiplying with the estimated exit rate I have assumed that these coffee shops (new entrants
that become incumbents) will behave in the same manner with all the other incumbents in the market.
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On the horizontal axis I have plotted the time period of the data and on the vertical
the average number of independents per tube station. The red dashed line corresponds to
the counterfactual number of independents per tube station (OwnindeppureNEW; this is
the number of independents on average) and the black discontinuous line refers to the actual
number of independents (Ownindeppure). Interestingly, the number of independents increases
immediately after the shock (introduction of regulation) but in the following year it decreases
to a point that reaches a lower level than the pre-shock period. Thus, the intervention fails to
safeguard or even increase the number of the independents in the market since after 3 years
the number of independents decreases by approximately 14% ((11-9.5)/11). Notice that this
holds even though the number of exits has decreased17. It seems that the decrease on the
number of exits is not enough to compensate for the decrease on the number of entries. The
last result, supports the displacing and replacing ideas presented in the theoretical chapter
of this topic. This is mainly because the least profitable and most inefficient incumbents are
forced to exit from the market at an earlier stage. Consequently, the counterfactual results
suggest that a policy of a maximum cap on the number of entrants will definitely generate a
loss of independents.
Furthermore, notice that the entry of C-Ss and other C-Ss is largely unaffected by this
policy and that the exit rates of these groups are lower than the exit rates of the independents.
However, the entry decision of the C-Ss (small and large) is not endogenized. As a result I
am expecting that the effects on independents from the presented policy will be smaller than
the actual (real) effects from implementing this policy. To be more specific, by restricting the
entry of independents I am expecting an increase on the entry of the C-S (both small and
large) while in this scenario I assume that their entry remains unchanged. This will increase
the likelihood of exit (more exits) and as a result decrease the number of independents even
further. For example, assume a market with 4 independent entrants, 1 C-Ss and 0 other
17The entry variables increases exit thus by placing a cap the exit rates decreases.
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C-Ss. By placing a cap I am imposing 2 independent entrants, 1 C-S and 0 (zero) other C-Ss.
However, it should be expected that the C-Ss will respond to this policy by increasing their
entry, for example 2 C-Ss instead of 1. As a result, I underestimate the effects on the number
of independents in the market of Central London. However, the analysis is useful since it
provides a maximum bound (independents are going to be necessarily smaller in number) on
the number of independent coffee shops.
To conclude, this policy can be adopted by a planning authority in order to promote
growth in other retail sectors, within a metropolitan area, that have been underdeveloped (for
example efforts to establish a shopping centre). However, in the case of coffee shops this policy
will largely benefit the C-Ss and the decrease of the coffee shops will be disproportionately
against the independents, thus a loss on product differentiation. The driving force of this result
is that the independents have a higher entry and exit rate. This means that by restricting
entry the independents’ exit rate remains relatively high and the net result is a decrease on the
number of independents. In other words, a selection process is constrained, a process which
guarantees that the less profitable independent incumbents will be displaced or replaced by a
more profitable independent and as a result the entry will cancel out exit. The next section
presents a counterfactual exercise where the cap is more targeted.
4.3.2 Targeted Maximum Cap on Entry
In the second scenario I impose a zero entry of C-Ss and other C-Ss if their joint market share
is larger than 40%. This exercise has been motivated by antitrust authority’s policies which
are implemented when there is evidence of presence and abuse of market power. The main
difference is that I do not impose immediate liquidation of C-Ss assets (unlike what an anti-
trust authority would have done) in areas with market power but rather an intervention in
order to safeguard the presence of the independents and promote their entry in these markets.
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Figure 4.3: Average Number of Independents per tube station Scenario 2
This policy is more targeted compared to the previous case. In this scenario I focus
on how to decrease C-Ss market power (target the C-Ss) while in the previous scenario a
local community planner is restricting the total number of coffee shops. The counterfactual
approach is exactly the same as with the previous one (generating predicted values within
the sample and comparing them with the actual behavior). Thus, the approach will not be
presented in this section. The results of this exercise are presented in the figure (4.3).
The vertical axis corresponds to the number of coffee shops and the horizontal to the
time period. The black discontinued line corresponds to the actual number of independents
(Ownindeppure) while the red line corresponds to the number of independents under the
counterfactual scenario (OwnindeppureNEW). As it can be seen the new policy is more suc-
cessful in establishing a large presence of independents in the markets, which results to an
increase on differentiated products. The number of independents increases by approximately
9% within a year (an increase of 0.9575 from a total of 10.872 of actual coffee shops). While
within 3 years there is an increase of 23%, in 2009 a net increase of 2.561462 is observed while
the actual coffee shops are 11 on average. Therefore, compared to the previous scenario the
targeted policy manages to successfully decrease the market shares of the C-Ss across markets
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and increase the number of independents.
Notice that the entry decision of the independents is not endogenized. As a result, I am
expecting a higher number of entries of independents. The intuition is that less anticipated
entry of C-Ss (since the cap is binding) will result to more independents’ entries. However,
since the marginal effect of entry on the exit rate is less than 1, I anticipate that the over-
all number of independents will be even higher (if endogenized). Consequently, the above
predictions will be a lower bound on the number of independents in the markets.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the results of the empirical and counterfactual analysis. I
found presence of product differentiation (within the group of independents competition is
more important than between groups), time effects of consumption (marginal propensity to
consume) and market effects. I have also shown that city planning policies can be distor-
tionary. To be more specific, placing a cap on the maximum number of coffee shops that
enter a market will disproportionably decrease the number of independent coffee shops and it
will increase the market concentration of the market. On the other hand, restricting entry of
C-Ss in markets that are dominating it will increase the number of independent coffee shops
by approximately 25% within 3 years.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Appendix
5.1 Conclusion
A different aspect of the Chain-Stores’ effects on the independents has been presented. An
aspect that rejects the conventional belief that market concentration increases by the presence
of Chain-Stores and their ability to abuse their power to displace the independents. It is
actually shown that product differentiation is a tool to preserve the presence of independents
(small firms) in the market. More particularly, it is shown that in the coffee shops’ market of
Central London, there is no effect on the independents’ profitability, resulting from the C-Ss’
presence or expansion. The independents’ exit is found to depend mainly on the number
of independent incumbents and entrants (within group competition is more important than
between groups). Furthermore, the significance of product differentiation for the buyers is
estimated, their taste parameters (marginal propensity to consume conditional on the time
of the day and area) and market specific effects are identified .
In the theoretical model both entry and exit are incorporated. An incumbent can be
replaced and displaced by the entrant or can choose to exit. The identity of the entrant
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will depend on the demand characteristics, where markets with higher demand for differen-
tiation generate more profitable independents. The theoretical model predicts that product
differentiation and market specific characteristics will safeguard the independent incumbents
from the C-Ss entry behavior. It also describes the evolution of market structure when C-Ss,
independents and product differentiation are present in the markets. I have characterized the
factors that influence the independents’ (a non-strategic fringe) exit decisions. Consequently
and by identifying this fringe, I have tested the importance of product differentiation, market
and time specific effects for the independent coffee shops’ presence in Central London with a
simple and tractable empirical approach.
The unique data set allows investigation of the factors that determine the presence of
independents in a metropolitan area. Tube stations’ data, a previously unexplored approach,
were utilized to construct footfall variables that measure the size of demand and estimate the
importance of demand characteristics. This topic is the first research project that investigates
such a metropolitan area using footfall data and examines the impact of product differentiation
and market effects for independents in an industry where C-Ss are present. This is a very
useful data source to investigate the means to decrease market concentration and improve
policy planning in metropolitan areas. The significance of investigating such areas lies in the
fact that they influence a large part of a country’s population, in contrast to the majority of
the literature that investigates small isolated towns.
The empirical investigation was divided into two parts. In the first part it is shown
that local demographics fail to capture the demand parameters influencing the independents’
profits. It is also shown that the footfall variables are the most appropriate source to be used
in the studies of entry and exit in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, it is found that within
groups competition is more important than between groups. The latter result suggests the
presence of product differentiation.
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In the second part of the empirical estimation I have taken an approach used to iden-
tify asymmetric behavior to identify the increased propensity to consume and the demand
parameters of interest; such as the taste for differentiation and the income effect. This was
achieved by decomposing the market demand variables into two parts; a higher and lower
percentile. Hence, I have identified the increased propensity to consume, which was given by
the part of the variable with the lower percentile, and the demand parameters. It is shown
that there is a higher propensity to consume coffee on the weekends and that the profitability
of independents increases even more if they are located in leisure areas (the higher percentile
variable of the number of people that visit a tube station on the weekends). The latter, I
anticipate that quantifies the product differentiation effect. The decomposition of the variable
that measures the number of visitors in an area during the morning rush hours identifies the
propensity to consume coffee in the morning and the effect of being located in a business
center. Interestingly, it is found that an independent coffee shop located in a business center
will be less profitable1. Finally, it is found that less deprived areas are more profitable for the
independent coffee shops.
To conclude, in this topic it was established that the “clone city” effect does not apply
to the coffee shops’ market of Central London. Instead, it is found that there is no effect
on the independents’ profitability due to the presence or expansion of Chain- Stores in the
said market. The key finding of this topic is that product differentiation is a tool to preserve
independent presence in the market since within groups competition is found to be more
important than between groups competition. Moreover, the key contribution, to the existing
empirical literature, is the introduction of an identification strategy used to quantify the
demand market effects and the increased propensity to consume during weekdays’ morning
rush hours and weekends. Further research is required to introduce a dynamic approach that
might reveal further interesting information on the strategic behavior of the C-Ss entry and
1Let me remind the reader that the latter result can be explained by the fact that Chain-Stores are
specialized in serving fast coffee; something that matches better the preferences of people in such areas.
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Figure 5.1: Map of London and Central London.
exit and its importance on the industry’s market structure and evolution2. Another extension
is to endogenize the entry of independents in order to investigate the evolution of the market3.
5.A Appendix
The map (5.1) presents the geographic area of London. The area within the black line is the
market of Central London.
The next map (5.2) presents the market of Central London and the location of coffee
shops. The red color corresponds to the independents, the blue to other C-Ss and the green
to the C-Ss.
2I believe that the simultaneity of C-Ss entry and exit decisions can be tackled with a nested algorithm
that takes in to consideration the entry decisions of the independents in the profit function of the C-Ss.
3I believe that combining Ericson and Pakes (1995) and K. Seim (2006) papers might be an approach to
investigate the evolution of the market.
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Figure 5.2: Coffee Shops Density in Central London.
Figure 5.3: Total Number of Firms to Log Area.
5.A.1 Firms to Area Figure
The next graph (5.3) plots the number of firms and its decomposition to the three subgroups,
at the vertical axis, and the logarithm of the geographic size of the market at the horizontal
axis, where the area is measured in m2.
In these group of graphs (5.3) the evidence is inconclusive. The number of coffee shops
seems to be independent to the geographic size of the market, see left hand side graph. This
might suggest that that the profitability of the coffee shops might not be influenced by the
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geographic size of the market. A similar lack of pattern seems to arise in the right hand side
graph, when I decompose the number of firms to the three subgroups. However, since the
above statistics are descriptive in nature, it is not safe to reach any conclusion.
5.A.2 Data sources and Issues
Identification of Independents’ subcategories
The identification was possible by going through the four Yellow pages categories (these
four categories can be actually found in the Yellow pages) and also by matching the name of
a coffee shop with a particular subcategory. I have also used the actual name of the coffee
shop to categorize it since in some cases the name revealed its specialization (for example
“Tiffin’s Sandwich Bar” can be categorized as a Sandwich Bar4).
5.A.3 Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics for the variables used in the empirical investigation are presented in the
table below.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TubeStatMinDist 47 0.00699 0.00251 0.00413 0.01746
Area 47 263929.5 159709.6 92587.88 767650.2
Population 47 1937.754 362.385 1109 3284
Claimben 47 8.47045 5.82473 0 26
Pensioners 47 235.6099 83.16672 81 421
Totalcoffeeshops 47 17.2766 11.3908 0 51
Indep. Incumb. 47 10.634 7.0547 0 38
C-Ss Incumb. 47 3.9173 3.9452 0 23
4Notice that this particular firm had chosen to be listed in the Yellow pages as a coffee shop and not as a
sandwich bar. In some cases a firm which offered both services (coffee shop and a sandwich bar) could have
chosen to be listed under one of the two, in order to avoid paying fees for two listings. In other cases a similar
firm could have decided to be listed in both categories. Finally, in some other cases a firm could have chosen
to be listed as a coffee shop for a number of years, then as a patisserie for another time period and finally as
a coffee shop.
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Other C-Ss Incumb 47 2.7258 2.4066 0 11
Net entries 47 0.48227 2.32828 -9 12
Total entries 47 2.25332 2.21714 0 13
Indep. entries 47 1.32861 1.47276 0 10
C-Ss entries 47 0.52009 0.99950 0 9
Other C-Ss entries 47 0.40462 0.67111 0 3
Total exits 47 1.77305 1.8306 0 9
Indep. exits 47 1.17021 1.3258 0 6
C-Ss exits 47 0.23404 0.5589 0 4
Other C-Ss exits 47 0.37116 0.6931 0 5
Average flat value 66 372.1th 109.2th 122.3th 800th
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Where TubeStatMinDist is for Tube Stations Minimum Distance. An important obser-
vation is that all the variables exhibit significant variation suggesting that Central London
is highly diversified even though its geographic coverage is small compared to London as a
whole.
5.A.4 Timing
5.A.5 Theoretical Model
Within the sections that follow I will formally develop the arguments presented in the theo-
retical chapter of this topic.
Displacement and Replacement
Lemma 5.A.1 Given assumption 2:
If B¯In >B¯En then the incumbent will be displaced.
If B¯In ≤ B¯En then the incumbent will be replaced.
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Figure 5.4: Timing David vs. Goliath
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Proof: The proof is straightforward, by 2.7 the incumbent will always exit if not replaced.
As a result the entrant by 2.6 will enter independently of displacing or replacing the incumbent.
Hence, for the entrant to displace or replace the incumbent it will depend on their cost. If
the outside option for the entrant is smaller than the minimum value of the incumbent, which
is willing to accept, (1st condition) to exit then the entrant will choose to enter through the
outside option increasing the number of companies to (n+1) and displacing the incumbent.
In other words, ΠEn1,j,t(n, f
En
1 )−B¯In < ΠEn1,j,t(n, fEn1 )−B¯En ⇒ B¯In >B¯En. I implicitly assume
that the incumbent’s B¯In is the scrap value. Otherwise, the incumbent will be willing to
accept B¯In − ε, instead of B¯In, rather than just exit the market. If however the incumbent’s
min value, B¯In, is smaller than the entrant’s outside option, B¯En (2nd condition), then the
entrant will choose to buyout the incumbent. The incumbent accepts the offer and leaves the
market (the entrant has a first mover advantage, a backwards induction argument). Hence,
the incumbent is replaced.
QED
Multiple Equilibria
Lemma 5.A.2 Given assumption 1, the most profitable entrant will enter replacing the in-
cumbent with a bid equal to the profit of the second most profitable entrant if the incumbent’s
outside option is low enough.
Proof: First of all, notice that the outside option, in this case, is irrelevant since it is
not possible for both entrants to enter and it is not possible for one entrant to enter while the
least profitable incumbent is still in the market. By the English auction assumption the most
profitable entrant will bid the valuation (profit) of the second entrant and win the right to
enter. The most profitable entrant will outbid the second most profitable entrant (the most
profitable entrant will increase the bid until it is not profitable for the second entrant to bid).
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The incumbent will accept the entrant’s bit if ΠEn2,j,t(n, f
En
2 ) >B¯
In. By the assumption (2.4)
ΠEn2 (n, f
En
2 ) > Π
In
n (n, f
In
n ) it will only be incentive compatible for the incumbent to exit when
the bid (which is equal to the profitability of the ΠEn2 (n, f
En
2 )) is greater than her scrap value
B¯In. If the scrap value is larger than the second most profitable entrant then the incumbent
will be replaced if B¯In < ΠEn1 (n, f
En
1 ) since the entrant can further increase the bid as long
as it is profitable. Hence, the incumbent is replaced for low enough B¯In.
QED
Entry Deterrence
I will now present a case of entry deterrence. I will assume that the fixed cost draws are such
that it could be feasible for two entrants to enter and two incumbents to exit. Some further
conditions are provided in the 3rd assumption:
Assumption 3:
ΠEn1,j,t(n, f
En
1 ) > Π
In
n−1,j,t(n, f
In
n−1) > Π
En
2,j,t(n, f
En
2 ) > Π
In
n,j,t(n, f
In
n ) > 0 = B¯
In
(5.1)
0 > ΠEn1,j,t(n + 1, f
En
1 ) (5.2)
The first condition states that the most profitable entrant is more profitable than the
second least incumbent. But the second most profitable entrant is not. The second condition
states that it is not possible for the most profitable entrant to enter without replacing an
incumbent.
Lemma 5.A.3 Given assumption 3, the most profitable entrant will enter by replacing the
least profitable incumbent.
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Proof: First of all, notice that condition (5.2) states that it is not possible for any
of the entrants to enter without replacing the least profitable incumbent. As a result the
existence of an outside option is irrelevant for the entrants. The outside of the incumbents is
also irrelevant since I have assumed zero value for the outside option. Both conditions (5.1)
and (5.2) state that the second most profitable entrant will only enter if it replace the least
profitable incumbent, by a backwards induction argument. However, for the most profitable
entrant it will be less costly to replace the least profitable incumbent instead of replacing
the n − 1 incumbent. This is because by (5.1) the n-1 incumbent is more profitable (and
as a result requires a higher bid) than the second in order profitable entrant. Hence, by
the English auction assumption the most profitable incumbent will outbid the second most
profitable entrant and replace the least profitable incumbent. Hence, one entry and one exit.
QED
I have named this case as entry deterrence since one of the potential entrants deters
the entry of the other. Notice that the entry deterrence is defined differently to most of the
literature, see for example Dixit (1980). To be more specific, in this topic an entrant is the
one that deters entry while most of the researchers have focused on incumbents’ deterring
entry.
Dynamic Model
Let me present a simple dynamic aspect of the game. Assume that the game is repeated twice
and that in the first period there are n incumbents and one potential entrant with a fixed cost
draw such that it is necessary to replace the least profitable incumbent (ΠInn,t(n + 1, f
In
n ) <
ΠEn1,t (n + 1, f
En
1 ) < 0) in every period. Let me also assume that only the least profitable
incumbent has negative profits in the first period. In the second period there is a new draw
of fixed costs and in some cases it is possible for a draw gives a favorable outcome to the
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incumbent. For example, a case with two draws such that the least profitable incumbent
needs to be replaced is ΠInn,t+1(n, f
In
n ) < Π
En
2,t+1(n, f
En
2 ) < Π
En
1,t+1(n, f
En
1 ) < 0. In this case the
bid will be equal the profitability of the second most profitable entrant. A further assumption
is needed:
Assumption 4:
EtB¯
In
n,t+1 = EtΠ
En
n,t+1(n, f
En
n ) > Π
En
n,t (n, f
En
n ) > |ΠInn,t(n, f Inn ) + EtΠInn,t+1(n, f Inn )| (5.3)
EtB¯
In
n,t+1
2
> B¯
In
n,t (5.4)
The equation (5.3) states that the expected bid to replace the incumbent at t+1 is higher
than the sum of the incumbents profit at t and t+1. Hence, it is profitable (at expectations)
for the incumbent to refuse being replaced and exit at t+1. The second condition states that
the expected bid at t+1 is more than double the current bid. The above discussion generates
the next result:
Corollary 5.A.4 An incumbent will refuse to be replaced at a given period if assumption 4
holds.
The proof is a straightforward result from the 4th assumption and the assumption that
within each period there is a unique entrant to replace the incumbent. Thus, even in the case
where the entrant is more profitable than the incumbent it is possible for the incumbent to
refuse being replaced if it anticipates a better draw of entrants’ types in the near future that
will raise their displacement bid. In the empirical investigation I control for this possibility
by incorporating the growth of the demand variables (expected changes on profitability).
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A simple numerical example of strategic manipulation of exit
Let ay =
2
3
and ac−s =
1
3
, the value of the market (total demand) is 10 and there is an
independent incumbent with fixed costs 5. Let two potential entrants, an independent with
fixed costs 4 and a C-S with 3.5. The independent is faced with a higher cost and the C-S
has a valuation of the market equal to -0.1666 (=1/3*10-3.5). However, the independent
entrant will enter by buying out the incumbent. The valuation of the entrant is 2.67 and the
valuation of the incumbent is 1.67. As a result the entrant can pay a sunk cost of 1.67, to
the incumbent, that will generate an exit of the incumbent and the total number of firms in
the market will stay unchanged. I assume that if two firms of the same group exist they will
split the subgroup market (for example 3.33 each for the independents).
If however, ay = ac−s =
1
2
the C-S will enter for sure and an independent will enter by
displacing the incumbent. In this case the number of firms increases and the incumbent exits.
Thus, there is both a restructure of the industry (within groups) and a change in the market
structure as well (from 1 independent and 0 C-Ss to 1 independent and 1 C-S).
Let me keep the market shares as defined above, but now assume that an entry of
independent (C-S) increases the demand by 1
3
and the demand of the C-S (independent)
decreases by 1
3
, in order to preserve the size of the market (the market shares need to add to
one). Hence the market shares are ay = 0.67 (ac−s = 0.33) if an extra independent enters and
no C-S and ac−s = 0.67 (ay = 0.33) if two C-S enter and one independent exist. Furthermore,
if 3 C-S enter then the market share will be ac−s = 0.89 and ay = 0.11. For illustrative reasons
I assume that the shares are linearly changing. Let me also assume that the cost of the C-S is
3. In this case the independent incumbent should exit, given that the C-S entrance is certain,
since even if an extra independent enters its profitability will still be negative. Hence, there
might be 1 independent entrant and 1 C-S. However, if 2 C-Ss enters the total revenues are
6.67 and the total costs are 6. The independents, both the incumbent and the entrant, have
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negative profitability. If a third C-S enters then the revenues are 8.9 and the fixed costs are
9 but this is unprofitable for the C-Ss.
Hence, in this case (with demand spillover effects) at equilibrium there will be 2 C-Ss and
zero independents. This generates an increase in the number of firms and the displacement
of the independent incumbent by a C-S. The endogenous sunk cost will be zero since the
incumbent will be displaced in any case (I assume zero outside cost for the entrants to enter),
the C-S will enter with two stores and whether the incumbent stays to the market the C-S
profitability will be unchanged. The market structure will be consistent by zero independents
and two C-Ss.
A simple numerical example of strategic manipulation of exit:
I now focus on the demand within the C-Ss group. Let me assume that there is a C-S
incumbent, named A, with profitability 2 and FC 3 and a potential entrant B with FC 2.5.
Initially the valuation of the market is 5 but if Entrant B enters then the market expands
to 6.5 (with one or two shops and replace C-S A) and if a second type A enters the market
the market with no C-S B entry then the market expands to 8.5. This means that the total
profitability under two firms of type A is 2.5 (and zero of type B) while two firm of type B is
1.5 (an zero C-S of type A), if there is one A and one B then the profitability is 0.25 for A
and 0.75 for B. In this case it is profitable for B to displace incumbent A (by offering 0.25)
and enter the market with two stores. However, if C-S behaves strategically then A should
enter with a second store in order to prevent displacement and generate a profit of 2.5 (or 1.25
per store). In any case the profitability of the C-S A is reduced but it remains in the market
because of the business stealing effect (expansion) which is greater than the cannibalization
(business stealing within own shops).
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5.A.6 Definition of Variables
Fixcost = fixed cost
Fixcosttime = Fixed cost changes across time
Pop = Local residential population.
Housing = Number of houses in the area.
Pensioners = Number of pensioners living in the area.
Claimben = Number of people claiming social benefits.
Area = The area of the tube station in squared metres (m2).
Weekend = Number of people that exit a tube station during the weekend (both in
Saturday and Sunday).
Inrush = Number of people that enter a tube station during the morning rush hours
(7am to 10am).
Outrush = Number of people that exit a tube station during the morning rush hours
(7am to 10am).
Totaltube = Total number of people that visit a tube station on an average day and
weekend (sum).
WeekendNleis = Number of people that exit a tube station during the weekend in no-
leisure areas. Tube stations at the lower 50 percentile.
WeekendLleis = Number of people that exit a tube station during the weekend in leisure
areas. Tube stations at the upper 50 percentile.
InrushNResid = Number of people that enter a tube station during the morning rush
hours (7am to 10 am) in the tube stations at the lower 50 percentile of this variable.
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InrushResid = Number of people that enter a tube station during the morning rush
hours (7am to 10am) in the tube stations at the upper 50 percentile of this variable.
OutrushNBus = Number of people that exit a tube station during the morning rush
hours (7am to 10am) in no-business areas. Tube stations at the lower 50 percentile.
OutrushBus = Number of people that exit a tube station during the morning rush hours
(7am to 10am) in business areas. Tube stations at the upper 50 percentile.
L1OwnIndep = The lag of the number of independent incumbents.
L1OwnCS = The lag of the number of C-Ss Incumbents.
L1OwnOtCS= The lag of the number of other C-Ss Incumbents.
EntryIndep = The number of independent Entrants.
EntryCS= The number of C-Ss Entrants.
EntryOther= The number of other C-Ss Entrants.
Trains = A dummy variable that takes 1 if at the particular tube stations there is a
train station as well.
Parks = A dummy variable that takes 1 if the tube station is located next to a park.
Thames= A dummy variable that takes 1 if the tube station is located near the Thames
river.
5.A.7 Investigating the Shifts on the Demand Size of the Market
In this section I am going to show the presence of demand shifts across time. I achieve that
by multiplying the Totaltube variable to the years of the sample. Hence, I break this variable
into 9 parts, each part corresponding to a particular year. The specification that I am going
to use is specification (8), which was found the most appropriate (the one that better fits the
data).
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Independent Probit (8)
Variables Probability for
an Independent
to exit
Fixcost 0.0002
(0.00011)
fixcosttime -0.00013
(0.0001)
Area -0.00010***
(0.00004)
WeekendNleis -0.0862*
(0.0444)
WeekendLeis -0.106**
(0.0438)
InrushNResid -0.0165
(0.0384)
InrushResid -0.0642**
(0.0266)
OutrsushNBus -0.1767*
(0.0927)
OutrsushBus -0.0895**
(0.0401)
Totaltube2001 0.0371**
(0.0150)
Totaltube2002 0.0362**
(0.0145)
Totaltube2003 0.0356**
(0.0151)
Totaltube2004 0.0367**
(0.0150)
Totaltube2005 0.0202
(0.0239)
Totaltube2006 0.0372**
(0.0151)
Totaltube2007 0.0373**
(0.0152)
Totaltube2008 0.0345**
(0.0165)
Totaltube2009 0.0357**
(0.0154)
L1OwnIdep 0.0078***
(0.0030)
EntryIndep 0.0159**
(0.0069)
L1OwnCS -0.0016
(0.0023)
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EntryCS 0.0044
(0.0057)
L1OwnOther -0-.0008
(0.0031)
EntyOther 0.0151**
(0.0067)
Constant -2.0291***
(0.2697)
Obs. 4382
Groups 932
Sigma u 0.2058
Rho 0.0406
LogLikel. -1503.7033
yhat 0.0926
Table 5.2: Shifts of Demand Effects on Estimation
Notes: All the probits above are based on the random-effects model. In all the specifications I have included
control variables for missing data and year fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.
The coefficients and the standard errors reported are the ones that correspond to the marginal effects, with
the exception being the one of the constant term.
*Statistically Significant at 10%.
**Statistically Significant at 5%
***Statistically Significant at 1%
In the above table we can see that all the previous results remain robust to the new
specification. Furthermore, it can be seen that the Totaltube variables are statistically sig-
nificant with the exception the one in 2005. The changes of demand is attributed to demand
shifts (income or preference shocks).
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Topic II: Buyers Reporting a Cartel
In this topic I investigate the strategic interaction between buyers and suppliers when the
buyers are able (informed) to report a cartel to the antitrust authority. The cartel antici-
pates the threat of being reported and as a result chooses to satisfy the buyers’ Incentives
Compatibility Constraint (ICC) by indirectly compensating the buyers. Reporting generates
a commitment mechanism, between the cartel members, which constrains the collusive prof-
its. It is shown that the likelihood of collusion is negatively related to the cost of reporting,
that is a more stable cartel is generated. Most importantly, it is shown that if an antitrust
authority tackles the cost of reporting, or increases the transparency of a market, it generates
two opposing forces. It increases the consumer surplus in existing hidden cartels but at the
same time increases the likelihood of cartel formation, potentially increasing the number of
cartels. It is shown that the first effect dominates; therefore tackling reporting costs is of
immense importance. I also investigate an alternative mechanism to control for reporting,
threat of exclusion. I show that it is a credible threat. I further show that compensation can
actually be given at equilibrium if the buyers are faced with heterogeneous costs of reporting.
Finally, a comparison with treble damages, a different private enforcement policy, reveals that
reporting is the most efficient policy.
The second topic is divided in to five chapters. The first chapter includes the motivation,
the research questions and the literature review. In the second chapter I formally present the
model and characterize the equilibrium behavior. The third chapter, of this topic, investigates
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alternative mechanisms that a cartel can use and compare the proposed policy (allowing for
buyers’ reporting to the anti-trust authority) with another private enforcement policy (treble
damages). In the fourth chapter I conclude and provide the mathematical appendix. In the
last chapter I report the bibliography.
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Chapter 6
Introduction and Literature Review
In this chapter I present the research questions of the second topic, the motivation and the
framework used. The most important findings are also being discussed. Finally, in the last
section of this chapter I present the relevant literature.
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6.1 Introduction
Antitrust authority investigations can be self-initiated, result from the application of a le-
niency programme or from buyers reporting a cartel to the antitrust authority. Self-initiated
investigations are generated by either the buyers’ (consumers) complaints of high prices or
even of suppliers’ suspicious behavior (trade tactics). In a recent case the Office of Fair Trade
(OFT), UK’s antitrust authority, initiated an investigation in to the UK’s construction indus-
try after a buyer’s report and found a bid-rigging operation. The OFT found more than 100
companies involved. The cartel members had managed to co-ordinate without being detected
for 7 consecutive years, from 1999 to 2006. The cartel members were fined with 129.2 UK
million pounds in total, since the cartel had affected projects in excess of 200mn. Further-
more, OFT states with respect to reporting on cartels: “In addition to our own research and
market intelligence, the OFT relies on complaints to help us in enforcing competition law.
If you suspect that a competitor, supplier, customer or any other business is infringing the
law, you may contact us with your concerns.” 1. Hence, understanding the driving forces of
reporting and the strategic interplay of players is not only of academic importance. In this
topic some further research questions are need to be answered. Research questions such as:
What tools can a cartel use to control for reporting? What will be the social cost? and Should
the antitrust authority target buyers’ cost of reporting?
Though there is a large literature on public enforcement policy, the research on private
enforcement has been developed relatively more recently. This literature has focused to private
lawsuits and leniency programmes but has surprisingly failed to account for the choice of
buyers to report a cartel to the antitrust authority 2. In this topic I assume that buyers are
more likely to trace the existence of a cartel (or misbehavior) than an antitrust authority
(regulator). Given the existence of a cartel, the buyers choose whether to report. The cartel’s
1http : //www.oft.gov.uk/about− the− oft/legal− powers/legal/competition− act− 1998/complaints
2With only one exemption a paper by McAfee, Mialon and Mialon in (2008).
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members will need to tackle this threat by satisfying the buyers’ Incentive Compatibility
Constraint (ICC) and by making the buyers just indifferent from reporting and not reporting.
I show that at equilibrium there will be no reporting3 which means that the results are not
driven by the actual act of reporting but from the mere fact that the threat of reporting
exists. A cartel’s commitment to satisfy the ICC of the buyers decreases its profit and
increases stability, since deviation is relatively less profitable. Interestingly, being informed
on suppliers’ competitiveness is both a blessing and a curse. The threat of reporting forces
the cartel members to set lower prices than the benchmark case, with the buyers being
uninformed, and as a result implicitly compensating the buyers. However, at the same time
the likelihood of collusion increases and as a result it is more likely for the buyers to be faced
with collusive prices.
An alternative mechanism, to control reporting, is presented. The threat of exclusion,
foreclosure, is a robust strategy to deter reporting. However, I show that as the size of the
buyers increases or the size of suppliers decreases or even the number of buyers decreases it
becomes more difficult to sustain such a strategy. The size of the buyers matters because it
corresponds to a higher profit per buyer for a given supplier. The driving force of this result
is the trade-off between foregoing profits in one period (by punishing a buyer) and enjoying
higher profits in the future. The number of buyers matters because a smaller number of
buyers corresponds to a higher per buyer profit for the suppliers and as a result a greater
cost for the implementation of the threat of exclusion. Hence, the last result suggests that
buyers’ associations reduce the credibility of the threat of exclusion since these associations
increase the number of buyers that need to be excluded by a cartel. The number of suppliers
approximates the intensity of competition, since I assume competition a` la Cournot, and as
a result more intense competition reduces the per buyer profit of the suppliers and decreases
3The simple case, mentioned above, naively predicts that reporting will not be observed. However, when
I relax the assumption of successful antitrust authority investigation, probability being less than one, then
reporting is an equilibrium action.
114
the cost of the threat. Finally, the number of buyers matters since it decreases the per
buyer profit. Therefore, anonymity for the reporting buyer and monitoring cartel members’
behaviour after prosecution is essential to protect the buyers from the cartel’s retaliation
tactics.
As for social welfare, it is shown that two main forces are working in opposite directions.
First of all, if the antitrust authority decreases the cost of reporting then the Consumer Surplus
(CS) increases, given that a cartel has been formed. Mainly, the ICC will bind the collusive
profits at a lower level thus enforcing the cartel to lower its price4 and as a result increasing
the CS of the buyers and decreasing the Dead Weight Loss (DWL). The second driving force
is the likelihood of collusion. The antitrust authority by reducing the cost of reporting,
increases the likelihood of cartel formation and generates more stable cartels. This means
that it increases the number of potential cartels that can be created. The stability increases
because the relative decrease on the deviation profits is higher than the relative decrease of
the collusive profits. However, it is shown that the first effect dominates the second.
When compared to another private enforcement policy, treble damages5, I show that the
most efficient policy is reporting. Hence, policy makers should aim to reduce reporting costs
rather than promoting private lawsuits. This comparison identifies boundaries for buyers’
optimal response, between three possible alternatives6, given the existence of a cartel. In
this way this topic identifies factors that can explain why in EU private lawsuits are less
frequent than in USA7. Furthermore, conditions for reporting to be observed (cartel chooses
the benchmark quantity and takes the risk of being reported) are presented in the relevant
4The buyers become more willing to report and as a result the cartel will need to lower its price in order
to make the buyers indifferent from reporting again.
5Treble damages refer to buyers suing cartel members for anti-competitive damages and receiving triple
their damages.
6Reporting or reporting and taking a legal action or just taking legal action
7This problem has been identified by EU and measures to increase private engagement on the
control of cartels have been suggested through a White Paper (see EU website, http : //eur −
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = COM : 2008 : 0165 : FIN : EN : PDF . However,
investigating reporting as a deterrence mechanism has been ignored.
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chapter.
6.2 Literature Review
This research project is related to an increasing amount of literature that examines the effi-
ciency of private antitrust authority enforcement policies. The literature on private enforce-
ment has initially focused on buyers taking legal action against the cartel members (treble
damages and decoupling)8. Becker’s and Stigler’s (1974) paper is the first one that proposed
private enforcers, that benefit from damages awarded by the court, to achieve deterrence
efficiency. Papers by Landes and Posner (1975) and Posner (1992) argue that private enforce-
ment generates incentives for over-deterrence9. On the other hand, Polinsky (1980) shows
that it can lead to under-deterrence because of limited liability10.
Furthermore, Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) have suggested that treble damages are
neutral with respect to the social welfare, and do not constrain the cartels to lower prices
and profits11. However, researchers have later shown that neutrality fails given some fair
assumptions. To be more specific, Spulber (1989) achieves to show that by introducing a
limited liability in the cartel members’ ability to compensate the buyers. In addition, Spulber
(1989) shows that neutrality fails if legal costs, transaction costs, are introduced. Furthermore,
according to Besanko and Spulber (1990) neutrality fails if information asymmetries exist,
between buyers and cartel, on the marginal costs of the cartel members.
8The literature on leniency programmes is not mentioned, even though it is related to the private en-
forcement literature, since it is not related to buyers - suppliers interaction. For a seminal paper on leniency
programmes see M.MottaandM.Polo(2003)
9The buyers take their suppliers to the court even if there is no antitrust authority violation
10Where limited liability refers to the maximum fine that can be imposed to the cartel members. In most
of the cases compensation for cartel damages will drive the cartel member’s to bankruptcy and as a result the
market will be distorted.
11The buyers anticipate the compensation if a cartel is found, increase their demand (to maximize their
compensation) and this cancels out the deterrence effects of the policy (the cost of the penalty is canceled out
by the increased demand).
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An alternative to treble damages is decoupling, see for example Schwartz (1980), Polin-
sky (1986) and Polinsky and Che (1991). In this case, if a private lawsuit is filed and the
plaintiff wins the court trial then the penalty imposed by the court will be equal to treble
the damages sustained but the claimant will receive only once the amount of damages. De-
coupling has been suggested in order to keep the deterrence of cartels as high as possible,
for the private enforcement, but eliminate the inefficiencies of the treble damages policy12.
A major inefficiency is created with the strategic use of lawsuits by the competitors of a
group of companies. A nice example of such inefficiency is given by McAfee, Mialon and
Mialon (2008)13: “hostile takeover targets often initiate antitrust authority suits against their
acquirers, because such suits create substantial delays that allow the target firms to imple-
ment antitakeover strategies, such as poison pills. If the intended takeover is good for the
market, these antitrust authority actions have a negative effect”. The authors incorporate
private and public enforcement into their model of strategic interaction and find that in most
of the cases both are necessary to achieve efficiency. This is line with Segal and Whinston
(2006) results, who find that both private and public enforcement policies are necessary for
an efficient anti-trust policy.
The literature mentioned above assumes that buyers have full information in the anti-
competitive action taken by the cartel. The researchers mainly assume that the buyers either
know or form beliefs on the marginal costs of the cartel’s members. Harrington and Chen
(2006), on the other hand, examine buyers updating (they introduce uncertainty) their private
information on the suppliers’ cost distribution and its consequences on a cartel’s pricing
schedule given a multiple damages penalty14. They assume that the suppliers cost has a
random element and that the buyers do not condition their information to the cost shocks
(since it is unobservable for them) but rather on the prices chosen by their suppliers. The
12The buyers will not increase their demand anymore.
13For further reading on the strategic abuse of the antitrust authority legislation please see Baumol and
Ordover (1985), McAfee and Vakkur (2004) and McAfee, Mialon and Mialon (2006).
14The authors assume that the buyers get suspicious if the prices behave abnormally across time.
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authors provide a dynamic perspective to the literature.
In this topic I investigate the impact of buyers reporting the existence of a cartel to
the antitrust authority, an approach which blends private and public enforcement. However,
this is not the first research project that blends private and public enforcement policies. To
be more specific, McAfee, Mialon and Mialon (2008), from hereafter it will be referred as
MMM, examine the efficiency and the deterrence effect of private and public enforcement
policies. It is the first research project, as far as I know, that investigates the strategic
interactions generated by reporting. In MMM’s paper reporting is mentioned as cheap-talk
because, as they argue, reporting should be costless. In this topic, this opinion is not endorsed
since a cartel will be able (through foreclosures for example) to generate a cost of reporting
or a buyer might be unwilling to damage a long running relationship (a fall in its suppliers
reliability). Alternatively, it might be the case that the buyers will need to pay a cost to gather
“convincing” information for the antitrust authority. The OFT recognizes the problems that
might arise from reporting (the suppliers being able to generate a cost of reporting) and
provides anonymity15 and a prize for a buyer that reports16. The OFT, however, mentions
that it will prioritize the complaints based on the seriousness of the offence, which means that
the buyers will need to gather convincing proof to persuade the OFT that a cartel exists (or
at least to initiate an investigation).
MMM’s paper also relax the assumption of reporting costlessly (as an extension to their
basic model), however they abstract from strategic interaction between buyers and suppliers.
They assume that the cartel has an exogenous probability to take-up an anti-competitive
behaviour that yields a fix predetermined payoff for cartel members, antitrust authority and
buyers (conditioned to each players’ actions). As a result, the cartel has no tools to counteract
15The OFT states “We usually expect complaints to be made in writing,...complaints regarding suspected
cartels should be made over the telephone by calling our cartel hotline”. See the website:
http : //www.oft.gov.uk/about− the− oft/legal− powers/legal/competition− act− 1998/complaints.
16See the following website for reference:
http : //www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition− act− and− cartels/cartels/rewards#.UMzfhG9dDvA
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the threat of reporting. Finally, by fixing the collusive outcome the authors restrict the
strategic behavior of the cartel members.
When I introduce strategic interaction I observe that a cartel will be formed if there
is a cost of reporting, a “transaction cost”, under full information. The results of this topic
are compared with Spulber’s (1989)17, who uses a similar “transaction cost” under a treble
damages policy. In this topic I allow the cartel to vary the seriousness (where seriousness
refers to the difference of the collusive outcome from the Cournot) of its action and to use
alternative ways to control reporting. In this way I am able to investigate the strategic
interaction between cartel’s members, buyers and the antitrust authority. To be more specific,
I assume that the cartel can compensate the buyers for damages, introducing a mechanism to
control for reporting. I also present an alternative mechanism to control reporting, I mainly
assume that the cartel can threaten buyers with exclusion (in most of the literature it is
referred as foreclosure). Moreover, I investigate what happens to the likelihood of collusion
and infer whether the ability of buyers to report makes the industries more collusive. Lastly,
I examine whether it is optimal for an antitrust authority to lower the cost of reporting. I
examine the consequences to the welfare if the cost of reporting decreases; the DWL in an
existing cartel decreases but at the same time the industries become less competitive overall,
thus DWL is created in other markets. I actually show that measures such as reducing the
cost of reporting and providing safeguards for the buyers that report, should be employed be
the antitrust authority.
6.3 Conclusion
This topic is motivated by the observation that buyers have reported a cartel and the OFT
has initiated an investigation and successfully prosecuted a cartel. As a result, in this topic
17Even though he does not formally prove this argument.
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I want to investigate what determines reporting, what strategies can a cartel use to deter
reporting, the social welfare implications and to compare reporting with an alternative private
enforcement policy, that of buyers taking legal actions. This topic is relevant to the literature
of private and public enforcement. The closest papers to this piece of research are McAfee,
Mialon and Mialon (2008) and Harrington and Chen (2006). However, none of these papers
examine the strategic options that a cartel may use and do not investigate the consequence
to welfare or characterize the optimal private enforcement policy.
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Chapter 7
Basic Model and Social Welfare
Implications
A simple model that captures the interaction between buyers, suppliers and antitrust authority
is constructed in order to investigate factors that influence reporting, cartel formation and
the likelihood of collusion. I further present a social welfare analysis. To be more specific, I
investigate whether it is optimal for an antitrust authority to take a policy that lowers the
cost of reporting.
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7.1 Model
The antitrust authority is faced with uncertainty as to whether there is a cartel in a market
and it is assumed that it does not generate self-initiated investigations1. On the other hand,
I assume that the buyers know with certainty whether (or not) their suppliers are competing
a` la Cournot but are faced with a cost of reporting (this might be a cost with respect to time
and effort to make a meaningful complaint or a cost of potential retaliation tactics by the
suppliers). Thus, the buyers might be willing to report the existence of a cartel if the benefits
under Cournot (Consumer Surplus) outweigh the cost of reporting and the benefits under
collusion. If the suppliers decide to form a cartel then they need to take into consideration
the incentives of their buyers to report. Hence, the suppliers might decide to compensate
their buyers for the increase in prices, given they have formed a cartel. When the antitrust
authority receives a report it decides whether to investigate the market and if a cartel is
found it imposes Cournot competition and chooses the penalty that will apply. A graph of
the timing follows.
Figure 7.1: Timeline, Ch.7
There are three players that interact in the market; the buyers of the cartel, the suppliers
and the antitrust authority. The costs of the suppliers (C ∈ [0, Cmax]), the buyers’willingness
to pay, the antitrust authority’s investigation costs (CA ∈ [0, CmaxA ])2 and the cost of reporting
(v ∈ [0, vmax]) are determined by “nature”. All the costs are common knowledge between
buyers and suppliers but the antitrust authority knows only its own cost of investigation.
1This can be rationalized by the fact that antitrust authority is not committed to investigating all the
industries in a country. However, they are randomly investigating. For simplifying reasons though I will
assume no investigation.
2Where A is for antitrust authority.
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The suppliers choose their quantities by maximizing their profits (joint or not) and decide
whether to pay compensation3 (Comp) to the buyers, so that there is no reporting. The
buyers are homogeneous in a finite population M and an individual buyer has a well defined
demand function (Q(P) downward sloping and bounded), additive to the number of buyers.
This demand function defines a Consumer Surplus, (CS) which is a function of reporting,
CS(IBR ;Q, v). I also need to assume that v
′(Q) ≥ 0 and v′′(Q) ≥ 04, the cost of reporting
is convex with respect to quantities. The buyers decide to report (signal) to the antitrust
authority, an action denoted as IBR ∈ {0, 1}, where subscript R is for the choice to report and
superscript B is for buyers, with IBR = 1 if there is reporting and zero otherwise. It is assumed
that the CS is a convex function of quantity,
ϑCS(IB
R
;Q,v)
ϑQ
> 0 and
ϑ2CS(IB
R
;Q,v)
ϑQ2
> 0. Moreover,
the buyers decide after trade (ex post) on whether they will report.
Finally, the antitrust authority decides whether to investigate; an action denoted as IAIn ∈
{0, 1}, where subscript In is for the choice to investigate and superscript A is for Antitrust-
Authority. If a cartel is revealed then the antitrust-authority will impose competition by
enforcing a quantity such that QA = max{Qc, Q∗}5, where Qc is the Cournot quantity and
Q∗ is the observed quantity chosen by the suppliers. Furthermore, the antitrust authority
might decide not to investigate and as a result not to intervene, this is explicitly modelled as
the antitrust authority choosing quantity Q∗. However, it is assumed that type I and II error
is not possible. Where type I error refers to the antitrust authority investigating but falsely
conclude that there is no cartel and type II error refers to the antitrust authority claiming
the existence of a cartel when the suppliers are competing. Notice though that the key to
the analysis is the antitrust authority’s belief of the value of the Cournot quantity and the
probability that a cartel exists. To conclude, the players strategic choices are:
3More information on the compensation will be provided in the next sections.
4The last assumption is necessary to generate uniqueness, see figure 7.2.
5I am implicitly assuming that there is no penalty for the creation of a cartel; but instead the antitrust
authority imposes Cournot competition. This assumption is made in order to simplify the analysis. As it will
be shown, the assumption will not influence the conclusions adversely except in the case where the penalty
structure depends on the cost of reporting.
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• Suppliers: sS = {Q,Comp}
• Buyers: sB = {IBR}
• Antitrust Authority: sA = {IAIn, QA}
For the repeated form of this game I assume that nature chooses the parameters in period
zero only. The purpose of the last assumption is to avoid production or demand shocks that
might create unnecessary complexities. Furthermore, the repeated game assumption allows
the cartel members to employ Grim trigger strategies.
The stage game has to be solved backwards. Consequently, I first need to examine the
interaction between buyers and antitrust authority. The conduct between the buyers and the
antitrust authority can be captured by a signalling game, where the buyers announce (report)
that collusion exists and the antitrust authority responds with investigation. The equilibrium
between the buyers and the antitrust authority will be defined by using the concept of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium6.
7.1.1 Buyers and Antitrust Authority
In this section I will examine the interaction between the buyers and the antitrust authority.
I will mainly investigate the incentives of the buyers to report (signal) and the antitrust
authority’s reaction (to investigate). First of all, some further assumptions are necessary. It
will be assumed that the buyers know with certainty if a cartel exists and that they are always
worse off with the creation of a cartel (this assumption excludes cases where buyers might
provide a noisy signal to the antitrust authority). If the buyers are not always worse off with
the creation of a cartel, then strategic reporting might be generated, something that I am
not interested in investigating in this topic. I will also assume that if the antitrust authority
6See Cho and Kreps (1987) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1989).
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investigates and a cartel exists, the cartel will be revealed with probability one. Introducing
uncertainty of the antitrust authority’s successfulness will generate reporting conditional on
the probability of an authority to investigate and punish (allowing for type I error), this is
examined at a later stage.
I also assume that if a cartel is formed it will be able to compensate the buyers (denoted
as Comp), in order to avoid being reported. More specifically, given that a cartel is formed:
Comp = Comp∗ if IBR = 0 and Comp = 0 if I
B
R = 1, where Comp
∗ is suppliers choice variable.
The actual amount of compensation will be decided by the cartel at the equilibrium. As
for the antitrust authority, I will assume that its prior on the likelihood of cartel formation
is equal to zero, P1 = 0
7. Moreover, the probability of detection equals one8 and the cost
of investigation is small enough for the antitrust authority to investigate whenever there is
updating in its beliefs. The purpose of the last two assumptions is to shift the focus on the
consequences of reporting and neutralize any deterrence effect that policies of the antitrust
authority might have on the cartel’s behavior. As for the payoff functions, the buyer value
function is defined as:
V B(IBR ; v,Q
∗, Comp, IAIn, Q
A) = CS(IBR , v;Q
∗, Comp, IAIn, Q
A)−v∗IBR+Comp∗(1−IBR ) (7.1)
The value function is defined as the difference of the CS with the cost of reporting plus
any compensation paid to the buyers. The CS received by the buyers depends on the actions
of both the suppliers and the antitrust authority. The cost of reporting is conditional on the
action of buyers9. The compensation, which is decided by the suppliers, is conditional on the
7Where being the probability that a cartel exists and 1 − P1 = 1 the probability that it does not. This
assumption is equivalent to the legal argument that someone is innocent until he is found guilty.
8In other words, if a cartel exists and the antitrust authority investigates then it will punish with probability
equal to one.
9Since the buyers can choose to report even if there is no cartel.
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buyers not to report10.
The antitrust authority maximizes the social welfare function while taking into consider-
ation their costs of investigation (CA). Assuming equal weight to the CS and to the suppliers
profits, I derive the following value function:
V A(IAIn, Q
A;Pr, CATA, Q
∗, Comp, IBR ) =
∑
j=0,1
{
Prj
M∑
m=1
V Bm (I
B
R ; v,Q
A, Comp, IAIn, Q
A)
+ Prj
N∑
i=1
Πi(Q,Comp;C, I
A
In, Q
A, IBR ) + I
A
In ∗ CA
}
(7.2)
Pr refers to antitrust authority’s prior beliefs in the existence of a cartel, when Prj=0
there is no cartel and Prj=1 there is a cartel. The antitrust authority’s payoff function depends
on the choices of the suppliers and the buyers and the beliefs (ex-ante and ex-post, in the case
with updating) on whether a cartel exists. Equation (7.2) presents the information asymmetry
between antitrust authority and the participants of the market, buyers and suppliers, on the
behavior of the suppliers. Notice that the incentives of the buyers and the antitrust authority
are aligned (higher CS is desirable by both), however this is not the case with the suppliers. A
complete description of the value functions for each choice set is provided in the mathematical
appendix. Note that the suppliers’ profit function will be defined in a later stage.
The equilibrium of the signalling game, between buyers and antitrust authority, is de-
fined as a strategy that generates the max payoff of the two players given the antitrust
authority’s beliefs and out of equilibrium path beliefs. The next two Lemma characterize the
two equilibria that arise. However, let me first define CSc as the Consumer Surplus generated
under Cournot competition, CSm as the Consumer Surplus under Collusion and Comp as
10I implicitly assume that reporting is a public signal. Alternatively, the cartel members observe whether
an antitrust authority initiates an investigation and the compensation can be conditional on investigation (At
equilibrium the antitrust authority only investigates if there has been reporting. This is a result of the priors
being equal to zero and the existence of cost of investigation for the antitrust authority.).
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Compensation paid to the buyers.
Lemma 7.1.1 Pooling Equilibrium:
If v ≥ CSc − CSm − Comp, the buyers never report and the antitrust authority choose not
to investigate, (IB0 , (I
A
0 , (I
A
1 , Q
A))) with Pr1 = 0 (no updating). While the antitrust authority
investigates whenever there is reporting.
The proof of the above lemma and the one that follows will be given in the mathematical
appendix. The first lemma states that there will be no reporting if the cost of reporting is
higher than the difference of CS’s, under Cournot and collusion, and the compensation. In
other words, if the cartel manages to make the buyers just indifferent from the Cournot
equilibrium (i.e. by choosing accordingly the amount of compensation or choosing sufficiently
low prices) then there will be no reporting and the cartel will remain hidden from the antitrust
authority. Alternatively, it might be the case that the costs of reporting may be forbiddingly
high for the buyers to report.
Lemma 7.1.2 Separating Equilibrium:
If v < CSc − CSm − Comp, the buyers report under collusion and the antitrust authority
investigate, ((IB1 , I
B
0 ), ((I
A
1 , Q
A), IA0 )) with Pr1 equal to 1 if there is reporting Pr1 and equal
to zero if not.
A direct observation that arises from the above lemmas is that there are only truth
telling strategies used by the buyers. This is driven by the assumption that buyers are always
worse off under cartel formation, as well as from the fact that there is no noisy signal and that
the buyers have no uncertainty of the competitiveness of the market. As for the last lemma,
it states that collusion is not possible if the cost of reporting is low enough, consequently
there is only one equilibrium with reporting and it is conditional on the cost of reporting
and the compensation the buyers will receive. Therefore, reporting will not be observed if
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the cartel members are able to compensate the buyers. An interesting result that emerges is
that the absence of reporting, in industries where the buyers are able to report (have insight
information), does not mean that a cartel does not exist. It might be the case that the cartel
is successfully controlling for reporting.
The condition used to define the two lemmas can be used to define the Incentives
Compatibility Constraint (ICC from hereafter) of the buyers. A cartel will need to choose its
compensation in order for the buyers not to report, otherwise the suppliers will not collude
(this is derived with basic backward induction arguments of the cartel members’ participation
behaviour11). The ICC is found by rearranging the condition of lemma 7.1.1:
Comp


≥ CSc − CSm − v if v < CSc − CSbem ,
= 0 if v > CSc − CSbem .
The above condition states that the compensation decreases as the cost of reporting
increases12. Furthermore, notice that there is a max value for v such that no compensation
needs to be paid, this can be seen by the second part of the ICC. The max point is found by
comparing the loss of the CS under the benchmark case13, superscript (be) is for benchmark,
where no reporting is observed and no compensation needs to be paid. This is equivalent
to setting the ICC equal to zero and finding the cost of reporting that is greater than the
difference of the CS under Cournot and collusion.
The above analysis has implicitly assumed that the antitrust authority requires all buyers
11If the buyers are allowed to report then the cartel members will know with certainty that the antitrust
authority will dissolve the cartel. Hence, if there is a specific date that the cartel will dissolve then the
suppliers (cartel members) will deviate in the period before the break-down. The last argument suggests that
the incentives of deviation will be such that the cartel becomes unstable from period zero and as a result will
not be formed at all.
12It is not optimal, as it will be argued later on, for the cartel to overcompensate. Hence, the ICC will hold
with equality.
13Under linear demand (P = a− bQ) the benchmark collusive quantity is Qm = a−c2b . Notice that the under
linear demand can be written as CS = bQ
2
2 hence the CS under collusion (benchmark case) is CSm =
(a−c)2
8b .
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to report, thus excluding the possibility of a free-rider’s problem between buyers. However,
this problem is present due to the existence of the cost of reporting. The cost of reporting
needs to be paid by at least one buyer but the benefits (CS under Cournot) will be shared by
all. A buyer might not be willing to report if someone else is going to report, thus free-riding
on other buyers. An example of this dilemma is presented in the game that follows.
Buyer i / Buyer j Report Do not report
Report CSi,c − v, CSj,c − v CSi,c − v, CSj,c
Do not report CSi,c, CSj,c − v CSi,m, CSj,m
Table 7.1: Reporting Dilemma
The row player corresponds to buyer i while the column are buyers j where jǫ{1, .., i−
1, i + 1, ..., n} and j 6= i. A similar issue is examined by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984). In
their paper they show that there are M (number of buyers) equilibria in pure strategies with
M-1 buyers not reporting and one buyer reporting. They also show that if not all but some
players use pure strategies then there is at most one equilibrium in mixed strategies and if
all players choose mixed strategies there are at most two equilibria in mixed strategies with
reporting.
As for the antitrust authority, it is worthwhile to mention that requiring all buyers to
report is not optimal. Since reporting is a wasteful activity. At the same time Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1984) have shown that if there is a rule that requires only one player to pay the
cost (report) for a project that benefits all (competition in the next stage) then there will
be at least one buyer that will report. Thus, the optimal rule should be set to one buyer to
report.
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7.1.2 Cartel
The cartel anticipates the behavior of both the antitrust authority’s and the buyers’ and
as a consequence it should take them into consideration. However before presenting the
Cartel’s incentives, I will take some further simplifying assumptions. I assume that the
suppliers employ Grim strategies to sustain collusion with the punishment being the Cournot
equilibrium for all the remaining periods14. As for the maximization problem of the suppliers,
the cartel will need to satisfy the ICC of the buyers otherwise they will be reported and the
cartel will break down, this is according to the buyers’ behaviour derived from lemma 7.1.1.
Hence, the cartel should choose the collusive quantity given an extra constraint that needs to
be satisfied, the ICC of the buyers. The cartel’s maximization problem is defined as:
argmax
q
Π = (P − c)Q− comp
s.t.
[1] P = P (Q)
[2] Comp = CSc − CSm − v if v < CSc − CSbem
[3] Comp = 0 if v > CSc − CSbem
[4] Πc ≤ Πm
The cartel maximizes its profit’s by choosing a quantity subject to the aggregate demand,
the ICC which is presented in constraints 2 and 3 and the cartel’s own incentive compatibility
constraint. The last constraint states that the collusive profits need to be greater than the
ones under Cournot for a cartel to form, cartel’s own ICC. Notice that if constraints [2] and
14Admittedly there might be an optimal punishment period. However, I take as exogenous the punishment
period in order to simplify the analysis.
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[3] are dropped then I get the benchmark model (monopoly quantity). The 2nd constraint
states that a cartel to be successfully formed it has to make the buyers just indifferent on
reporting. While the 3rd constraint states that if the cost of reporting is forbiddingly high,
for the buyers to report, then the cartel should ignore the threat of reporting (not a credible
threat).
Proposition 7.1.3 If the condition of the 2nd constraint holds and v > 0, then the optimum
collusive quantity and price will be found by setting compensation equal to zero.
For the proof see the mathematical appendix. The above proposition (proposition 7.1.3)
states that under costly reporting a cartel will be formed by setting the compensation equal to
zero and choosing a quantity that satisfies the ICC. The intuition is that the cartel internalizes
the loss of CS for quantities smaller than the one that satisfies the ICC and as a consequence it
chooses zero compensation. However, the buyers are implicitly compensated by being offered
a lower price compared to the benchmark case. Moreover, the proposition states that if the
cost of reporting is too high (constraint 3 is binding) then the ICC (constraint 2) is not
binding and the cartel is back to the benchmark case. Notice that in the last case the threat
of reporting is not credible. A graphical illustration is provided in the figure that follows.
Figure 7.2: Cartel’s Profit and Buyers Incentives
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In the above figure I report the quantity at the horizontal axis and the monetary value of
the three functions presented at the vertical axis. The three functions are the profit function,
which is a concave function to quantity, the CS and the CS having added the cost of reporting,
which are convex. Moreover, it is trivial to show that for linear demand the CS is a convex
function on quantity and that it crosses the profit function at a point between the benchmark
collusive quantity, Qbem, and the Cournot quantity Qc. Notice that by introducing the cost
of reporting the CS shifts upwards, this is because the cost of reporting is always positive,
v(Q) > 0. I have also assumed, in the previous section, that v′(Q) ≥ 0 and v′′(Q) ≥ 0.
Therefore, it has a higher slope than the simple CS and a unique point when setting the ICC
with equality, CSc = CS + v.
Furthermore, there are three points of interest; the benchmark collusive quantity Qbem,
the collusive quantity that makes that buyers just indifferent from reporting Q∗m, and the
Cournot quantity, Qc. The CS at the Cournot quantity is found at the point CSc at the
graph, from which a horizontal line was drawn which extends that point up to the benchmark
collusive quantity. Additionally, the extended line crosses CS+ v(q) at the point that defines
the collusive quantity Q∗m. In other words, the collusive quantity that makes buyers indifferent
will provide a CS and cost of reporting that equals in value with the CSc, CS(Q
∗
m)+v(Q
∗
m) =
CS(Qc). Π
∗
m is the collusive profit when choosing Q
∗
m. I have also drawn a horizontal line
that extends Π∗m up to the benchmark collusive quantity. Notice that the choice of setting
the CS(Qc) being larger than Π
be
m is not random, since this holds under linear demand and
for the number of companies being greater than two. As for the cartel’s choice, if it decides to
produce Qbem then it will increase its profit by ∆Π, as depicted in the figure, but at the same
time it will have to compensate buyers by Comp = CS(Qc)− CS(Qbem)− v(Qbem), depicted in
the graph as Comp. As it can be seen from the graph the difference between the increased
profits and the compensation is going to be negative. The compensation increases by a faster
rate than the increase on profits, since CS(Q) + Profit must be increasing in quantities but
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less than the welfare optimum. Therefore, it is not optimal for the cartel to choose a quantity
smaller or higher than Q∗m. Therefore, the solution for the cartel will be found by setting the
compensation equal to zero. For values of v that drives the Q∗m (as depicted in the graph)
to be smaller than the Qbem, the cartel should choose Q
be
m since it will generate higher profits
and at the same time the buyers will not report. Finally, the last case corresponds to the
possibility that the cost of reporting is prohibitively high. In this case the horizontal line
drawn from point CSc will cross the CS+ v(q) curve at a quantity smaller than Q
be
m, thus the
cartel can choose Qbem and avoid be reported. Another interesting implication of proposition
7.1.3 is presented to the next corollary.
Corollary 7.1.4 If reporting is costly then there will be neither reporting nor compensation
of buyers when a cartel is formed.
Proof: By proposition 7.1.3 there will be no compensation and the buyers are just
indifferent from reporting if a cartel is formed. Moreover, by lemma 7.1.1 the buyers will not
report and as a result the antitrust authority will not investigate, since there is no updating
on its beliefs.
QED
This result states that it is not the actual act of reporting but the threat of reporting
that matters. It also suggests that the policy of allowing buyers to report seems insufficient
to counteract the creation of a cartel. However, the existence of the threat of reporting lowers
the collusive profits and the Dead Weight Loss (DWL). The last statement is presented in
the next proposition.
Proposition 7.1.5 The cost of reporting influences non-negatively the collusive profits and
non-positively the collusive quantity.
133
For the proof see the appendix. Proposition 7.1.5 states that if the antitrust authority
manages to decrease the cost of reporting the cartel profits will decrease. The driving force is
the reduction of the ICC (CSm ↑= CSc − v ↓⇒ Qm ↑). By decreasing the cost of reporting,
the collusive profits and the DWL decreases. A graphical representation of the proposition
7.1.5 is presented in the figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Profits and Quantity as a function of v
In the figure 7.3 I have calibrated the collusive quantity and profit as a function of the
cost of reporting. I have assumed linear demand, P = a − bQ where a is the maximum
willingness to pay, b a measure of the slope and P is the price. I have also assumed that the
cost of reporting enters linearly into the ICC of the buyers, CS(Qm) = CS(Qc)− v. Where
the individual (buyer i) CS under linear demand is defined as CSi =
bq2ι
2
. The values used for
the graph are a − c = 10, n = b = 2 and the cost of reporting takes values between 0.1 and
5. As expected the quantity decreases as the cost of reporting increases while the collusive
profits increase. The collusive quantity and profits become independent from changes on the
cost of reporting at the value of v = 4.9.
In order to investigate the impact of reporting on the likelihood of collusion I will
first need to define the CS. After substituting for a linear inverse demand the CS becomes:
CS = (bQ
2)
2
15. Let me define the number of colluding suppliers as n. The Cournot quantity
is Qc =
n(a−c)
(n+1)b
and the profits are: Πci =
(a−c)2
(n+1)2b
, where i stands for the individual supplier.
15The CS is defined as CS = (a−P )Q2 substituting for the linear demand function I get CS =
(bQ2)
2 .
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Let the Minimum Discount Factor (which will be defined as MDF from hereafter and I am
going to use δ for notation) be defined as the minimum discount factor that is required for
the cartel to be stable as defined by a trigger strategy with an infinite horizon punishment,
δ =
Πdi−Π
m
i
Πdi−Π
c
i
, where Πdi are the profits of a firm that deviates from the collusive quantity. Notice
that the benchmark trigger strategy is defined as choosing Qm at t if Qm was chosen at t-1
otherwise choose Qc. This generates the following incentive compatibility constraint for the
cartel: Πdi + δ ∗ Π
c
i
1−δ
≥ Πmi
1−δ
. The equality generates the condition for the minimum value of the
discount factor that will generate collusion (when the left hand side is equal to the right hand
side). Let me also define the probability of the generated discount factor being higher than
the MDF as fδ = Prob(δ > δMDF ). I will assume that fδ is independent from other factors
that influence collusion, defined as J . The last assumption suggests that Prob(fδ∩J) = fδ∗J .
Proposition 7.1.6 The cost of reporting influences negatively the likelihood of collusion,
given assumptions 1 and 2.
Assumptions:
1. Linear Demand
2. Independence between the MDF and other factors that influence collusion
For the proof see the appendix. The intuition of this result is simple. By decreasing the
costs of reporting, the collusive profits are relatively decreased by a smaller amount than the
decrease in deviation profits, which means that the cartel becomes more stable (the incentives
of deviation are relatively decreased). Alternatively, the reduction of the collusive profits will
span to the infinite horizon while the decrease in the deviation profits will influence the first
period only16. So a decrease on the cost of reporting decreases deviation profits by more than
16Let me remind the reader that the discount factor is calculated by setting the present value of the collusive
profits equal to the profit under deviation in the first period and the present value of the Cournot profits
starting from the period after the deviation
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the decrease on the present value of the collusive profits (the incentives to deviate decreases).
Hence, the discount factor required for stability (to satisfy the ICC of the cartel members)
decreases and as a consequence the probability for a cartel to form increases17.
Furthermore, the cost of reporting works as a mechanism of commitment, for the collu-
sive companies, to a quantity that is higher than the benchmark one. The deviation becomes
less profitable and the minimum discount required for a cartel to be sustained is reduced.
Consequently, the cartel becomes more stable and the likelihood to collude increases.
This result is actually counterintuitive, because one might expect that a decrease on
the costs of reporting and as a consequence an increase in the threat of being reported, will
generate cartels with a smaller probability. However, as it has just been shown the cartel
becomes more stable by satisfying the ICC18 of the buyers and as a result the cartel is
not threatened by reporting. In this case, this result states that if an antitrust authority
decreases the cost of reporting it will decrease the DWL, in existing cartels, but with the
trade-off of increasing the stability of a cartel and an increase in the probability of a cartel
being created. This last statement will be further explored in the section where I analyze
welfare implications. Finally, a similar result has been found by other researchers as well,
see for example Symeonidis (1999). He shows that restricting collusive profits increases the
likelihood of collusion by reducing the incentives to deviate.
Notice that proposition 7.1.6, as well as the previous results, are derived by some relative
general assumptions on the functional form of the cost of reporting19. For example, the cost
of reporting might be a function of the collusive quantity, representing the CS that the buyers
are willing to loose in order to avoid the inconvenience of reporting and giving testimony for
the cartel actions, or be just a fixed cost. Under either functional form the results will remain
17Notice that I have implicitly assumed that the realized discount factor is generated by a distribution that
has a single crossing property.
18Consequently the buyers will not report.
19This means that a regulator does not need to investigate the specific function that the costs of reporting
might obey to take action.
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unchanged, the only difference is that the collusive quantity will be calculated differently.
This is due to the fact that the results are driven by the existence of the ICC that the cartel
needs to satisfy and the assumption of costly reporting.
On the other hand, if the cost of reporting is zero then the cartel is not possible to form.
The reason is that the ICC will bind at a point where the CS under collusion is equal to the
CS under Cournot, CSm = CSc. Consequently, the cartel cannot satisfy the ICC constraint
and at the same time receive collusive profits greater than the Cournot profits. Furthermore,
if the cartel decides not to satisfy the ICC then the buyers will report, see lemma 7.1.2 (the
separating equilibrium), and as a result the cartel will be investigated and dissolved. The
next corollary summarizes the above findings.
Corollary 7.1.7 If the cost of reporting is zero then the likelihood of collusion is zero.
Proof: The ICC constraint is binding and the cartel needs to compensate the buyers.
However, compensation needs to be zero for a cartel to be profitable (see proof of proposition
7.1.4). As a result the CSm = CSc and the optimal choice of the cartel is the Cournot
equilibrium. Hence, zero probability of a cartel to be formed.
QED
The last result, in contrast to proposition 7.1.6, states that if the antitrust authority
manages to eliminate the costs of reporting then a cartel is not possible to form. The results
of this section can be combined to describe how the cost of reporting influences the likelihood
of collusion. To be more specific, proposition 7.1.6 states that the likelihood of collusion
increases as the cost of reporting decreases. Consequently, there is a point where the MDF is
not defined and the likelihood of collusion is zero (not possible to collude since they will be
immediately be reported). Therefore, I can combine proposition 7.1.3, 7.1.6 and corollary 7.1.7
to describe the relationship between the likelihood of collusion and the cost of reporting. By
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proposition 7.1.6 the likelihood of collusion is decreasing with respect to v. By corollary 7.1.7;
for zero cost the likelihood drops to zero suggesting at the limit that there is a discontinuity,
while by proposition 7.1.3 the v has a maximum bound that can be found by substituting
into the ICC the benchmark collusive quantity.
Notice that if I assume price competition (Bertrand) the results do not change. Actually
under Bertrand the likelihood of collusion is independent from the cost of reporting while the
collusive quantity and profits remain constant. Hence, the likelihood of collusion is non-
increasing (in general) to the cost of reporting. For more details please see the appendix. In
the next section I present a simple example.
A simple example
I assume a linear demand (P = a − bQ). From proposition 7.1.3 the cartel will choose a
quantity that is higher than the one under the benchmark case. Assume that the cost of
reporting enters the collusive quantity in the following way20:
Qm =
(a− c + γ)
2b
(7.3)
Where γ = f(v) is a function of v, which captures the effect of the cost of reporting
on the collusive quantity. I assume that γ is positively related to v. Notice that γ > 0 and
that if γ = 0 then we are back to the benchmark collusive case (this corresponds to the case
where v = 0). I further assume that γ decreases as the cost of reporting increases in other
words: ϑγ
ϑv
< 0. This is assumed in order to be in line with proposition 7.1.5, which states
20This is actually not a proper way to introduce the cost of reporting in the collusive quantity since
the v should influence the ICC and from the ICC should the collusive quantity be defined. However, the
quantity presented might be an approximate expression of the equilibrium Qm. To be more specific the ICC
is defined as CSm = (1 − v)CSc and this generates (a−bQm)Qm2b = (1 − v) (a−bQc)Qm2b . Rearranging terms
Qm =
a−
√
a2−4b(a−bQc)Qc(1−v)
2b and setting γ = c −
√
a2 − 4b(a− bQc)Qc(1− v). Notice that γ depends
negatively on v.
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that the cost of reporting influences non-positively the collusive quantity, as it is presented in
the example. Moreover, the Cournot equilibrium is reached when γ equals to:
γmax =
(a− c)(n− 1)
(n+ 1)
(7.4)
Which is found by setting equation 7.3 equal to the Cournot quantity. Moreover, the
minimum is found under the benchmark collusion case. Therefore, ϑQm
ϑv
< 0 (as predicted in
the previous section). Equation (9.3), which is the condition for no deviation from the cartel
members, states that (1− δ)ϑΠd
ϑv
− ϑΠm
ϑv
> 0. Notice that this condition is a rearrangement of
the MDF condition. Equation (9.3) can be rewritten as:
ϑΠd
Πd − Πc,i >
ϑΠm,i
Πm,i −Πc,i (7.5)
Hence, I need to show that the relative change on the deviation profits is greater than
the relative change on the collusive profits21, for the likelihood of collusion to be negatively
related to the cost of reporting. To verify that the condition holds I need to get an expression
of all the profit functions and their derivatives. Let me first define the collusive profits:
Πm,i =
(a−c)2−γ2
4nb
22. The derivative of the collusive profits with respect to the cost of reporting
is:
ϑΠm,i
ϑv
= −ϑγ
ϑv
γ
2nb
(7.6)
Notice that
ϑΠm,i
ϑv
> 0, as expected. For the deviation profits the maximization problem
21It is defined as relative because it is not quite proportional since I am subtracting a constant, the Cournot
profits, in the denominator of each fraction.
22The quantity is defined by 7.3 and the price is Pm = a − bQm. The profits are defined as Πm,i =
(a− bQm − c)qm,i, substituting for Qm this generates Πm,i = (a−c−γ)(a−c+γ)4nb = (a−c)
2
−γ2
4nb .
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is not constrained by the ICC of the buyers23. Thus, Πd = b(qd)
2 24 and as a consequence
I only need to find the deviation quantity. Maximizing the profit function of the deviating
firm I get the following expression qd =
(n+1)(a−c)−γ(n−1)
4nb
. Notice that the deviation quantity
is influenced negatively by the γ factor. Therefore, ϑqd
ϑv
> 0 in contrast to what happens
with the collusive quantity
ϑQm,i
ϑv
< 0. The intuition is that the collusive quantity defines
the residual demand hence an increase in v decreases the collusive quantity which in turn
increases the residual demand and the deviating firm can sell more. Mathematically, the cost
of reporting does not influence the deviating firm’s maximization problem which means that
γ only appears through the collusive quantity. The next step is to substitute qd into the profit
function:
Πd =
[(n+ 1)(a− c)− γ(n− 1)]2
16n2b
(7.7)
Notice that for γ = 0 I get the benchmark case. The derivative of the above profit
function with respect to the cost of reporting is positive as well:
ϑΠd
ϑv
= −
ϑγ
ϑv
(n− 1)[(n+ 1)(a− c)− γ(n− 1)]
8n2b
(7.8)
The next step is to get an expression for the denominators of condition 7.5. The Cournot
profits are defined as: Πc,i =
(a−c)2
b(n+1)2
. The denominator at the left hand side is (after some
algebra):
23As it has been shown in the proof of proposition 7.1.6, the firm that deviates will choose a quantity that
is greater than the individual collusive quantity. This means that under deviation the ICC will always be
satisfied (the ICC will no bind the deviating firm’s profits).
24The deviation profits are defined as Πd = (Pd − c)qd = (a − c − bqd − (n − 1)bQi,m)qd and at the same
time the first order condition (foc) of the profit maximization is 0 = a− c− (n− 1)bQi,m− 2bqd. The foc can
be rewritten as bqd = a − c− (n− 1)bQi,m − bqd and by substituting this expression in the profit function I
get Πd = b(qd)
2.
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Πd − Πc = (n− 1)[[(n+ 1)(a− c)− γ(n− 1)](n+ 1) + 4n(a− c)]
16n2
(7.9)
While the denominator at the right hand side is:
Πm,i −Πc = (n− 1)(a− c) + γ(n+ 1)
4n
(7.10)
Substituting the reduced forms of 7.6, 7.8 and equations 7.9 and 7.10 into 7.5 and after
some algebra, what remains is the following condition:
γ <
(a− c)(n− 1)
(n+ 1)
(7.11)
The above condition always holds since equation 7.4 gives the maximum value of γ which
is the right hand side of equation 7.11. Therefore, the likelihood of collusion is negatively
related to the cost of reporting.
In this section I have shown that a decrease in the cost of reporting will actually generate
more stable cartels. The mechanism behind this result is twofold. First of all, the cartel needs
to commit at smaller profit, by increasing its supply. The second force is the incentive for
a cartel member to deviate; the cartel by committing to a smaller profit it further decreases
the deviation profit and as consequence the stability increases.
7.2 Social Welfare Implications
The purpose of this section is to establish that a policy targeting on decreasing the cost of
reporting will increase the Social Welfare (SW). Thus, justifying as socially optimal the OFT
efforts to increase market transparency in the markets, which implicitly decreases the cost of
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reporting.
7.2.1 Social Welfare
In this section I will assume that the SW is maximized when the DWL is minimized (this is
equivalent to assume equal weights between buyers and suppliers). Some further simplifying
assumptions are presented below:
Assumptions:
1. The discount factor is generated by a uniform distribution.
2. If the generated discount factor is greater than the MDF, then the likelihood of collusion
equals to 1.
3. There are m identical industries.
4. Linear Demand.
5. Independence between the MDF and other factors that influence collusion.
Under the above assumption, I show that the cost of reporting influences negatively the
SW. I also show that the efficiency gain (decrease on prices) is greater than the potential
increase in the number of cartels, through an increase to their stability.
Proposition 7.2.1 Under the above assumptions, there is a negative relationship between the
cost of reporting and the SW.
For the proof see the appendix. As it was argued at the introduction, there are two
effects working on the opposite direction. The first one, the reduction of the cost of reporting
decreases the DWL (ϑDWL
ϑv
> 0), which is a consequence of proposition 7.1.3. While at the
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same time a decrease on the costs of reporting decreases the MDF, stabilizing the cartel, and
as a result increases the likelihood of collusion. This means that by reducing the costs of
reporting the DWL will decline in existing collusive industries but at the same time it will
increase the number of the cartels in a country. However as proposition 7.2.1 states, the gains
from reducing the DWL outweighs the potential losses from the increase on the probability
for a cartel to be created in other industries.
Moreover, the cost of reporting can also be interpreted as the cost that buyers need
to pay in order to discover the competitive status of their suppliers. If this is the case then
the analysis in the previous sections remains unchanged but the welfare implications change.
Mainly because the question that needs to be answered is whether market transparency
between participants is desirable. Additionally, the measures that an antitrust authority
needs to take change as well. Instead of reducing the cost of reporting the authority will need
to take measures to increase the market transparency between market participants (buyers
and suppliers). For example, it might enforce a good trade act that requires suppliers to trade
on a particular code. Notice that the last suggestion is a policy that is already used in the
UK by OFT.
7.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that for a cartel to be formed it is required for buyers to be
prevented from reporting. Consequently, the cartel’s profit is constrained to lower values than
the benchmark monopoly profit. However, this generates a lower MDF, required for a stable
cartel, and as a result reporting increases the likelihood of collusion. When I examine the
effect of an antitrust authority policy on lowering the cost of reporting I show that the social
welfare increases, even though the likelihood of a cartel to be created increases. The driving
force of the last result is the increase of Consumer Surplus which cancels out the decrease of
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Social Welfare from the increased probability of a cartel to be generated.
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Chapter 8
Cartel Mechanisms on Controlling
Reporting and Optimal Antitrust
Policy
In this chapter I investigate alternative mechanisms to control for reporting. To be more
specific, I examine whether the threat of exclusion (foreclosure) is a robust strategy for a
cartel to use. The credibility of this threat depends on the size and the number of buyers,
as well as the number of suppliers. Thus, anonymity for the reporting buyer and monitoring
cartel members’ behavior after prosecution is essential to protect the buyers from the cartel’s
retaliation tactics. I also introduce buyers heterogeneity with respect to the cost of reporting.
I show that under some conditions the cartel can compensate the buyers. At the last section
I compare reporting with treble damages to characterize the most efficient policy.
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8.1 Introduction
The cartels have been found to employ a number of strategies to avoid being detected. For
example, in a case with Recruitment Agencies in UK1 they used the threat of exclusion as a
mechanism to enforce collusion. In addition it is possible for the cartel to price discriminately
based on whether the buyers are informed or not. However, in order to argue about antitrust
authority’s intervention I will need to compare the policy of allowing buyers to report with
the alternative of buyers taking legal actions (treble damages). Therefore, I am interested
in answering the following questions: What alternative mechanisms can a cartel use to avoid
being reported? And what is the optimal private enforcement policy?
For the threat of exclusion to be credible the cartel will need to take a re-instate strategy.
This is due to the fact that the punishment of a reporting buyer needs to be taken when the
antitrust authority has imposed competition. Therefore, for a cartel member to have an
incentive to punish at the competition stage (when a cartel has been dissolved) it is required
that the cartel will be re-instated. Consequently, I employ a sharp trigger strategy (as defined
by P. Schiraldi and F. Nava (2012)). I compare the minimum discount factor (MDF) generated
from this strategy with the benchmark one (required to prevent deviation at the collusive
stage) and I show that the re-instated MDF is more binding for some parameter values. I also
shown that the threat of exclusion becomes more difficult to implement when the number of
buyers is small, the number of excluded buyers is large and when the number of suppliers is
small as well. Another interesting result, of this chapter, is that differences on the cost of
reporting might generate compensation.
At the last section, I compare two private enforcement policies. The first one is a policy
to promote buyers’ reporting to the antitrust authority and the alternative is to allow for the
buyers to take legal action against the cartel. I further relax the assumption of a cartel being
1See http : //www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition− act− and− cartels/ca98/closure/recruitment−
agencies/.
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detected with probability one and I also allow for the probability of a buyer to successfully
win a legal action, given the existence of a cartel, to be less than one. Finally, I show that
reporting is a more efficient policy than taking legal action.
The next section presents the threat of exclusion and in the second section the case
with the heterogeneous cost of reporting is presented. In the third section I compare the two
private enforcement policies and in the last section I conclude.
8.2 Threat of Exclusion, foreclosure
The threat of exclusion, foreclosure, is not a new concept in economics. The effect of foreclo-
sure has been examined in mergers and has been used to rationalize tie-ins; see for example
Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Whinston (1990) and Rey and Tirole (2007). However, as
far as I know the threat of exclusion has not been examined as a tool of collusion. The threat
of exclusion in a collusive framework is not only of a mere academic interest. Quite recently
there was a cartel case with Recruitment Agencies in UK which begun in 2003 and ended
in 20062. The recruitment agencies were responsible for finding candidates for intermediaries
and certain construction companies in the UK. Seven companies had colluded in order to
protect their margins from the entrance of an intermediary, (Parc UK Ltd). The cartel had
boycotted the new entrant (have threaten with exclusion their buyers). The investigation was
triggered by a leniency applicant (in 2005). Even though the breakdown of the cartel was not
caused by buyers reporting on the cartel, this case is interesting since it suggests the use of
the threat of exclusion as a tool to enforce collusion. Thus, this section introduces the threat
of exclusion as a mechanism to control for reporting.
In this section I am going to assume that the buyers have no direct cost of reporting
2See http : //www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition− act− and− cartels/ca98/closure/recruitment−
agencies/.
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(v = 0) but the cartel’s members can use exclusionary threats to their buyers. As a result
the cartel generates an indirect cost of reporting (when using the exclusionary threat). To be
more specific, excluding a buyer will generate a zero Consumer Surplus (CS). Therefore, the
difference of the CS without reporting and the CS under exclusion (which is zero) is the cost
of reporting. Consequently, in this section I rationalize the existence of the cost of reporting3,
which was assumed previously. I further believe that the use of the threat of exclusion
is a reasonable assumption since practitioners have suggested that exclusionary threats are
used either explicitly or implicitly to coordinate different practices. See for example Intel in
2009 (fined by EU for 1bn Euro) where it used exclusionary threats to bundle its products
and decrease competition on the microchip market. Furthermore, I am avoiding the term
foreclosure since I focus in final product buyers.
First of all note that, with the exception of the cost of reporting, all the other assump-
tions of chapter 7 hold (Cournot Competition, timing and anti-trust authority have zero prior
probability for the likelihood of collusion). In addition, note that when a cartel is formed
it is possible that some buyers (if buyers are heterogeneous) will be excluded in any case.
Therefore, threatening this group of buyers with exclusion is not credible. An illustration of
this case is given to the next subsection.
8.2.1 Excluded Buyers
Assume that the buyers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness to pay (infinitely
heterogeneous). This is equivalent to assume m buyers with different maximum willingness
to pay and individual demands that can be aggregated (P =
∑m
i=1(ai− bqi))4. The suppliers,
though, cannot price discriminately when competing but they might know that there are
3In this way I explicitly propose an interpretation of what the cost of reporting might be.
4Therefore, the buyers are not imposed on buying a one unit of quantity.
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Figure 8.1: Collusive Price and Excluded Buyers
different types of buyers in the market5. Let me now give an example how the groups of
excluded and included buyers are generated. The next figure (8.1) presents the argument.
In figure (8.1) I present the collusive price and quantity, as well as the corresponding ones
for the competitive case. First of all, notice that an increase in price will create a reduction in
the quantity supplied (from Qc to Qm). Hence, any buyer with maximum willingness to pay
greater than the Cournot price but smaller than the collusive price will be excluded (shadowed
area). This means that it is meaningless to threaten buyers who are already excluded from
the market with exclusion. However, this generates an interesting result; the cartel is more
threatened of being reported by the excluded (marginal) buyers than the included ones (as
it will be shown) and as a result the cartel is willing to compensate (with lower price or
compensation - monetary transfer) only the excluded buyers and keep them in the market.
This holds if the threat of exclusion is robust to the included buyers.
However, I still need to show that there is an equilibrium strategy (pricing or compen-
sating) that will guarantee no reporting from the excluded buyers. This is done in the next
subsection.
5This assumption will be better understood later on.
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8.2.2 Equilibrium Cartel Behavior
In this subsection I present the equilibrium behavior of the cartel when both excluded and
included buyers are present. In order to simplify the analysis I will assume that there are
two groups of buyers with different maximum willingness to pay. To be more specific assume
a population of buyers (min) with ain (the maximum willingness to pay for the included
buyers) and a population of buyers (mex) with aex (the maximum willingness to pay for the
excluded buyers), where subscript in is for Included and subscript ex for Excluded. Assume
that ain > aex and that P
m > aex (the group with the lowest willingness to pay is excluded),
where Pm is the benchmark uniform (imposing no discrimination) collusive price. I am also
assuming that the cartel can identify the two groups6, with no mimicking. Furthermore and
as presented in the graph (8.1), a cartel can only use an exclusionary threat to the “included”
buyers and compensate the excluded. The cartel can either compensate the excluded buyers
by setting a price P¯ that is just affordable for this group, where P co ≤P¯< Pm 7, (which
generates price discrimination) or set a higher price and make a monetary transfer to the
excluded buyers (compensate). However, the last case cannot be an equilibrium response
since the cartel can profit from the excluded by offering at least their reservation price (than
not selling and paying for compensation which generates a negative return from this group
of buyers)8. Therefore, the excluded buyers will be offered a lower price than the included.
However, I still need to show that the exclusionary threat is credible.
6So I implicitly assume that the cartel might suspect that the buyers have different valuations. Thus, it
offers the collusive price to all and if a buyer refuses to buy then the cartel is willing to offer a lower price up
to the Cournot. I do not investigate the bargaining process that might arise but I definitely know that the
equilibrium price for this cohort of buyers needs to be smaller than the collusive and greater or equal than
the Cournot.
7Since Pm > aex ⇒ P¯< Pm.
8Πm = ΠmIn+(P¯−c)QEx > ΠmIn − Comp as long as P¯−c > 0. Notice that ΠmIn is the part of the collusive
profit derived from the inclusive buyers.
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8.2.3 Threat of Exclusion
In order to focus entirely on the credibility of the threat of exclusion I will assume that there
are no excluded buyers (mex = 0). Therefore, I am looking at the homogenous case (buyers
are identical). The demand is defined as P = a − bQ, where I have neglected the subscript
In because of the buyers homogeneity assumption.
First of all, notice that the threat is credible with respect to the buyers. Being excluded
will generate a zero CS which is worse than CSm (as long as P
m < a which always holds).
As for the cartel members, the exclusionary threat will take place after the cartel has been
dissolved, since the antitrust authority would have investigated and enforced Cournot compe-
tition. Thus, the exclusion of a buyer will take place at the Cournot stage. This means that
the cartel members will need to employ a sharp trigger strategy (a cartel re-instate strategy),
as defined by P. Schiraldi and F. Nava (2012)9, given that a buyer has been excluded. At the
intervention (by the antitrust authority) stage the suppliers will need to exclude the report-
ing party, generating Cournot profits smaller than the benchmark case (where everyone is
supplied). At the last stage suppliers decide to re-instate the cartel given that the reporting
buyers (notice that I am not restricting reporting to only one buyer) has been excluded, in
order for the suppliers to have an incentive to punish the reporting party. I also assume
that the cartel members know which buyer has reported and from where they buy (which
supplier). A strategy of enforced punishment, following P. Schiraldi and F. Nava (2012), can
be defined as:
• if: Qm,t−1 then qi,m,t
• if: Qt−1 > Qm,t−1 then qi,c,t
9They define a trigger strategy of an infinitely repeated game where the suppliers might re-instate with a
positive probability. Their strategy refinement is more general than mine since I restrict that probability to
be equal to one.
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• if: reporting in t− 2 and QX,t−1 then qi,m
• if: reporting in t− 2 and Qc,t−1 then qi,c
Where QX,t−1 is the aggregate Cournot quantity under exclusion. Notice that the quan-
tity under exclusion needs to be smaller than the Cournot quantity, QX,t−1 < Qc,t−1. Subscript
t corresponds to time. The first two points, of the above strategy, are the benchmark trigger
strategy. These two points state that if in the previous period (t-1) the aggregate quantity
was equal to the collusive then the individual supplier should choose the collusive quantity,
otherwise choose Cournot. Notice that this strategy corresponds to the benchmark Grim
strategy with an infinite punishment. The last two points correspond to the case where a
buyer has reported (in t-2) and the cartel needs to employ a strategy to punish the buyer.
To be more specific, these two points state that if there was reporting in period t-2 and the
supplier has punished the buyer at t-1 (QX,t−1) then the firm should choose the collusive
quantity, otherwise choose the Cournot (with an infinite punishment as well). It is implicitly
assumed that the anti-trust authority is not able to monitor the market from the second
period and onwards. Notice, that the last two points define the out of the equilibrium path
(at equilibrium there will be no reporting). However, I need to examine these points in order
to verify that the threat is credible.
I also need to show that a discount factor exists that supports such a strategy. To do
so I need to compare the stream of profit under compliance and under no compliance, where
compliance corresponds to punishing the buyer. The compliance profit is ΠX +
δΠm
1−δ
, while
the profit without punishment is Πc
1−δ
. By setting the compliance profit greater than or equal
to the profit without compliance I get the following discount factor requirement:
δ ≥ δE = Πc,i − ΠX,i
Πm,i − ΠX,i (8.1)
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Where superscript E is used to denote the MDF required for this strategy to be cred-
ible. Since Πm,i > Πc,i and both the numerator and denominator are positive then there
is a discount factor that supports this strategy (sufficient condition). The above minimum
discount factor is calculated based on individual cartel member incentives and assuming that
this member will need to punish the reporting buyer (generating ΠX,i). The next step is to
compare δE (defined in equation 8.1) with the benchmark one (δBen =
Πd,i−Πm,i
Πd,i−Πc,i
≥ δE) and
infer which is more binding, where binding refers to the highest MDF. The benchmark MDF
will be higher if:
δBen > δE
Rearranging terms:
δBenΠm,i − Πc,i + (1− δBen)ΠX,i > 0
This means that it is sufficient to focus on δBenΠm,i − Πc,i > 0. Substituting for δBen
and rearranging terms:
(Πd,i −Πm,i)Πm,i > Πc,i(Πd,i −Πc,i)
Gathering terms with respect to Πd,i this gives:
Πd,i(Πm,i − Πc,i)− (Π2m,i − Π2c,i) > 0
Straightforward algebra gives:
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Πd,i − Πm,i − Πc,i > 0 (8.2)
For the above condition to hold the number of suppliers needs to be larger than 4.10
However, it will be more interesting to see how the above condition behaves as the number of
buyers and the excluded buyers changes. Let define the benchmark MDF, having substituted
for Πd,i, Πm,i and Πc,i:
δ =
(n + 1)2
(n+ 1)2 + 4n
(8.3)
Notice that the above MDF depends solely on the number of suppliers (n). I am now
going to assume that the size of the market is fixed, while I change the number of buyers
(m). Let me also define parameter “A” as the number of buyers that need to be punished,
where A ǫ (0, m]. The size of the market is kept fixed in order to simplify the analysis.
Mainly because I am not interested to investigate what happens as the size of the market
changes. However, these parameterizations will allow me to examine the impact of the size
of buyers (as m increases, keeping constant the size of the market (parameter a), the size of
the buyers (quantity per buyer) decreases) and the impact of the number of excluded buyers
given the size of the market (as A increases and given m and the size of the market a the
number of excluded buyers, which corresponds to higher quantity, increases). Consequently,
this assumption allows me to keep the benchmark MDF unchanged with respect to other
factors (such as parameters a, b and c) except of n. Notice that I let the max value of A to
be m in order to examine what happens if the supplier needs to punish all of their buyers.
Additionally, the term m − A will capture the number of buyers that have not reported
(and there is no need to punish). Let me now examine what happens with the MDF under
the threat of exclusion when the number of buyers changes, keeping the size of the market
10Substituting for Πd,i =
(n+1)2(a−c)2
16bn2 , Πm,i =
(a−c)2
4bn and Πc,i =
(a−c)2
(n+1)2b
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unchanged.
Define πc =
Πc,i
m
the per buyer profit of a supplier11. Furthermore, define ΠX,i = (m −
A)πc =
(m−A)Πc,i
m
. The last equation relates the profits under the threat of exclusion with
the ones under the benchmark case. Notice that as the m parameter increases, the cost of
the threat of exclusion decreases (since the cost of exclusion is the profit foregone in that
period). To be more specific as m↑ then ΠX,i ↑ (for given A) which means that the foregone
profits decreases (cost of implementing this strategy), ∆Π ↓= Πc,i − ΠX,i ↑. The next step
is to substitute the above expressions, of the Cournot profits, in the MDF under threat of
exclusion. Substituting for ΠX,i into 8.1 gives:
δ =
Πc,i − (m−A)Πc,im
Πm,i − (m−A)Πc,im
Substituting for Πm,i =
(a−c)2
4bn
, Πc,i =
(a−c)2
(n+1)2b
and after some algebra I get:
δ =
4An
m(n− 1)2 + 4nA (8.4)
The new MDF depends on the number of suppliers, the number of buyers and the
number of excluded buyers (A). Some comparative statics are reported below:
ϑδ
ϑA
=
4nm(n− 1)2
(m(n− 1)2 + 4nA)2 > 0, (8.5)
ϑδ
ϑn
= − 4Am(n
2 − 1)
(m(n− 1)2 + 4nA)2 < 0, (8.6)
ϑδ
ϑm
= − 4An(n− 1)
2
(m(n− 1)2 + 4nA)2 < 0 (8.7)
11Just to remind the reader that both suppliers and buyers are homogeneous. Thus, the profits and the
buyers should be equally divided between the firms.
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Figure 8.2: Minimum Discount Factor
The first derivative states that as the size of a buyer (A) (or the number of excluded
buyers) that needs to be excluded increases the cartel becomes less stable. Due to the fact that
the excluded buyers absorb a greater proportion of the profits as (A) increases (the punishment
becomes harder to be implemented12). While the MDF will be negatively influenced by a
change in the number of suppliers (n). This means that as the number of suppliers increases
competition becomes more intense and the suppliers can extract less profit per buyer. Hence,
the cost of punishment decreases as the number of suppliers, the intensity of competition,
increases (see the partial derivative 8.6). Furthermore, as the number of buyers increases (m)
the cost of implementing the threat decreases (see the partial derivative 8.7). The intuition
is that as m increases the per buyer profit decreases and as a result the cost of punishment
decreases. However, I need to be careful how to interpret these comparative statics since the
MDF of the benchmark case might dominate (higher) the MDF under the threat of exclusion.
The figure 8.2 presents this case.
In the vertical axis I have introduced the MDF and in the horizontal the number of
suppliers (taking values from 2 to 6) and the parameter A (taking values from 0.1 to 2). In
12More profits need to be foregone.
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the first graph I present the MDF under the threat of the exclusion and in the second graph I
have plotted the maximum of the MDF under the benchmark trigger strategy and the MDF
under the threat of exclusion strategy (the sharp trigger strategy). I have imposed that the
maximum number of buyers per supplier to be equal to two (m=2). Notice that for a cartel
to be stable the realized discount factor needs to be greater than the surface of the plotted
MDF in both the graphs. The MDF under the threat of exclusion takes its maximum when
the number of suppliers are 2 (smallest possible) and the supplier needs to punish all of its
buyers (m=A=2), while the minimum is generated when the number of suppliers is 6 and the
punishment is the smallest of all (A=0.1).
As it was shown (by the comparative statics) the MDF increases as the number of buyers
that need to be excluded (parameter A) increases and decreases as the number of suppliers
(parameter n) increases. The intuition is simple, as the number of buyers that need to be
excluded increases (parameter A) the cost of punishment increases and the cartel member
needs to be more patient (willing to sacrifice a greater portion of current date profits with the
potential of high profits tomorrow). However, as the number of suppliers increases the cost of
the punishment decreases. This is due to the fact that the number of suppliers corresponds
to the intensity of competition (a` la Cournot) and as a result as n increases the Cournot
profits decreases (the cost of foregoing profits decrease) which means that the cartel member
needs to be relatively less patient. Hence, there are two effects working in opposite directions,
the number of buyers that need to be punished that increases the MDF and the number of
suppliers that decreases the MDF generated by the sharp trigger strategy.
However, the MDF under the benchmark case might be greater than the one under
the threat of exclusion. This is what I show in the second graph where I have plotted
the max MDF. I have identified the regions where the MDF under the threat of exclusion
dominates the benchmark MDF and vice versa. The flattened surface is generated due to the
benchmark MDF which dominates the new MDF. Notice that the MDF of the benchmark
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case is independent of A (but not of n) and as a result the MDF is only two dimensional
and generates a flat area. As can be seen, the MDF under the threat of exclusion is higher
when the number of suppliers is small, while the benchmark MDF dominates from a point
and afterwards (for n ≥ 5, as shown in the previous paragraphs, see 8.2). This suggests that
the threat of exclusion is more difficult to sustain if the number of suppliers is small and the
number of buyers that need to be punished is large enough.
The threat of exclusion forces buyers that can afford to pay for the increase in prices
(included buyers) to accept the benchmark collusive price. While for the excluded buyers,
the buyers that cannot afford the increase, the cartel will need to set a price such that they
are just indifferent from reporting and to remain in the market (see section 8.2.2). Therefore,
price discrimination arises because of the threat of exclusion and the ability of the cartel to
identify the excluded buyers.
However, notice that reporting is neutral with respect to the likelihood of collusion, for
the range of values (n ≥ 5) that generate an MDF independent of the factors that influence
the compliance strategy (enforcement of the threat of exclusion). This is mainly because the
ability of the buyers to report does not constrain the collusive profits and this is because of
the threat of exclusion. However, for the region where the MDF of the compliance strategy
is higher than the one of the stability then there is a possibility that the true discount factor
belongs in between these values (δs < δ < δcp, where s is for stability and cp for compliance
strategy). This means that the cartel is not possible to form since a compliance strategy to
punish reporting is not credible. This is in contrast to what the majority of the research has
shown, which argue that for a small number of suppliers collusion is more likely.
To conclude, the threat of exclusion is a credible strategy to control reporting and
as a consequence the antitrust authority should take measures to protect buyers from such
tactics. Anonymity for the reporting buyer and monitoring of cartel members’ behaviour after
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prosecution is essential (in order to avoid exclusion).
8.3 Heterogenous cost of reporting
This section assumes exogenous differences on cost of reporting. Assume that there are two
groups of buyers. A group of population H which faces a cost of reporting vH and another
group of population of size L which faces a cost of reporting vL, with vH > vL. Let me
remind the reader that the total population of buyers is M. Assume that vH is such that the
high cost group will never report13. I will also assume that there are no excluded buyers; the
buyers maximum willingness to pay is identical. In order to simplify the analysis it will be
assumed that if a cartel is reported, it is going to be punished with a probability equal one
(probability of an antitrust authority to detect and successfully prosecute a cartel is one).
Last, I assume that the cartel cannot use 3rd degree price discrimination, thus the cartel must
set a uniform price under a linear demand. This can be rationalized if the use of 3rd degree
price discrimination raises anticompetitive concerns to the antitrust authority. However, the
cartel knows which buyers are informed and as a result is able to compensate. Therefore,
there is a range on the population of “informed” (where informed from now on will refer to
the buyers that are faced with lower cost of reporting) buyers that the cartel will choose to
satisfy the ICC while for a sufficiently low number of informed buyers the cartel will choose
to compensate these buyers through a monetary transfer14. This result is presented in the
next proposition.
Proposition 8.3.1 Compensation as a monetary transfer at equilibrium:
If L
M2
≥ (P ∗−c)q∗−Π′
CS(Qc)−CS(Qm)−v
the cartel chooses to satisfy the ICC. If L
M2
< (P
∗−c)q∗−Π′
CS(Qc)−CS(Qm)−v
the
13The buyers are faced with a cost such that CSm,b > CSco + v
H
14Notice that compensation generates a 3rd degree discrimination. However, the fact that it is is a monetary
transfer this will remain unobserved by the antitrust authority. Therefore, satisfying the requirement that
there is no price discrimination.
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cartel chooses to compensate the informed buyers and the optimal quantity will be found at
the benchmark case.
Where, Π′ are the profits that arise when satisfying the buyers’ ICC. The proof is based
on comparing the profits when the ICC is satisfied and the profits when compensation is
provided. A sketch of the proof is the following:
The maximization problem under compensation is defined as:
argmax
q
Π = (Pm − c)Qm −
L∑
j
{
CSc,j − CSm,j + v
}
(8.8)
Where the compensation is the sum of L buyers CS. By using the terms: Qj =
Q
M
and
under linear demand CS = bQ
2
2
I generate the following profit function:
argmax
q
Π = (Pm − c)Qm − L
M2
{
CSQc − CSQm + v
}
The above equation is generated by summing L times the expression CSQc −CSQm + v
(homogeneous buyers need to have j identical CS) and by substituting Qj =
Q
M
into the CS
expressions. In addition, notice that the f.o.c. (first order condition) has a unique solution at
Q*. The next step is to compare the profit function as defined by 8.8 with the profit’s under
ICC (Π′). This comparison generates the condition presented in proposition 8.3.1.
The intuition of the proposition is the following, if the population of informed buyers is
low enough then the compensation that needs to be paid is less than the increase in profits
by restricting the quantity and as a result the cartel will find it optimal, higher profits, to
compensate the informed buyers. In this case the informed buyers are better off than the
uninformed, since the informed are compensated. However, the uninformed will benefit if the
population of the informed buyers (L) is high enough, since the cartel will decide to satisfy
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the ICC (by setting a lower price). As a result the number of informed buyers constrains the
ability of the cartel to extract CS from the uninformed buyers.
Moreover, notice that the price will exhibit a jump in prices (from the price that satisfies
the ICC of the informed buyers to the benchmark collusive), as the ratio of the population
changes. This is achieved when the population ratio L
M2
is initially lower than (P
∗−c)q∗−Π′
CS(Qc)−CS(Qm)−v
and then increases beyond that point. Notice that in this case the likelihood of collusion
will depend on the population of the informed buyers. As L increases the collusive profits
decrease (in the case where compensation needs to be paid) and the likelihood increases (see
Proposition 7.1.615). In the case where the cartel needs to satisfy the buyers’ ICC, an increase
on the L share of the population will not have an impact to the collusive profits (the cartel is
already satisfying the incentives of the informed buyers) therefore no impact on the likelihood
of collusion either.
Finally, when the cartel is able to price discriminately then it will find it optimal to set
a price (PL) to the informed buyers which satisfies their ICC and the benchmark collusive
price to the uninformed buyers. In this case the uninformed buyers do not benefit from the
existence of the informed buyers. Therefore, price discrimination can be used as a tool for the
cartel to control reporting16. Notice that price discrimination does not arise on differences of
maximum willingness to pay between different groups of buyers, or the size of the markets,
but merely from the fact that buyers are either informed on the existence of a cartel and can
report or not.
15Actually this is a straightforward result from proposition 7.1.6 and 8.3.1. By proposition 8.3.1 as the
population of informed buyers increases the collusive profits decreases. Hence, in this case the population
parameter has the same properties of the cost of reporting. To be more specific both are binding the collusive
profits (under both cases the cartel is forced to satisfy the ICC) and this is the driving force of proposition
7.1.6. The only difference is that the two effect have an opposite, with respect to the sign, impact on the
likelihood of collusion.
16The no arbitrage assumption for a 3rd degree price discrimination applies.
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8.4 A Comparison with Treble Damages
Let me now compare the results of the previous sections to the ones in the treble damages
literature. Spulber (1989) uses a cost for legal action and reaches to similar conclusions on
how the cartel chooses its quantity but does not investigate the cartel’s stability, some further
differences will be presented in this section as well. However, I need first to introduce buyers’
choice of taking legal action in the basic model, in order to compare the two policies.
Let me define the cost of taking a case to the court as k. I assume that the damages
that can be retrieved by the buyers are just once, and not triple, the difference between
CS under Cournot and collusion17. Furthermore, the game needs to be redefined in order to
include the possibility that buyers can take legal action. The cartel’s and antitrust authority’s
choice set remains unchanged but the buyers can also choose to take the cartel to the court
in period zero. If the buyers win the case they receive the exact amount of their damages
in the next period, CSco − CSm, and the antitrust authority punishes the cartel in period
218. If the buyers lose the case they have to pay the legal expenses, k. In addition, if the
buyers were unsuccessful in winning the case, the antitrust authority will not take any further
measures against the cartel. Furthermore, I have assumed that if a buyer reports then it
takes one period for an antitrust authority to investigate and dissolve a cartel. In this way
I am capturing the fact that antitrust authority’s investigations are time demanding. The
time-line is presented in figure (8.3).
Moreover, I am going to assume that the antitrust authority punishes the cartel with a
penalty Pen(Q) whenever a cartel is found either because of reporting or because the buyers
won a case in the court. Assume that, Pen′(Q) < 0, the penalty increases as the quantity
decreases and Pen′′(Q) > 0. Furthermore, I allow the buyers to report first and then take
legal action. If reporting happens and the antitrust authority traces the existence of a cartel,
17This is a simplifying assumption.
18The antitrust authority observes the decision of the court and then takes further action
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Figure 8.3: Timeline Extended, Ch. 8
the buyers can sue and win with probability equal to 1. Moreover, I will assume a type I
error, there is a cartel but the antitrust authority fails to successfully dissolve it. This will
be captured by introducing a probability h for an antitrust authority to successfully punish
a cartel.
The analysis that am presenting in this section is based on comparing the different
actions of the players and identifying their optimal behavior. I first define the buyers’ value
function from reporting the cartel:
Vr = CSm +
hδCSco
1− δ +
(1− h)δCSm
1− δ − v (8.9)
Where subscript r is for reporting, h the probability of a cartel being punished and δ
the discount factor (used for the buyers to discount the future). Notice that the parameter
h captures the uncertainty to the benefits of a successful antitrust authority investigation.
This was done in order to enrich the framework and as a robustness check on the driving
forces of reporting. Furthermore and in contrast to the previous chapter, the discount factor
appears to the buyers payoff function. This is a result of the assumption that punishment of
the antitrust authority and court decisions are taken in the next period. Notice that in the
previous chapter the discount factor did not appear because the buyers had an incentive to
report from the first period (since the cartel was dissolved immediately).
The buyers’ payoff when they first report and then take legal action is:
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Vr,l = CSm + hδ
2(CSco − CS)m) + hδCSco
(1− δ) +
(1− h)δCSm
(1− δ) − v (8.10)
Where the subscript l is for legal action. Notice that the term CSco − CSm appears in
equation 8.10. This term is the damages paid to the buyers when a case in the court is won.
The damages are multiplied by the discount factor raised to the square; this is due to the
assumption that legal action will be chosen in period one and the decision of the court will
be formalized in period two. Thus, the benefits of this action will be enjoyed in the second
period while the costs will be borne at period zero. Moreover, there are no costs of taking a
legal action since if the antitrust authority has penalized the cartel, with probability h, then
the buyers will win the case for sure and the legal costs will be paid by the cartel (if the
antitrust authority has not found a cartel then the buyers have no incentive to take a legal
action). I implicitly assume that if the antitrust authority fails to penalize a cartel then the
buyers or the antitrust authority cannot pursue a retrial19. Finally, it is trivial to show that
Vr,l > Vr. This means that the buyers should always prefer to report and claim damages than
just to report.
According to the EU Green Paper20, the buyers are failing to reclaim their damages in
most antitrust authority cases. This means that Vr,l < Vr. For this case to hold the buyers
need to face costs that make them unwilling to reclaim damages or faced with difficulties to
prove that they have been directly harmed by the activities of the cartel. This means that the
equation 8.10 should account for these factors as well. I believe that this will be driven by the
difficulty of the buyers to legally prove that they have been directly damaged by the cartel21.
19On the other hand, even if I allow for a retrial, or appeal, the results should not change much. Almost
certainly, the probability of a cartel to be punished will be a more complex expression of the sum on future
probabilities of winning the case. In any case this scenario is left for future research. Furthermore, Bourjade,
Ray and Seabright (2009) have investigated the implication on private enforcement of allowing pre-trail
bargaining. Consequently, it would also be interesting to extend the current model in the same direction with
Bourjade, Ray and Seabright (2009).
20See EU website: http : //eur− lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005 0672en01.pdf .
21This has also been the main argument presented in the Green paper.
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As a result I will assume that the buyers will win a legal action with probability hb < 1 if
a cartel is found, thus introducing another source of uncertainty. Therefore, I redefine the
buyers’ value function as:
V ′r,l = CSm + hδ
2hb(CSco − CSm)− hδ2(1− hb)k + hδCSc
(1− δ) +
(1− h)δCSm
(1− δ) − v (8.11)
Notice that now k appears in equation 8.11. This is due to the fact that the buyers are
faced with a positive probability to lose the court case even though a cartel has been found
by the antitrust authority. For the findings of the Green Paper to hold (buyers failure to take
a legal action), equation (8.9) needs to be greater than (8.11) which means that the expected
gain from taking a legal action is smaller than the expected costs, hb(CSco−CSm)−(1−hb)k <
0. The parameter hb will increase when the legal barriers are reduced. This is mainly because
it becomes less difficult to prove that the cartel has inflicted damages on the buyers. While if
procedural barriers decreases then k (the cost) decreases. This provides us with the following
condition, such that there is only reporting (derived by comparing equation 8.9 and 8.11):
hb <
k
CSco − CSm + k (8.12)
Let me now assume that the buyers are choosing only to take a legal action, without
reporting first to the antitrust authority. The buyers payoff function is then defined as:
Vl = CSm + hhbδ(CSco − CSm)− ((1− h) + h(1− hb))k + hδCSco
(1− δ) +
(1− h)δCSm
(1− δ) (8.13)
Notice that k now appears without a discount factor, this is because the legal action is
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taking place in period zero. Furthermore, the expected benefit from taking a legal action, the
term hhbδ(CSco − CSm), is discounted because of the assumption that damages are going to
be paid in the next period. Additionally, the legal expenses are multiplied by the probability
that the court acknowledges that a cartel exists but fails to link the buyers with any damages
and the probability that the court has ruled against the existence of the cartel. Moreover, the
discounted utility (the last two expressions of the right hand side of 8.13) are independent
on hb. This is mainly because the antitrust authority will take measures against the cartel
and impose Cournot if the court has decided that a cartel exists, irrespective of the decision
of the court on whether the buyers have suffered any damages. Hence, the next period’s CS
is conditional on the probability of a cartel being found, but the buyers damages payment
depends on whether they have successfully proven direct harm. Finally, for equation 8.9 to
be greater than equation 8.13 the following needs to hold:
h <
k − v
hb(δ(CSco − CSm) + k) (8.14)
Condition (8.14) states that if the probability of a cartel being punished is smaller (low
enough) than the right hand side then the buyers will prefer to report than take immediately
a legal action against the cartel, given that condition (8.12) holds. If condition (8.12) does
not hold then I need to compare (8.11) with (8.13). To be more specific, I need to compare
the value function of reporting and taking legal action with just taking legal action. For the
former to generate a higher value for the buyers, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
h <
k − v
k(δ(1− hb) + hb) (8.15)
This condition states that the probability of a cartel being punished needs to be suffi-
ciently low for the buyers to report and take legal action than simply taking legal action. In
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other words, the buyers are willing to pay the cost of reporting to dissolve the uncertainty
with respect to the existence of a cartel and then take a legal action. Therefore, if the buy-
ers take a legal action they will only need to prove direct damage from the cartel than the
existence of the cartel as well.
All in all, the above analysis states that private enforcement does not necessarily fail
in the presence of limited legal actions, as it is implicitly suggested by the EU antitrust
authority. On the contrary, the analysis suggests that the buyers are behaving according
to their incentives when faced with different challenges and as a consequence the private
enforcement is present in the EU context. It is just uses another mean to an end.
Cartel’s Incentives
The next step is to examine the incentives of the cartel. The cartel can choose either to ignore
the buyers’ incentives and take the risk of being reported (benchmark maximization problem)
or make the buyers just indifferent from taking any action (satisfying the buyers ICC). The
option of not satisfying the buyers’ ICC is a consequence of relaxing the assumption that the
cartel will be punished with probability 1 (the h parameter). Therefore, there are two different
approaches with respect to profit maximization. The first one is the benchmark case where the
cartel maximizes its expected profits while the second one is to satisfy the buyers ICC. Assume
that condition (8.14) and (8.15) holds; the cartel knows that the buyers prefer reporting to
any other action. As a result, the quantity satisfying the ICC of the buyers will be found
by setting equation (8.9) equal to CSm
(1−δ)
, see proposition 7.1.3 (this generates the following
equation CSm = CSco− (1−δ)vhδ which will define the quantity that satisfies the ICC). However,
another condition needs to be found such that the cartel will prefer to satisfy the ICC than
take the risk to be reported (benchmark collusive quantity). The condition will be found by
setting the collusive profits when satisfying the ICC, Πm,L, greater or equal than the expected
profits when the ICC is not satisfied,
Πm,L
(1−δ)
≥ Πm,b−hδPen(Qm,b)+ hδΠco(1−δ) +
(1−h)δΠm,b
(1−δ)
. Where
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Πm,b is the collusive profit when the cartel maximizes the expected profit. By comparing the
profit functions and substituting for Pen(Qm,b) = Πm,b−Πco, I reach the following condition:
h ≥ Πm,b − Πm,L
δ(2− δ)(Πm,b − Πco) (8.16)
For the right hand side to be smaller than one it has to be that Πm,L > (1− δ)2Πm,b +
δ(2 − δ)Πco. To be more precise, the collusive profits under the ICC condition need to be
sufficiently high or equivalently the reporting cost, which defines Πm,L, needs to be sufficiently
high.
Assume condition (8.15) hold and (8.14) does not hold; the buyers prefer to report and
take a legal action afterwards. The cartel needs to satisfy an ICC which is found by setting
equation 8.12 equal to CSm
(1−δ)
. Consequently, the ICC is defined as:
CSm = CSco − (1− δ)v
hδ[1 + δhb(1− δ)] −
δ(1− δ)(1− hb)k
1 + δhb(1− δ) (8.17)
The cartel will satisfy the above condition if the profits that arise, which will be defined
as Πm,rl are greater than the expected profit of the benchmark maximization problem. Hence,
a new condition arises from the comparison of the two profit functions:
Πm,rl
(1−δ)
≥ Πb,rl −
hδPen(Qb,rl)−hhbδ2(CSco−CSb,rl+k)+ hδΠco(1−δ) +
(1−h)δΠb,rl
(1−δ)
. Where Πb,rl is the collusive profit
under the benchmark maximization problem. A further simplifying assumption is needed; I
am going to assume that tb,rl(Πb,rl − Πco) = CSco − CSb,rl22. In other words, the difference
of the CS can be expressed as the difference of the collusive and Cournot profits times a
multiplier, tm,bl, which is greater than one. Therefore, the condition is defined as:
h ≥ Πb,rl − Πm,rl
δ[(Πb,rl − Πco)(2− δ + hbtb,rlδ(1− δ)) + khbδ(1− δ)] (8.18)
22This assumption, even though not necessary, will help me to find a well-defined condition.
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Notice that the right hand side of the above condition is going to be smaller than one for
a sufficiently high discount factor. This is a similar condition with (8.16) the only difference
is that I have a different ICC that needs to be satisfied and as a consequence a different
expression for the collusive profits.
For the buyers to prefer to take the initiative of suing the cartel from the first period, it
has to be that neither (8.15) nor (8.14) holds. In this case, the ICC that needs to be satisfied
is23:
CSm = CSco − (1− hhb)(1− δ)k
hδ(1 + hb(1− δ)) (8.19)
For a cartel to satisfy the buyers’ ICC (equation 8.19) it needs to generate greater
profits than the expected profits of taking the risk of being sued. This generates the following
condition:
Πm,l
(1−δ)
≥ Πb,l−hδ2Pen(qb,l)−hhbδ(CSco−CSb,l+k)+ hδΠco(1−δ) +
(1−h)δΠb,l
(1−δ)
24. Where Πb,l
is the benchmark collusive profit when the buyers decide to take a legal action from period
zero. The condition for the last inequality to hold is:
h ≥ Πb,l − Πm,l
δ[(Πb,l − Πco)(1 + δ(1− δ)(1 + hbtb,l)) + hbk] (8.20)
The above condition states that for the cartel to choose to satisfy the buyers ICC the
risk of being punished (h) needs to be sufficiently high. For illustration, I present in figure
(8.4) the equilibrium behavior of the cartel for different parameter values of h for a given ICC
of the buyer (assuming for example that the buyers will always take a legal action first).
In the horizontal axis (of figure 8.4) I have plotted the probability of a cartel to be
23The condition is found by rearranging terms in CSm(1−δ) = CSm − δ[(1 − h) + h(1 − hb)]k + δhhb(CSco −
CSm) +
δhCSco
(1−δ) +
δ(1−h)CSm
(1−δ) .
24Notice that the structure of the penalty is assumed to be the same as with the previous cases (Pen(qb,l) =
Πb,l −Πco). I implicitly assume that if a cartel is found the anti-trust authority will be able to calculate the
true level of damages (no error on calculating the penalty).
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Figure 8.4: Cartel Incentives
punished (h) and on the vertical the profits. The lower profit sustained is the Cournot (Πc)
and the maximum is the benchmark collusive (Πm). The cartel has two strategies. The
first one is to satisfy the buyers ICC which generates ΠICC . The profit of this strategy
is independent of the punishment probability (h), since by definition the cartel will not be
reported. The second strategy is to choose the benchmark collusive quantity and take the risk
of being punished (ΠRisk), notice that there is a probability of 1− h that a cartel will not be
punished. This strategy will generate expected profits which are declining to the h parameter.
The equilibrium strategy will be the one that generates the higher stream of profits. To be
more specific, for high values of h the strategy which satisfies the buyers ICC generates the
highest profits, thus the optimal one. This is what condition 8.20 states.
Using this approach (comparing the different strategies of the cartel to characterize the
optimal behavior) I have characterized the equilibrium behavior for all the parameter values
of h and hb. In other words, the parameter values of h and hb will generate a specific behavior
of the buyers (i.e. report or report and take legal action or even take a legal action) and given
that behavior I found conditions for the optimal behavior of the cartel (satisfy buyers ICC
or take the risk of being reported). The full equilibrium characterization, of each subcase,
is presented in table 8.1. However, notice that the factor tb,rl presented in that table (which
simplifies the buyers damages paid by the cartel) is going to be different than the one used in
the previous case (tb,l) since Qb,l 6= Qb,rl and Πb,l > Πb,rl. This is because the cartel is going
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to be punished by the antitrust authority and pay a penalty, with probability h, in period 2
for Πb,rl while for Πb,l the penalty is paid in period one.
Buyers
Reporting Reporting & Legal Action Legal Action
Condition hb <
k
CSc−CSm+k
hb >
k
CSc−CSm+k
h > k−v
k(δ(1−hb)+hb)
h < k−v
k(δ(1−hb)+hb)
h > k−v
hb(δ(CSc−CSm)+k)
h > k−v
hb(δ(CSc−CSm)+k)
ICC CSm = CSc −
(1−δ)v
hδ
CSm = CSc − (1−δ)vhδ(1+δhb(1−δ)) −
δ(1−δ)(1−hb)k
1+δhb(1−δ)
CSm = CSc − (1−hhb)(1−δ)khδ(1+hb(1−δ))
Cartel
Condition
to satisfy
ICC
h ≥
Πb−Πm,l
δ(2−δ)(Πb−Πc)
h ≥ Πb,rl−Πm,rl
δ[(Πb,rl−Πc)(2−δ+hbtb,rlδ(1−δ))+khbδ(1−δ)]
h ≥
Πb,l−Πm,l
δ[(Πb,l−Πc)(1+δ(1−δ)(1+hbtb,l))+hbk]
Inefficiencies v k + v k
Deterrence,
when ICC is
satisfied
Πb −Πm,r Πb −Πm,rl Πb −Πm,l
Table 8.1: Reporting vs. Treble Damages
In table (8.1) the inefficiencies and the deterrent effect for each state are also reported.
The inefficiency is normally defined as the difference from the social optimum. In this chapter
I define the inefficiency as the difference of the social optimum from the sum of the collusive
profit, the penalty paid to the antitrust authority, the damages paid to the buyers and the
enforcement costs. In the latter case, the inefficiency under treble damages is always going
to be greater than the case with reporting. The main reason for this result is that with both
public and private enforcement, the damages paid to the buyers is always going to be greater
than the cost of reporting (the penalty is going to be the same whether the buyers report
or take a legal action). While the deterrent effect is measured as the actual reduction of the
collusive profits relative to the benchmark case. For instance, when buyers report a cartel the
deterrent effect will be equal to Πb − Πm,L. Hence, the case with the highest deterrent effect
will be the one with the lowest value on the ICC. This is not helpful since the conditions
given for each case to hold are derived from comparing the best alternatives of the buyers. In
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other words, the deterrent effect cannot be compared between the different cases. However,
if the probability of a cartel being punished is such that the cartel chooses not to satisfy the
ICC then the deterrent effect is equal to the penalty of the antitrust authority.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is characterized in the “Condition to Satisfy ICC” row for
each subcase. In other words, given the values for k, v, and hb there is an h value for the
buyers either to report or take legal action or even report first and then take legal actions. At
the same time, there is a value of h for each subcase that the cartel will decide to satisfy the
buyers ICC, otherwise it sets the benchmark collusive quantity and takes the risk of being
reported.
An interesting result that emerges is that the most inefficient case is when the buyers
choose both to report and take a legal action. The intuition for this case is that the society
needs to pay both the cost of reporting and the cost of legal actions to punish the cartel.
Furthermore, the following proposition states that the most efficient policy is the one under
reporting.
Proposition 8.4.1 The most efficient policy is reporting, given the assumptions of this sec-
tion.
For the proof see appendix. The intuition is simple, in the treble damages case the cartel
will need to pay for damages both to the antitrust authority and the buyers which means
that it is not, any more, a mere monetary transfer (of excess profits transferred to the buyers
or the antitrust authority). Moreover, in the proof it is shown that the relative inefficiency
is independent of the penalty. If this is not the case then the penalty structure will influence
the expected collusive profits and as a result will generate a deterrent effect (the efficiency in
this case depends on the penalty structure).
To sum up, the best policy with respect to efficiency is to promote reporting, whether
the condition for a cartel to satisfy the ICC holds or not. As for the deterrent effect it seems
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that it depends mainly on the best alternative of the buyers. However, the antitrust authority
can always construct a penalty structure that incorporates the reduction of the profits by a
private deterrent policy. Thus, with respect to both efficiency and deterrent reporting is
the best choice. Finally, it seems that the EU officials have wrongfully predicted that the
private enforcement has failed in EU. On the contrary, the private enforcement had its share
of success; it has found another means to an end.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the threat of exclusion is a robust strategy for a cartel to
enforce no reporting. However, the credibility of this threat depends positively on the number
of buyers and the number of suppliers and negatively the number of buyers that need to be
excluded. When I introduce heterogeneous costs of reporting I show that in some cases it
gives rise to compensation being paid to the buyers with the lowest cost of reporting. At the
last section I have compared reporting with buyers taking legal action (treble damages) and
have shown that reporting is a more efficient policy.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Mathematical
Appendix
9.1 Conclusion
The purpose of this topic was to examine the impact of reporting on the likelihood of collusion
and on social welfare. It is shown that the strategic interaction between buyers and suppliers
generates some intuitive results. The cartel will choose its quantity by satisfying the ICC of
the buyers. Furthermore, for costly reporting the threat of reporting reduces the collusive
profits and increases the likelihood of collusion. At the equilibrium of the simple model there
is no reporting from the buyers of the cartel. In other words, it is the mere threat of reporting
that influences the results. Reporting will be observed if the assumption of the cartel being
punished with certainty, after a buyer’s report, is relaxed1. The above results suggest some
empirical implications. First of all, in markets where buyers are better informed we should
1This has been shown in the social welfare section. In that section it was shown that there is a range of
values (low enough conviction probability) that the cartel will choose to take the risk of being reported rather
than satisfy the buyers ICC.
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anticipate collusion more frequently2. In addition, the cartels should be more likely to remain
hidden and should be more stable (less frequent price wars), when faced with informed buyers.
The results of this topic have some interesting implications on the policies of the antitrust
authority. To be more precise, if the antitrust authority reduces the cost of reporting then the
society becomes better off, in terms of welfare. To eliminate the cost of reporting, the buyers
should be overcompensated for cartel damages. Alternatively, the antitrust authority might
set a good practice code to increase the transparency in an industry and as a consequence to
minimize the likelihood of collusion.
An alternative mechanism, to control reporting, is proposed in chapter 8. The threat
of exclusion, foreclosure, is a robust strategy to deter reporting. However, it was shown that
as the size of the buyers increases or the size of suppliers decreases it becomes more difficult
to sustain such a strategy. Additionally, I find that as the number of buyers increases the
threat becomes more robust. The driving force of this result is the trade-off between foregoing
profits in one period and enjoying higher profits in the future. The size of the buyers matters
because it corresponds to a higher profit per buyer for a given supplier. The number of
suppliers represents the intensity of competition (since I assume competition a` la Cournot)
and as a result more intense competition reduces the per buyer profit and decreases the cost
of the threat. Finally, the number of buyers matters since it decreases the per buyer profit.
The credibility of the threat of exclusion suggests that anonymity (for the reporting buyer)
and monitoring (cartel members’ behavior after prosecution) is essential to protect the buyers
from cartel’s retaliation tactics.
I also investigate the importance of buyers’ information on the cartel’s behavior. It
has been shown that uninformed buyers benefit from the existence of informed buyers3 since
2In this case I am interpreting the cost of reporting as the cost of acquiring information. Therefore, if
the buyers are relatively more informed in some industries then they are less likely to occur high costs of
reporting.
3Let me remind the reader that I found two cases; a case where the neutrality effect is present (compensating
the informed buyers will have no impact on the collusive quantity) and a case where it is not present due
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the cartel under some conditions will choose to set a lower than the benchmark (monopoly)
price. This result is driven by the assumption that the cartel cannot use 3rd degree price
discrimination. If the cartel is able to discriminate then it will find it optimal to set a price
for the informed buyers that satisfies their ICC (low) and sell at the benchmark collusive price
to the uninformed (high). Most interestingly price discrimination may arise solely due to the
information available to the buyers.
Finally, a comparison with the treble damages suggests that reporting is an equivalent
policy with respect to the cartel’s deterrent effect but more efficient. This result contradicts
the conclusions of EU’s White Paper of private enforcement failure in the European area.
More particularly, the lack of private legal actions does not account for a failure on private
enforcement, since the buyers have the choice of reporting. Furthermore, even if reporting
or legal actions are not present, this does not mean that private deterrents fails. The reason
is that the cartels remain hidden by satisfying the buyers’ ICC and as a result the collusive
profits are going to be less than the ones with no private enforcement (or the threat of it). For
the cartels that are prosecuted it seems that the buyers prefer to report than take any legal
action, suggesting that this is their best alternative. However, the findings of this topic agree
with some of the conclusions of the EU paper. Private legal actions will increase if the cost
of prosecution and the requirements to prove a direct damage from the cartel are reduced.
A natural extension of this topic will be the introduction of dynamics, combined with
uncertainty on both the marginal cost of the suppliers and their likelihood of collusion. This
is possible if buyers monitoring the suppliers prices is introduced and learning on the marginal
cost of their suppliers and the likelihood of collusion is allowed. Further dynamics can be
introduced by allowing a stochastic element on the marginal cost.
to credit constraints. In the case of the neutrality problem the uninformed buyers benefit if the number of
buyers is high enough. While in the case where buyers are credit constrained the uninformed buyers always
benefit.
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Figure 9.1: Signalling
9.2 Mathematical Appendix
9.2.1 Signalling Game
The signalling game between buyers and antitrust authority takes place after the suppliers
have decided whether to collude or not, presented as t1 and t2 respectively
4. If collusion is
observed the buyers choose whether to report (signal, IB1 = 1
5) its existence or not (IB0 = 0)
and the antitrust authority choose whether to investigate (respond, IATA1 = 1) or not (I
ATA
0 =
0).
As for the payoffs; if the buyers decide to report and antitrust authority to investigate
when there is collusion, then the antitrust authority will achieve a positive return, V ATA −
cATA > 0. As for the buyers, they receive CS under Cournot minus the cost of reporting. In
other words, if we have (IB1 , I
ATA
1 /t1) then the payoffs of the two players are (V
B
c −v, V ATA−
cATA), where subscript “c” is for Cournot, v is for the cost of reporting and cATA the cost
of investigation for the anti-trust authority. When suppliers collude and buyers report but
the antitrust authority decides not to investigate then the value function of the antitrust
authority will be equal to the expected Social Welfare (SW)6 (E(V ATA)). The value function
4Notice that the behaviour of suppliers will be taken as given in the signalling game
5The notation has been simplified in order to be easily distinguished in the graph since the antitrust
authority has a similar binary action
6The antitrust authority beliefs are updated
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of the buyers is V Bm − v, where the subscript “m” is for collusion, and it is equal to the
CS under collusion minus the cost of reporting. To sum up, if (IB1 , I
ATA
0 /t1) the payoffs are
(V Bm − v, E(V ATA)). If the buyers do not report but the antitrust authority investigates;
then the value function of the antitrust authority will be equal to SW under Cournot minus
the cost of reporting, V ATAc since if it investigates will reveal the cartel and impose Cournot
quantities. The buyers receive CS under Cournot plus compensation. So at (IB0 , I
ATA
1 /t1) I
have (V Bc + comp, V
ATA
c − cATA). If the suppliers collude, the buyers do not report and the
antitrust authority does not investigate (IB0 , I
ATA
0 /t1) then the antitrust authority receives an
expected SW without paying a cost of investigation. The buyers’ value function will be equal
to the CS under collusion plus compensation (V Bm + comp,EV
ATA).
As for the case where suppliers are competing a` la Cournot; when the buyers report
and the antitrust authority investigates (IB1 , I
ATA
1 /t2), the antitrust authority’s payoff will be
equal to SW under Cournot minus the cost of investigation (V ATAc − cATA). The buyers, on
the other hand, receive CS under Cournot and bear a cost to report (V Bc − v, V ATAc − cATA).
When suppliers compete a` la Cournot, the buyers report and the antitrust authority chooses
not to investigate (IB1 , I
ATA
0 /t2), the antitrust authority will receive an expected SW with
its beliefs being updated and without bearing the cost of investigation. The buyers in this
case will receive CS under Cournot but at the same time incurring the cost of reporting
(V Bc − v, E(V ATA)). While if the buyers do not report and the antitrust authority chooses
to investigate (IB0 , I
ATA
1 , /t2), the authority’s value function will be equal to the SW under
Cournot (given the assumption on the priors) but at the same time it will incur the cost of
investigation. As for the buyers payoff, it will be equal to the CS under Cournot (V Bc , V
ATA
c −
cATA). Finally, if the buyers do not report and the antitrust authority choose not to investigate
(IB0 , I
ATA
0 , /t2) then the antitrust authority payoff will be equal to the expected SW without
the beliefs being updated and the buyers’ payoff will be equal to the CS under Cournot
(V Bc , V
ATA
c − cATA).
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9.2.2 Proofs for Lemma 2.1.2 and 2.1.4
Notice that some immediate results follow as a consequence of the assumptions and the
specification of the payoff functions of the players.
Result 9.2.1 A pooling equilibrium with buyers always choosing to report cannot exist.
Proof: If there is no cartel and given that the cost of reporting is positive, v > 0, the
buyers will not report, irrespective to the antitrust authority’s best response. This refers to
the t2 path. This can be seen when comparing the buyers’ payoff function, see figure 9.1,
when there is competition a` la Cournot (V Bc − v < V Bc ).
QED
In other words the existence of a reporting cost enforces the buyers not to report if there
is competition a` la Cournot.
Result 9.2.2 There cannot be an equilibrium with the antitrust authority always investigating
a market.
Result 9.2.3 There cannot be a separating equilibrium with the buyers choosing to report if
there is no collusion and not to report if collusion exists.
The result 9.2.2 follows from result 9.2.1 and the assumption that the prior beliefs of
a cartel to exist are equal to zero. As for the third result (9.2.3), it is an extension of the
first two. Moreover, the strategies remained to be examined have been reduced even further
by the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Notice that under a pooling equilibrium,
there is no updating and as a consequence of that the beliefs of the antitrust authority are
equal to zero.
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Let me now restate lemma 7.1.1 and provide the proof needed.
Lemma 7.1.1:Pooling Equilibrium:
If v ≥ CSc − CSm − Comp, the buyers never report and the antitrust authority choose not
to investigate, (IB0 , (I
A
0 , (I
A
1 , Q
A))) with Pr1 = 0, no updating. While the antitrust authority
investigates whenever there is reporting.
Proof of the 7.1.1 Lemma:
If there is Cournot competition between the suppliers then it is obvious that the buyers will
not report, see result 9.2.1. As for the antitrust authority, since there is no reporting there
is no updating on their beliefs which means that the best choice is not to investigate, the
only choice that provides a non-negative return. Notice that by the prior beliefs of a cartel’s
probability of existence is zero and as a result the antitrust authority without reporting
always believes that the industry is competitive. As a result, V ATAc −cATA under no reporting
and investigation is always smaller than V ATAc . On the other hand, under collusion the
buyers will not report if the cost of reporting is higher than the gain of switching to Cournot
(v ≥ CSc − CSm − Comp)7. The antitrust authority’s beliefs have not been updated which
means that their best choice is not to investigate, as shown previously. As for the out of
equilibrium beliefs, if a report is registered the antitrust authority believes that a cartel exists
and the best choice is to investigate, by the 9.2.1 result. The other out of equilibrium paths
are rejected by the intuitive criterion.
QED
I will now restate lemma 7.1.2 and provide its proof.
Lemma 7.1.2:Separating Equilibrium:
If v < CSc − CSm − Comp, the buyers report under collusion and the antitrust authority
investigate, ((IB1 , I
B
0 ), ((I
A
1 , Q
A), IA0 )) with Pr1 equal to 1 if there is reporting Pr1 and equal
7The condition is found by setting V B(IB1 /I
ATA
1 , t1, .) ≤ V B(IB0 /IATA0 , t1, .)
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to zero if not.
Proof of Lemma 7.1.2:
Under Cournot and for a positive cost of reporting the buyers will not report, by the 9.2.1
result. If there is collusion, the buyers will report if the cost of reporting is smaller than the
gains of a change of competition (v < CSc − CSm − Comp), given the antitrust authority’s
optimal choice8. As for the antitrust authority, their beliefs are updated if there is reporting
with P1 = 1, because of truth-telling strategies
9, and since its value function is greater under
Cournot (even after deducting for the costs of investigation and this holds by assumption) the
antitrust authority will choose to investigate (V ATAc − cATA > V ATAm ). If there is no reporting
then P1 = 0 and as a consequence it is better not to investigate, see the proof of lemma 7.1.1.
QED
9.2.3 Proposition 7.1.3
Proposition 7.1.3: If the condition of the 2nd constraint holds and v > 0, then the optimum
collusive quantity and price will be found by setting compensation equal to zero.
Proof: Let me assume that the 2nd constraint binds (the cost of reporting is sufficiently
low). If the cartel choose a quantity that violates the ICC of buyers, compensation is smaller
than the right hand side of the second constraint, then by lemma 7.1.2 the buyers will report
and the antitrust authority will impose the Cournot equilibrium (the cost of reporting is
smaller than the benefits of reporting). Therefore, compensation is necessary for a cartel to
form. Let me assume that the cartel sets a quantity that is smaller by ε than the one that
makes the buyers indifferent from reporting10, denoted as Q
′
. Thus, the buyers need to be
8In other words, if they do not report the buyers receive CSm + Comp while if they report CSc − v but
CSc − v > CSm + Comp.
9No reporting under Cournot.
10The quantity that makes buyers just indifferent without being paid any compensation will be found by
setting the 2nd constraint equal to zero (comp=0), thus Q
′
: CSm = CSc − v
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compensated by the decrease of their CS, Comp = ∆CS =
∫ Q′
0
P (x)dx − ∫ Q′−ε
0
P (x)dx =∫ Q′
Q
′−ε
P (x)dx. While, the additional revenues generated are ∆TR = P (Q
′−ε)(Q′ε)−P (Q′)Q′
which are smaller than the cost of compensation ∆TR < ∆CS , for any downward sloping
inverse demand function. In other words, the collusion generates Dead Weight Loss (DWL)
and as a consequence the change on revenues from further decreasing the quantity is going to
be smaller than the change on costs (TR < TC), which means that it is not optimal to deviate
downwards from the buyers indifference point. It is trivial to show that the collusive profits
are not maximized when the cartel chooses a quantity that is higher than the one that makes
the buyers just indifferent (CSc−CSm−v > 0) if the cost of reporting is sufficiently small (if
the condition for the constraint is binding)11. So it is not optimal to deviate upwards either,
and as a consequence to that the equilibrium will be found by setting the 2nd constraint equal
to zero.
If the cost of reporting is zero then the cartel will not be formed, since it cannot com-
pensate and retrieve positive returns at the same time. If the cost of reporting is higher
than CSc − CSm,be (the ICC is not binding any more), then the optimum will be found by
maximizing the profit function of the cartel given the 1st and the 3rd constraint.
QED
11If the quantity generated by satisfying the second constraint is larger than the benchmark collusive. So
by setting Qbenm < Q(ICC), where ICC is the quantity derived from the second constraint will generate the
condition which requires the cost of reporting to be sufficiently small. To be more specific, from the second
constraint by setting compensation equal to zero, CSm = CSc − v and since the CS depends positively on
the quantity: q(ICC) = f(,−v). Then by setting the latter equation smaller than the benchmark collusive:
Qbenm < f(,−v) which means that v < G(., Qbenm ). Where f(,−v) is a function of the collusive quantity related
to the parameters of the model (i.e. maximum willingness to pay) and the cost of reporting. Notice that
the minus sign on the cost of reporting is presented in order to show that the collusive quantity depends
negatively on the cost of reporting. The G(., qbenm is a function that relates the parameters of the collusive
quantity to the benchmark one.
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9.2.4 Proposition 7.1.5
Proposition 7.1.5: The cost of reporting influences non-negatively the collusive profits and
non-positively the collusive quantity.
Proof: Assume that the cost of reporting is sufficiently low. Increasing the cost of
reporting increases the value of the second constraint and as a consequence the collusive profits
will increase (by proposition 7.1.3, a decrease on the cost of reporting increases the CSm of
the second constraint of the cartel’s profit maximization problem). For the collusive profits to
increase, the quantity needs to decrease. In other words, ϑΠm
ϑv
= ϑQm
ϑv
( ϑPm
ϑQm
Qm + Pm − c), the
term in the parenthesis is the difference between Marginal Revenue, MR, and Marginal Cost,
MC. For the benchmark caseMR needs to be equal toMC which means that for any quantity
greater than the benchmark MR < MC. Therefore, ϑPm
ϑQm
Qm +Pm− c < 0. Furthermore, the
ICC is defined as CSm = CSc − v which means that an increase in v decreases CSm and as
a result decreases quantity (since the CS depends positively on the quantity). To be more
specific: ϑCSm
ϑv
= ϑCSm
ϑQm
ϑQm
ϑv
< 0 and the fact that ϑCS−m
ϑQm
> 0 this means that ϑQm
ϑv
< 0 and
as a consequence ϑΠm
ϑv
> 0. When the benchmark optimum is reached, an increase in the
reporting costs neither increases nor decreases collusive profits. As a result of that neither
quantity is influenced.
QED
9.2.5 Proposition 7.1.6
Proposition 7.1.6: The cost of reporting influences negatively the likelihood of collusion,
given assumptions 1 and 2.
Assumptions:
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Figure 9.2: Likelihood of Collusion and MDF
1. Linear Demand
2. Independence between the MDF and other factors that influence collusion
In this section I present two alternative proofs, with the second one being a smaller
version.
Proof I:
The minimum discount factor required for an internally stable cartel is defined as:
δ =
Πd −Πm
Πd −Πc (9.1)
Where Πd stands for profit under deviation. Moreover, notice that the probability of a
generated discount factor be greater than the MDF is negatively influenced by the actual
level of MDF. In other words, if the MDF increases then there is a smaller range for the
realized discount factor to be generated. The figure 9.2 provides a graphical illustration of
the argument.
In other words, an increase of the MDF decreases fδ = Pr(δ > δMDF ). The likelihood
is defined by the 2nd assumption. It specifies that an increase on δMDF decreases both fδ
and the probability of collusion. Thus, it is sufficient to examine what happens to the MDF
to infer how the likelihood of collusion changes by the cost of reporting. Let me take the
derivative of the MDF (the right hand side of 9.1) with respect to the cost of reporting and
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after rearranging terms I get:
ϑδ
ϑv
=
ϑΠd
ϑv
(Πm −Πc)− ϑΠmϑv (Πd − Πc)
(Πd −Πc)2 (9.2)
It is known that Πd > Πm for any Πm > Πc. By proposition 7.1.3: Pd < Pm, since
deviation should happen only to higher quantities and because the collusive quantities is
smaller than the benchmark (this holds for any Cournot competition model). By proposition
7.1.5 ϑqd
ϑv
, ϑQm
ϑv
< 0. The derivative of the deviation quantity with respect to the cost of
reporting is negative since the deviation quantity depends positively on the collusive quantity
which in turn depends negatively on the cost of reporting (ϑqd
ϑv
= ϑqd
ϑQm
ϑQm
ϑv
). Furthermore,
notice that at v → vmax ⇒ Πd → Πd,be and Πm → Πm,be. Moreover, by the monotonicity of
the profit function with respect to the cost of reporting: Πd < Πd,be and Πm < Πm,be. It is
also known that Πd,be > Πm,be. Notice also that as v → 0, Πd = Πm = Πc. However for ϑδϑv to
be positive, the following needs to hold (which is found by rearranging 9.2):
(1− δ)ϑΠd
ϑv
− ϑΠm
ϑv
> 0 (9.3)
The above condition was found by focusing on the numerator of 9.2 and setting it
greater than zero. Then multiply both sides of the inequality with Πd − Πc which gives
ϑΠd
ϑv
Πm−Πc
Πd−Πc
− ϑΠm
ϑv
and finally the term Πm−Πc
Πd−Πc
= 1−δ. Furthermore, notice that by proposition
7.1.5, an increase on the cost of reporting increases the collusive profits and as a consequence
the deviation profits’ has to increase as well. Condition 9.3 states that the deviation profits
need to change by more than the Cournot, with a change on the reporting cost, for at least
some part in the range [0, vmax]. By the assumption of linear demand the change in the
deviation profits is:
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ϑΠd
ϑv
=
ϑqd
v
(
ϑPd
ϑqd
∗ qd + Pd − c) + ϑPd
ϑQm,−i
ϑQm,−i
ϑv
∗ qd (9.4)
The derivative was taken from the following equation Πd = (a−c−qd−Qm,−i)qd. Where
Qm,−i is the collusive quantity of n − 1 companies, excluding the company that deviates.
Notice that the first term in the parenthesis is equal to zero, since the profit maximization
assumption states that the First Order Condition, FOC (MR = MC), needs to hold12. This
means that ϑΠd
ϑv
= −b∗ ϑQm,−i
ϑv
and by proposition: 7.1.5
ϑQm,−i
ϑv
< 0 which means that ϑΠd
ϑv
> 0.
The quantity under deviation can be derived from the first order condition of the deviating
company’s maximization problem: qd =
a−c−b∗Qm,−i
2b
. Moreover, the Cournot quantity is
defined as: qc,i =
a−c
(n+1)b
. As a consequence, qd can be expressed as qd =
(n+1)(qc,i−qm,i)+2qm,i
2
.
The collusive profits are defined as Πm,i = (Pm−c)∗qm,i. The change of a company’s collusive
profit is:
ϑΠm,i
ϑv
=
ϑqm,i
ϑv
( ϑPm
ϑqm,i
qm,i+Pm− c). Notice that for the collusive profits MR = MC at
Πbe but in this case Πm,i < Πbe,i which means that MR < MC.
Under linear demand
(ϑΠm,i)
ϑv
=
ϑqm,i
ϑv
(−bnqm,i + Pm − c), and in the same style with the
work on ϑΠd
ϑv
I get:
ϑΠm,i
ϑv
=
ϑqm,i
ϑv
((n+1)b(qc,i− qm,i)− b(n− 1)qm,i). Substituting the reduced
forms of
ϑΠm,i
ϑv
and ϑΠd
ϑv
into condition 9.3, provides me with the following equation:
[n+ 1− δ(n− 1)][(n+ 1)(qc,i − qm,i) + 2qm,i] > 2qm,i(n + 1)
Rearranging terms:
(n+ 1)(qc,i − qm,i) > δ(n− 1)
(n + 1)
[(n+ 1)(qc,i − qm,i) + 2qm,i] (9.5)
12Since deviation is achieved by increasing the quantity this means that the ICC is not binding any more
and as a result the maximization problem of the deviation company is the benchmark one
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Furthermore, notice that the discount factor can be re-written as:
δ =
(n + 1)2(qc,i − qm,i)2
[(n+ 1)(qc,i − qm,i) + 2(qc,i + qm,i)](n− 1)(qc,i − qm,i) (9.6)
The discount factor has been found by using the following equations: Πd = b(qd)
2,
Πc,i = b(qc,i)
2 and Πm,i = (b(n + 1)(qc,i − qm,i) + bqm,i)qm,i. Substituting the discount factor
9.6 into equation (9.5) I have found that the inequality holds and as a consequence ϑδ
ϑv
> 0.
QED
Proof II: The minimum discount factor is defined as:
(1− δ)Πd + δΠc,i = Πm,i
Taking the derivative of the above equation with respect to the collusive quantity this gener-
ates the following equation.
ϑΠd
ϑqm,i
(1− δ)− ϑδ
ϑqm,i
(Πd − Πc,i) = ϑΠm,i
ϑqm,i
Rearranging terms:
ϑδ
ϑqm,i
(Πd − Πc,i) = ϑΠd
ϑqm,i
(1− δ)− ϑΠm,i
ϑqm,i
(9.7)
Notice that by proposition 7.1.5
ϑΠm,i
ϑqm,i
> 0. The next step is to show that ϑΠd
ϑqm,i
< 0.
Notice that the deviation profit’s for linear demand are defined as Πd = (a− c− bqd − b(n−
1)qm,i)qd and the f.o.c.’s generate qd =
a−c−b(n−1)qm,i
2b
. Notice that ϑqd
ϑqm,i
< 0. Also let me define
the deviation profit’s as Πd = bq
2
d (substituting the f.o.c. into the profit function). Taking the
derivative of the deviation profit function with respect to qd generates ϑΠd = 2bqdϑqd > 0.
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Therefore, ϑΠd
ϑqm,i
< 0. As a result the rhs of equation 9.7 is negative. In addition Πd−Πc,i > 0
(otherwise no cartel can be sustained). Therefore:
ϑδ
ϑqm,i
< 0
Furthermore, by proposition 7.1.5
ϑqm,i
ϑv
< 0. Therefore:
ϑδ
ϑv
> 0 (9.8)
QED
9.2.6 Bertrand Competition
Assume that suppliers compete with respect to prices. Under this case the deviation profits
will be equal to the industry’s collusive profits, since the deviating company captures the whole
market, thus Πd = nΠm,i. The competitive profits are equal to zero, Bertrand competition
drives the prices to the MC. Combining this result I get the following benchmark discount
factor:
δ =
n− 1
n
(9.9)
Under reporting the cartel still needs to satisfy the ICC of the buyers, define its profit’s
as Πm′,i, and as a consequence the collusive quantity and profits are still constrained by the
cost of reporting. The deviation profits will be equal with n times Πm′,i, since a deviating
company will not set a higher price (since it will sell nothing). Thus even though the deviating
company is not interested in satisfying the ICC of the buyers (since the buyers will not report
the deviator because the cartel will break down in the next period, in any case), to maximize its
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own profits it will need to set a price just below the one set by the other colluding companies.
As a result, Πd = nΠm′,i which means that the MDF is identical to the benchmark case and
is independent on the cost of reporting, see equations below:
δ =
Πd−Πm′,i
Πd−Πc,i
δ =
nΠm′,i−Πm′,i
nΠm′,i
δ = n−1
n
9.2.7 Proposition 7.2.1
Proposition 7.2.1: Under the above assumptions, there is a negative relationship between
the cost of reporting and the SW.
Proof:
By the first three assumptions of the proposition, a country’s social welfare loss (SWL)
will be equal to the probability of an industry to be collusive (likelihood of collusion) times the
number of industries (denoted as m) and the DWL. Algebraically this is defined as SWL =
TDWL = m(1− δ)DWL, where TDWL is the total DWL. Taking the derivative of the SWL
with respect to cost of reporting: ϑTDWL
ϑv
= m[(1− δ)ϑDWL
ϑv
− ϑδ
ϑv
DWL]. Under linear demand
the DWL = b(Qc−Qm)
2
2
, while ϑDWL
ϑv
= −bnϑqm,i
ϑv
(Qc − Qm). As a consequence to that the
following equation is generated:
ϑTDWL
θv
= m[−(1 − δ)nbϑqm,i
ϑv
(Qc −Qm)− ϑδ
ϑv
b(Qc −Qm)2
2
] (9.10)
I then substitute for ϑδ
ϑv
and 1−δ (which is equal to Πm−Πc
Πd−Πc
). I then take common factors:
ϑTDWL
ϑv
=
−mbn(Qc −Qm)
2Πd −Πc [2(Πm−Πc)
ϑqm,i
ϑv
+
ϑΠd
ϑv
(Πm−Πc)(qc,i−qm,i)− ϑΠm
ϑv
(qc,i−qm,i)]
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Then I gather the first and the third term, substitute for ϑΠm
ϑv
, ϑΠd
ϑv
13 and for Πm−Πc14.
As a result and after some algebra I get:
ϑTDWL
ϑv
=
−mb2n(Qc −Qm)(qc,i − qm,i)
2(Πd −Πc)
ϑqm,i
ϑv
[2(nqm,i−qc,i)−(n+1)(qc,i−qm,i)+(n−1)qm,i
−(n− 1)qd b(qc,i − qm,i)(nqm,i − qc,i)
Πd − Πc ]
First of all notice that the common factor is positive, since the derivative of the collusive
quantity with respect to the cost of reporting is negative and this is multiplied by a minus.
From now on I will ignore the common factor and analyze the terms within the parenthesis.
The first three terms, within the parenthesis, can be rewritten as 2nbqm,i − (n + 1)bqc,i +
2(nqm,i − qc,i). Additionally, I use the fact that nbqm,i −Pm + c ≥ 015 which can be rewritten
as 2nqm,i−(n+1)qc,i. This means that the first two terms of 2nbqm,i−(n+1)bqc,i+2(nqm,i−qc,i)
are positive. Hence I am left with:
2(nqm,i − qc,i)− (n− 1)qd b(qc,i − qm,i)(nqm,i − qc,i)
Πd −Πc
Dividing the above terms with (nqm,i − qc,i) and multiplying with Πd − Πc I get the
following sufficient condition for the ϑTDWL
ϑv
to be non -negative:
2(Πd − Πc)− b(n− 1)qd(qc,i − qm,i) ≥ 0 (9.11)
Thus ϑTDWL
ϑv
> 0. Substituting for the deviation and Cournot profits, see proof of
proposition 7.1.6, I am left with 2qdqc,i−2(qc,i)2 and it is trivial to show that qd > qc,i. Mainly
13The last two equations can be found in the proof of the proposition 7.1.6.
14This is equal to Πm −Πc = b[(qc,i − qm,i)(nqm,i − qc,i)]
15This is a condition for the collusive profits to be no-negative.
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because qd,be, which is the minimum value for qd
16, is going to be greater than qc,i. It is also
known that Πd → Πc,i as v → 0 and as a consequence qd → qc,i. By the monotonicity of the
demand function the deviation profit’s will be monotonically decreasing which means that
the deviation quantity will be monotonically decreasing as well. This means that qd > qc,i for
all v ǫ [0, vmax].
QED
9.2.8 Proposition 8.4.1
Proposition 8.4.1: The most efficient policy is reporting, given the assumptions of this
section.
Proof:
Let the inefficiency be the amount that needs to be paid by the cartel in excess of the
value generated in the market. For reporting the inefficiency is defined as:
INr = h(v + Pen−∆Π) (9.12)
Where INr is the inefficiency under the case where buyers report and ∆Π the difference
between collusive and Cournot profits. In other words, the inefficiency is created when the
cartel members decide to choose a quantity that does not satisfy the ICC (the same case holds
for the the treble damages case). As for the treble damages case:
INl = h(k + Pen+ hb∆CS −∆Π) (9.13)
16The residual demand shrinks as the collusive quantity increases. Thus the deviation quantity will also
decrease as the collusive quantity increases.
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INl is the inefficiency created in the treble damages case. Notice that the term hb∆CS
appears, this is the damages paid to the buyers if they win the court case. The next step
is to compare the max inefficiency under the reporting case with the minimum one under
treble damages. This is achieved by imposing hmax for INr and h
min for Il
17. Notice that
hmaxr = h
min
l
18. Hence, in this case the buyers are actually indifferent between reporting and
taking a legal action which means that v = (1 − hb)k + hb∆CS. Setting INr < INl and
substituting the above results I find that the most inefficient case is the treble damages case
if hbk > 0 which holds by assumption.
QED
17See the table in the previous section
18This can be seen in Table 8.1 of the appendix. The minimum bound of the hr is the maximum bound of
hl
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Conclusion
My thesis was divided into two distinct parts. Both of them investigate the importance
of demand side effects to the market structure and competition. In the first part, I have
investigated the factors that determine the independent coffee shops exit decision in Central
London. I have found that within group competition is more important than between groups’
competition. This suggests the existence of product differentiation which can rationalize,
according to my theoretical model, the C-Ss failure to dominate the markets (no “clone
city” effects) through entry or strategic behavior19. The novelty of the first topic is the
identification strategy that quantifies the demand market effects (such as an estimate for
product differentiation, for income and business density effects) and the increased propensity
to consume during the morning hours and at the weekend. Another important aspect of
the first topic is the analysis of city planning implications (in metropolitan areas) on market
structure. I have found that imposing a cap on the number of new coffee shops in the market
will decrease the number of the independents. The intuition is that entry guarantees a natural
process of replacement or displacement of unprofitable independents which is restricted by the
intervention examined. In the second scenario explored, I have found that placing a targeted
cap (restricting the entry of C-Ss when their market share is larger than 40%) is sufficient to
guarantee a larger presence of independents in the markets.
19An example of C-Ss strategic behavior is presented in the appendix of the first topic. Admittedly I do
not investigate whether the strategic behavior is present in the market of coffee shops in Central London but
rather I assume that since it is equilibrium behavior it should be present on the data as well.
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In the second topic, I have presented a theory of cartel detection. To be more specific,
the buyers are informed whether their suppliers are colluding and as a result the cartel needs
to satisfy their ICC in order to avoid being detected by the anti-trust authority and getting
punished. The fact that the cartel needs to satisfy the buyers’ ICC constrains its ability to set
a monopoly price. The compliance to lower collusive profits decreases the deviation profits
sufficiently to increase the cartel stability (increase the likelihood of collusion). However, it
was shown that if the anti-trust authority reduces the cost of reporting then the social welfare
will increase (the industries become more likely to collude but this is overcompensated by
the Consumer Surplus increase, through a decrease on the collusive price). Furthermore, a
comparison with an alternative antitrust policy (treble damages) indicates that reporting is
a more efficient policy. An alternative mechanism to control for reporting, foreclosure, is
presented. It is shown that the threat of exclusion is a credible threat. The implementation
of this mechanism turns out to be easier as the number of buyers and suppliers increases but
more difficult as the number of excluded buyers increases. Finally, it was shown that price
discrimination can arise from differences on the cost of reporting.
For future research, a dynamic version of the first topic and the introduction of buyers
uncertainty on the likelihood of collusion and/or the marginal cost of the buyers might reveal
cartel pricing strategies that can be used for, an anti-trust authority, screening the industries.
Finally, introducing stochastic elements on the suppliers cost in a context of uncertainty might
also be interesting.
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